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Summary 
To increase fitness for survival, organisms not only passively react to environmental changes 
but also actively predict future events to prepare for potential hazards within their environment. 
Accumulating evidence indicates that the human brain is a remarkable predictive machine which 
constantly models causal relationships and predicts future events. This ‘predictive processing’ 
framework, a prediction-based form of Bayesian inference, states that the brain continuously 
generates and updates predictions about incoming sensory signals. This framework has been 
showing notable explanatory power in understanding the mechanisms behind both human 
behaviour and neurophysiological data and elegantly specifies the underlying computational 
principles of the neural system. However, even though predictive processing has the potential to 
provide a unified theory of the brain (Karl Friston, 2010), we still have a limited understanding 
about fundamental aspects of this model, such as how it deals with different types of information, 
learns statistical regularities and perhaps most fundamentally of all what its relationship to 
conscious experience is. This thesis aims to investigate the major gaps in our current understanding 
of the predictive processing framework via a series of studies. Study 1 investigated the fundamental 
relationship between unconscious statistical inference reflected by predictive processing and 
conscious access. It demonstrated that predictions that are in line with sensory evidence accelerate 
conscious access. Study 2 investigated how low level information within the sensory hierarchy is 
dealt with by predictive processing and regularity learning mechanisms through “perceptual echo” 
in which the cross-correlation between a sequence of randomly fluctuating luminance values and 
occipital electrophysiological (EEG) signals exhibits a long-lasting periodic (~100ms cycle) 
reverberation of the input stimulus. This study identified a new form of regularity learning and the 
results demonstrate that the perceptual echo may reflect an iterative learning process, governed by 
predictive processing. Study 3 investigated how supra-modal predictive processing is capable of 
  
learning regularities of temporal duration and also temporal predictions about future events. This 
study revealed a supramodal temporal prediction mechanism which processes auditory and visual 
temporal information and integrates information from the duration and rhythmic structures of 
events. Together these studies provide a global picture of predictive processing and regularity 
learning across differing types of predictive information.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This Chapter will start with a historical review of predictive processing starting with its early 
formulations in visual science to the Bayesian brain hypothesis, a theoretical antecedent of 
predictive processing. It will go on to discuss several key models that have substantially influenced 
the direction of predictive processing e.g. Friston (2005), Rao and Ballard (1999). This Chapter 
then moves on to review key aspects of predictive processing, unconscious inference, hierarchical 
predictive processing and regularity learning. The review reveals that we still have a limited 
understanding about fundamental aspects of predictive processing, such as how it deals with 
different types of information, learns statistical regularities and perhaps most fundamentally of all 
what its relationship to conscious experience is. Finally based on this literature review this Chapter 
discusses the research questions and motivations for the three studies that comprise this thesis. 
1.1 Predictive Processing 
Predictive processing – a theoretical framework of perception and brain function, which 
suggests that the brain continuously generates and updates predictions about incoming sensory 
signals, represents a general principle of neural functioning. The predictive processing framework 
has been shown to have a high explanatory power across a wide range of domains including 
auditory (Baldeweg, 2007; Wacongne et al., 2011), visual (Rao & Ballard, 1999; Summerfield, 
Trittschuh, Monti, Mesulam, & Egner, 2008), sensory-motor (Hickok, Houde, & Rong, 2011) and 
interoceptive (Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2012) processing. Predictive processing is becoming a 
powerful paradigm in cognitive neuroscience (Clark, 2012), especially in understanding the 
computational architecture of perception. Predictive-processing theory (Friston, 2009) proposes 
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that sensory input is compared with predictions generated by a hierarchically organized predictive 
model in order to minimize surprise. The original predictive processing model which attracted wide 
attention within neuroscience was a model of the visual cortex proposed by Rao and Ballard (1999). 
This was a specific model implemented by a hierarchical network and at the time a lot of 
researchers within the field of neuroscience recognised the huge potential of predictive coding. 
This led to a more general instance of the original idea, broadly referred to as predictive processing, 
which describes the brains attempt to constantly model external causal relationships or statistical 
regularities and predict sensory events. Although the predictive processing framework has superior 
explanatory power, its relation to conscious experience and whether it is an universal principle of 
neural processing (Karl Friston, 2010) are still unknown. This thesis will explore this predictive 
processing definition of perception and brain function by investigating conscious access, regularity 
learning, and temporal prediction in a series of studies to gain a deeper understanding of the 
predictive brain. 
1.1.1 Inverse problem and Bayesian brain hypothesis 
Our sensory systems are constantly bombarded by noisy and ambiguous input. This presents 
our sensory systems with the difficult task of tracking, decoding, and forming percepts of relevant 
input which may have multiple interpretations or causes (S. E. Palmer, 1999). A cause here can be 
defined as the source that causes sensory inputs. A simple example of a possible percept is shown in 
Figure 1-1 (a), which appears to be a cube. However, this 2D projection on the retina may be due to 
multiple possible external objects (Figure 1-1b). To infer the actual cause of percept is an 
unsolvable problem, commonly referred to as the “inverse problem of perception”. This specifies 
that to infer the external sensory causes that leads to a particular activation of sensory systems is 
challenging. To understand how the neural system deals with this problem, von Helmholtz 
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proposed that perception is a statistical inference process. His idea was that neural systems compute 
perceptual information from sensory data to construct a probabilistic model of the external world 
where the ultimate goal of perception is to infer the causes that generate sensory inputs (Dayan, 
Hinton, Neal, & Zemel, 1995; Karl Friston, 2012; Helmholtz, 1866). In this theory, a percept is not 
only passively caused by sensory stimulation but involves unconscious inferences, associated 
sensations, and the incorporation of prior knowledge which biases the computation toward a simple 
interpretation (Pizlo, 2001). 
 
 
Figure 1-1(a) an simple example of a visual percept (b) multiple possibilities (hidden causes) that 
can cause the percept  (figure taken from Kersten & Yuille, 2003) 
Motivated by von Helmholtz, in the past century, accumulating evidence in Psychology and 
Neuroscience indicates human cognition may process probabilistically. Specifically, the neural 
system performs Bayesian inference to solve the inverse problem (Friston & Stephan, 2007; 
Kersten & Schrater, 2002; Knill & Pouget, 2004; Knill & Richards, 1996).  
Bayesian inference is a parameter estimation framework that adopts Bayes' theorem to infer 
states of unknown hidden causes when more information (evidence) becomes available. To 
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perform this inference, a Bayesian inference process first constructs a prior distribution, a belief 
probabilistic distribution of all possible hypotheses 𝑝(𝐻) based on prior knowledge. When more 
evidence becomes available the system updates its belief probability distribution (posterior 
distribution), by updating 𝑝(𝐻) to 𝑝(𝐻|𝐸𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒) using the following Bayesian rule to integrate 
prior knowledge and new information:  
 𝑝(𝐻|𝐸) =
𝑝(𝐸|𝐻)×𝑝(𝐻)
𝑝(𝐸)
 (1-1) 
 
 
𝑝(𝐸|𝐻) is referred to as the likelihood, which indicates the compatibility of the evidence with 
the given hypothesis. 𝑝(𝐻) is the prior belief of all possible hypotheses. 𝑝(𝐻|𝐸) is the posterior 
distribution indicating the updated belief of all possible hypothesis. 𝑝(𝐸) is the marginal 
likelihood serving as a normalisation term. Following the principle of Bayesian inference, the 
Bayesian brain hypothesis suggests that the brain is trying to infer hidden causes of sensory inputs 
by constructing a generative model which is modelling possible causes and the generative 
processes which describe how the hidden causes yield sensory data (likelihood). When new 
sensory evidence becomes available, the internal representation of hidden causes is updated using 
Bayesian inference. In this view, the human perceptual system can be seen as a “statistical inference 
engine” that extracts statistical and causal relations from the environment to infer hidden causes 
based on these learned relations (Clark, 2012).  
The Bayesian brain hypothesis has been shown to be accurate in describing a wide range of 
human cognitive processes across different domains such as perception (Yuille & Kersten, 2006), 
motor control (Körding & Wolpert, 2004), memory (Anderson & Milson, 1989), and reasoning 
(Oaksford & Chater, 1994). For example, research has demonstrated its explanatory and predictive 
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power using sensory cue integration (Knill & Pouget, 2004). Several studies have found human 
subjects perform cue integration following Bayesian optimization (so called Bayesian ideal 
observer (Knill & Richards, 1996)) both within (Hillis, Watt, Landy, & Banks, 2004; Jacobs, 1999; 
Knill & Saunders, 2003) and across modalities (e.g. sight and touch or sight and sound) (Alais & 
Burr, 2004; Battaglia, Jacobs, & Aslin, 2003; Ernst & Banks, 2002; van Beers, Sittig, & van Der 
Gon, 1999). A study by Ernst and Banks (2002) is a classic example demonstrating how Bayesian 
inference accurately predicts behavioural performance.  
 
Figure 1-2 (a) The experimental setting and stimuli used in the study by Ernst and Banks, (2002). 
Participants were asked to integrate visual and haptic information to estimate the width of a virtual 
ridge. (b) Haptic and visual weights and Point of subjective equality (PSEs). The figure shows how 
the weighting between visual and haptic input changes with noise level for empirical and data 
predicted by Bayesian brain hypothesis. As the visual noise increases a stronger weighting is 
placed on haptic input. (figure adapted from Ernst & Banks, 2002). 
In this study, human participants were required to judge which of two ridges was taller (Figure 
1-2a). Three types of trials were presented. First, only haptic information was presented. 
Participants only received information by touching the ridge. Second, only visual information was 
presented. They were only provided visual information about the ridge. Third, they saw and 
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touched the ridge simultaneously and made integrated judgments based on both types of 
information. The Bayesian brain hypothesis suggests that, when multiple information sources 
become available to infer the hidden cause, the optimal method to integrate information is to 
compute a weighted average between estimations of signal information sources. The weights for 
information are determined by the relative reliabilities of the information sources. When one source 
is more reliable than another, the computation adds a stronger weighting to the more reliable source 
when computing the weighted average.  
In Ernst and Banks’ study, visual stimuli were presented with one of four different noise levels, 
i.e. manipulating the reliability of the visual cue. The results showed that behavioural performance 
in trials in which both visual and haptic cues were presented were very close to the predictions 
made by the Bayesian brain hypothesis (Figure 1-2b). This supports the Bayesian brain’s assertion 
that multiple information sources provide the optimal method to integrate information. As can be 
seen, when the visual noise level increases, the weighting to haptic information also increases, 
again in line with the predictions of the Bayesian brain hypothesis. Similar results have also been 
found in other perceptual and sensory-motor tasks, e.g. colour consistency (Brainard & Freeman, 
1997), motion perception, (Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006) and motion illusions (Weiss, Simoncelli, 
& Adelson, 2002). As a result of these and many other experiments the notion of perception as 
hypothesis testing as suggested by the Bayesian brain hypothesis has become a hot topic within 
Psychology and Neuroscience (Karl Friston, 2012; Gregory, 1968, 1980; Kersten, Mamassian, & 
Yuille, 2004). 
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1.1.2 Predictive coding: From Bayesian inference to Prediction 
1.1.2.1 From Bayesian inference to predictive coding: A history of predictive coding 
The notion of the brain as a hypothesis-testing machine is not a new idea, it has been around 
since the 60’s and became a crucial concept in computational neuroscience (Lee & Mumford, 2003) 
and also in the Bayesian brain framework (Knill & Pouget, 2004). The Bayesian brain hypothesis is 
usually described at Marr’s computational level (Marr, 1982). David Marr (1982) introduced a 
three-level framework to analyse a complex system:  
• Computational Level: What is the goal of the computation, why it is appropriate, and 
what is the logic of the strategy by which it can be carried out? 
• Representation and Algorithm Level: How can this computational theory be 
implemented? In particular, what is the representation of the input and output, and what is 
the algorithm for this transformation? 
• Hardware Implementation Level: How can the representation and algorithm be 
physically realized? 
The Bayesian brain hypothesis suggests a computational principle, i.e. Bayesian optimisation, 
as the ultimate goal of neural systems. Fundamentally, a computational description can be realised 
by multiple types of implementations. One particularly interesting formulation of the Bayesian 
Brain is predictive coding (Clark, 2012; Karl Friston, 2005; Hohwy, 2013; Seth, 2014). As 
mentioned above, the Bayesian brain hypothesis suggests that brains construct a generative model 
to infer the state of hidden causes. A generative model encodes the prior distribution of hidden 
8 
 
 
causes and the generative processes (i.e., the likelihood in Bayesian inference) which represent the 
compatibility of the sensory data with given hidden causes. This implies that generative models 
encode the joint probabilities between hidden causes and sensory data. Using these joint 
probabilities, the generative model can run internal simulations of the external generative processes. 
Therefore, a sensory system can generate predictions about sensory data by combining the current 
best estimation of the hidden causes with the joint probabilities. This allows a particular 
prediction-based form of Bayesian inference i.e. predictive coding. In this approach, generative 
models generate predictions about sensory input by simulating sensory data based on prior 
knowledge and generative processes. The predictions are then compared with actual sensory input. 
If the predicted sensory inputs do not fit the actual sensory inputs, a prediction error i.e. the 
difference between prediction and actual sensory evidence is computed. The model then updates its 
current estimation of the hidden sensory cause and generates new predictions about the sensory 
inputs in an attempt to minimise the current prediction error. By this process, statistical inference 
can be achieved and the model can find the best estimation of hidden causes through prediction 
error minimisation. Therefore, this predictive coding framework is identical to the view of 
“perception as a hypothesis testing process” (Gregory, 1980), in which perceptual systems test 
hypotheses by comparing predictions with actual sensory inputs. Predictive coding inherited all of 
the key characteristics of the Bayesian brain hypothesis. Importantly, predictive coding expanded 
the original framework by providing a physiologically plausible framework that was amenable to 
experimental investigation. 
Recently the predictive coding framework became hugely influential in the modelling and 
description of human cognition and neural imaging data. Currently, many different computational 
predictive coding models have been proposed to interpret empirical neurophysiological data (Karl 
Friston, 2005; Gagnepain, Henson, & Davis, 2012; M.W. Spratling, 2008; Rao & Ballard, 1999; 
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Seth et al., 2012; Spratling, 2012; Wacongne, Changeux, & Dehaene, 2012). Next, I will briefly 
review some of the most influential predictive coding models.  
 Rao and Ballard’s model 
A milestone model proposed by Rao and Ballard attracted large amounts of attention in 
neuroscience. Rao and Ballard (1999) presented a predictive coding model of the visual cortex. The 
model is implemented by a hierarchical network and has a superior explanatory power for 
endstopping effect. In this model, higher level layers generate predictions of the responses of 
neurons in the next lower level (Figure 1-3a) and send predictions to lower layers through feedback 
connections. Lower level layers compute the residual (prediction error) between inhibitory signals, 
from higher level predictions (Figure 1-3b), and its current state. The residual signals are then sent 
back to the higher layers through feedforward connections. These residual signals are then used to 
correct the higher-level estimates of sensory inputs and make new predictions. In this model, a 
higher-level unit connects to multiple lower level units, and therefore, has a larger receptive field. 
Higher level units integrate signals from multiple lower level units to form a new prediction (Figure 
1-3c).  
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Figure 1-3 Hierarchical predictive coding model of the visual cortex by Rao and Ballard (1999) (a) 
architecture of the hierarchical predictive coding model of the visual cortex. Higher level 
predictive estimators (PE) predict the response value of the units in the next lower level. Lower 
level units compute the difference (prediction error) between actual activity and predictions from 
higher levels and send the prediction error signal to higher level units through feedforward 
pathways. (b) The structure of predictive estimators. I: actual sensory inputs. U and UT: synaptic 
weights; r: current estimate of the input signal. rtd: top-down predictions; (c) A three-level 
hierarchical network. Three image patches at level 0 are processed by three level 1 PE units. Three 
level 1 PEs connect to one level 2 PE, suggesting a larger receptive field for higher level units 
(figure adapted from Huang & Rao, 2011) 
This architecture suggests that the top-down signal is crucial for the computation of perceptual 
information and determines the state of lower layers by the predictions at high level layers through 
feedback connections. Therefore, it can naturally explain several characteristics of V1 neurons, for 
example, the so-called end stopping effect. The end stopping effect was first described by Hubel 
and Wiesel (Hubel & Wiesel, 1965). Some neurons (end-stopping neurons) in V1 activate more 
when a contour is within its receptive field. However, their responses become smaller when the 
contour exceeds its receptive field, suggesting suppression from other neurons with receptive fields 
close to this neuron. This effect is well replicated by Rao and Ballard’s model. When the contour is 
longer than the receptive field, higher level layers can successfully predict the content of this 
receptive field by receiving information from neurons surrounding this receptive field. When the 
prediction from higher level layers mirrors the content of the input of this neuron it generates a 
smaller prediction error yielding a smaller activation (Figure 1-4a). Conversely, when the contour 
only falls within the receptive field of a single neuron, the high level layer has no information to 
predict the “atypical” input. Therefore, the higher level layer fails to predict the input content. This 
drives the low level neuron to produce a large prediction error and therefore shows a larger 
activation (Figure 1-4b). In summary, this model parsimoniously explains the endstopping effect 
within a predictive processing framework.  
11 
 
 
 
Figure 1-4 The end stopping effect simulated with the predictive coding model for visual cortex 
(Rao & Ballard, 1999) (a) a bar stimulus exceeds the central receptive field. Due to the contents of 
the central receptive field being predicted from the content of the neighbouring receptive fields, the 
prediction error generated from the central neuron is small. (b) a bar stimulus only presented in the 
central receptive field. Due to no predictive visual information from neighbouring receptive field, 
the prediction error is large for the central neuron. (figure adapted from Rao & Ballard, 1999) 
 Karl Friston’s model of predictive processing  
The core idea underlying the Bayesian brain and predictive coding frameworks is that the 
brain is an inference engine trying to optimize probabilistic representations of what caused its 
sensory input. Another generalisation form of predictive processing was proposed by Karl Friston 
at University College London (Karl Friston, 2005, 2010). His addition to the predictive processing 
framework was to add a more fundamental principle called the “free energy principle” that links 
predictive processing to statistical physics and information theory. Free energy can be seen as a 
measure that limits surprise when receiving new data into a generative model. Surprise is simply 
the improbability of sensory data, given a model of the environment. Therefore, prediction error 
minimization in predictive processing is equivalent to free energy minimization. Statistical 
inference and learning of a biological system can be achieved by minimizing the free energy of the 
internal generative models. Free-energy principle entails the Bayesian brain hypothesis and 
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predictive processing and can be seen as a biologically plausible implementation of these 
frameworks.   
This section has highlighted two key models that have been influential within the predictive 
processing field, following these models many other predictive processing models have been 
proposed that exhibit strong explanatory power across a wide range of domains (Baldeweg, 2007; 
Seth, 2014; Seth et al., 2012; Wacongne et al., 2011).  
Despite the predictive processing framework being applied to a wide range of behavioural and 
neurophysiological data, and also to phenomenological properties of consciousness such as 
emotion, feelings of presence, and the construction of the self, the role of predictive processing in 
conscious perception remains unclear. The next section will move on to review literature 
concerning the relationship between predictive processing and conscious content.  
1.2 Predictive processing and Conscious Content 
Broadly, consciousness can be broken down into two major components: arousal, which 
ranges from unconsciousness to full waking consciousness, and conscious content, the current 
content of a person’s experience This thesis focuses on conscious content within the predictive 
processing framework.  
Even early formulations of the Bayesian brain hypothesis describe conscious experience as 
the result of Bayesian inference. According to this view information processing and computation 
for perception are unconscious inference (Gregory, 1980; Helmholtz, 1866; MacKay, 1956; Neisser, 
1967; Rock, 1983). Only the results (best estimation of hidden causes) of statistical inference reach 
conscious awareness and form the content of conscious experience. The factors that render the 
computational process under statistical inference unconscious are still unknown. 
13 
 
 
The motion illusion in aperture problem provides a good example of unconscious inference 
(Horn & Schunck, 1981; Wuerger, Shapley, & Rubin, 1996). The aperture problem is confronted 
when using local information to determine a global pattern. Figure 1-5 shows a grating pattern 
presented in an “aperture”. When the grating is moving, a certain moving direction can be 
perceived (usually perpendicular to the line direction of the grating). However, the motion 
information is ambiguous locally because the motion pattern can be caused by infinite possibilities 
of global motion. For example, if the lines of the grating are moving to the left in the aperture, 
global patterns which move left, up-left, and up can produce the same spatial and temporal visual 
inputs (Figure 1-5b). Therefore, it is impossible to determine the global motion direction by local 
information alone.  
However, even though the local information is ambiguous, observers feel no ambiguity about 
the direction of movement, they instantly experience a certain motion direction. This observation 
implies that the computations underlying the orientation of movement is fully unconscious, 
therefore unconscious inference must play a crucial role in what we perceive consciously.  
 
Figure 1-5  The motion illusion in aperture problem. (a) shows a grating pattern presented in an 
“aperture”. The grating pattern is moving globally, but observers can only watch the pattern 
through the aperture. (b) A moving pattern in the aperture can be generated by infinite global 
moving directions, for instance the three examples in this figure. Observers usually perceive the 
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moving direction is perpendicular to the grating line directions. (figure adapted from Weiss et al., 
2002). 
To explain how the visual system solves the aperture problem, Weiss, Simoncelli, and Adelson 
proposed a model using Bayesian inference that describes conscious percepts of the motion 
direction in the aperture problem (Weiss et al., 2002). Following the Bayesian inference, the model 
multiplies prior of motion speed (a probability distribution that encodes previous experience) and a 
likelihood function that describes the probability of motion speed given the local motion pattern in 
the aperture. The model assumes a simple Gaussian prior which favours slow motion, i.e. higher 
probabilities for low velocities than high velocities. The likelihood incorporates sensory precision 
(inverse of sensory noise level). The model predicts that when the image contrast is low the 
precision should also be low and yield less weighting on likelihood. On the other hand, when the 
image contrast is high, the sensory signal is reliable, thus yielding higher weighing on likelihood. 
The final perceptual experience is determined by maximizing the posterior, the hypothesis with 
highest probability in the posterior distribution. This simple Bayesian model beautifully captures 
how the conscious experience of motion direction is affected by contrast, edge orientation, and 
other stimulus features, including the classic observation that stimuli appear to move slower at 
lower contrasts and vice-versa (Figure 1-6). The model also predicts a wide range of unintuitive 
motion phenomena, which are usually attributed to different neural mechanisms. 
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Figure 1-6 Bayesian inference relating to motion speed in the aperture problem. Stimulus contrast 
in an aperture determines the precision of likelihood. As a result, the perceived speed using 
Bayesian inference is modulated by stimulus contrast. A, B, and C illustrate perceived speed using 
three different stimulus contrast values (figure adapted from Hürlimann, Kiper, & Carandini, 
2002). 
 
In this example, conscious experience of motion is the final decision of Bayesian inference. 
More importantly, the complicated neural processes underlying the computation are utterly 
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unconscious. At the conscious level, we are unaware of how the brain integrates multiple features 
using Bayesian rules and computes the posterior distribution of motion directions. We also cannot 
intentionally and consciously access the prior distribution, which should be represented as 
long-term knowledge in the neural system. Therefore, a possible approach to understanding the 
neural basis of conscious perception is to investigate how unconscious inference is able to 
influence conscious perceptual decisions.  
The notion of unconscious perceptual decision making has been addressed throughout the 
history of visual science since e.g. Optics of Ptolemy 100-170 A.D. (Smith, 1996). Nevertheless, 
there is still no theory providing a fully explanatory account of how the result of the unconscious 
inference generates phenomenal experience.  
As Hatfield states (2005, p. 120): “to be fully explanatory, unconscious inference theories of 
perception must explain how the conclusion of an inference about size and distance leads to the 
experience of an object as having a certain size and being at a certain distance, or how a 
conclusion about a spectral reflectance distribution yields the experience of a specific hue. In other 
words, the theories need to explain how the conclusion to an inference, perhaps conceived 
linguistically, can be or can cause visual experience, with its imagistic quality. This is the 
phenomenal experience problem” 
As the explanatory power of predictive processing continues to become more prominent 
within neuroscientific and consciousness research, it is increasingly essential to understand this 
relationship between unconscious statistical inference and conscious experience.  
This section describes how predictive processing plays a crucial role in perception through 
unconscious perceptual inference. The next section will introduce and review the hierarchical 
predictive processing framework, which states that the same principle of perceptual inference can 
be used across sensory hierarchies in order to process differing levels of information. 
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1.3 Hierarchical predictive processing  
Predictive processing has been proposed as a unifying principle underlying all neural 
processing, though whether this ambitious claim stands up in practice remains to be seen. The 
human visual system, for example, is organized hierarchically and has extensive reciprocal 
cortico-cortical connections between different cortical levels (Felleman & Essen, 1991). Predictive 
processing models of vision therefore needed to address the hierarchical structure of neural systems 
and as a result have been primarily discussed in terms of a hierarchical structure (Clark, 2012; Karl 
Friston, 2002; Huang & Rao, 2011; Mumford, 1992). For example, the predictive processing model 
of the visual cortex proposed by Rao and Ballard, is modelled as a hierarchical network, with 
higher level units attempting to predict the responses of units in the next lower level. In the 
hierarchical predictive processing framework, prediction units at higher levels within the model 
aim to predict the states of units at the next lower level through a generative process. Prediction 
errors at lower levels within the model are computed by comparing the prediction generated by the 
higher level and the actual states of the lower level units. The lower level units pass the prediction 
error signal through feedforward pathways to higher level units, which has the effect of adjusting 
estimations of hidden causes and modifying predictions. At the lowest level of this hierarchy, the 
prediction units are tasked with predicting actual sensory inputs. If these predictions do not fit the 
sensory inputs, the prediction errors propagate from lower levels to higher levels one by one 
through feedforward connections between each level. This process iteratively occurs until 
prediction errors have been minimised across the whole hierarchy, which has the effect that the 
prediction closely mirrors the actual input, thus completing the inference process.  
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Deep hierarchical generative models outperform models with single or few levels (Hinton, 
2007). Due to this multilevel structure, hierarchical predictive processing is capable of modelling 
the generative process of external multilevel causal structures and is able to infer abstract hidden 
causes in the environment (Karl Friston, 2005; Hohwy, 2014). The hierarchical structure 
progressively encodes more complex features from lower levels to higher levels and thus is able to 
learn complicated, non-linear relationships in real world scenarios. This hierarchical structure also 
implies hidden causes at different spatial and temporal scales can be inferred and predicted. In 
terms of spatial scale, lower level units predict a smaller spatial input area, whereas higher level 
units encode statistical relationships between several lower level units. Therefore, predictions from 
higher level units cover a larger input area compared to lower level units. Rao and Ballard (1999), 
demonstrated that receptive fields of higher level units are larger than lower level units in a 
hierarchical predictive coding model (Figure 1-3c and Figure 1-7).  
 
Figure 1-7 Learned synaptic weights level-1 and level-2 modules in the hierarchical predictive 
coding model of the visual cortex. The receptive fields of neurons at level-2 are larger than the 
receptive fields of level-1 neurons, consistent with human and animal visual processing hierarchy. 
(taken from Rao & Ballard, 1999, Fig2). 
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In terms of temporal scales, lower levels learn and predict fast changing regularities such as 
contour and orientation. While higher levels generate predictions about longer-term invariant 
regularities such as faces (Hohwy, 2014). An example by Friston et. al., (2009) showed that 
information of size and strength of a bird can be extracted from bird songs, indicating that hidden 
causes in a slower time scale (bird identity) can be inferred by a fast changing time scale (bird 
songs).  
Wacongne et al. directly tested the hierarchical predictive coding hypothesis using a 
hierarchical auditory novelty paradigm using EEG and magnetoencephalography (MEG) 
(Wacongne et al., 2011). Participants were presented with blocks of auditory sound strings 
consisting of a rare sequence pattern (xxxxX) and a frequent pattern (xxxxY). This design creates 
local and global regularities. The local regularity is established by the standard tones (x) which 
made up the majority of the string. Therefore, when a deviant tone (Y) was presented, it violated the 
local regularity and caused a local prediction error. The global regularity was established by 
presenting a frequent pattern (xxxxY) in a block. Presenting a rare sequence pattern (xxxxX) 
violated the global regularity and caused a global prediction error. Wacongne et al. examined the 
human neural correlates of local and global prediction errors using EEG and MEG. The results 
show that the local deviant tone (Y) elicited a Mismatch negativity (MMN), a neurophysiological 
index of auditory change detection, even though the standard pattern (xxxxY) was globally 
predictable, suggesting that the MMN was sensitive to the local regularity but insensitive to the 
global regularity pattern. A temporally late mismatch response was found only responding to the 
violation of the global pattern (xxxxX) even though the stimulus was locally standard (the fifth 
stimulus X in xxxxX). This suggests a higher-order regularity learning mechanism exists which 
generates high-level predictions according to global regularities. To further examine hierarchical 
predictive coding, Wacongne and her colleagues examined the neural responses elicited by 
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stimulus omission. As mentioned above, the hierarchical predictive coding framework suggests 
that higher level predictive units generate predictions about the state of units in the next lower level. 
Therefore, high level predictions indirectly influence low level predictions via feedback 
connections down to the lowest level of the sensory system. To test this hypothesis, the authors 
designed a stimulus omission condition in which an expected stimulus was omitted to test 
top-down prediction. The omissions of the fifth stimulus in xxxxY block was compared with the 
one in xxxxX block. In the xxxxX, the omission of the fifth stimulus (X, the local standard) violates 
only local regularities. In contrast, in xxxxY block, the local deviant stimulus (Y) was expected to 
occur through high level prediction after four local standard stimuli (x). Therefore, the omission of 
the local deviant stimulus (Y) violates both local and global predictions. The result showed that the 
omission in the xxxxY block elicited a larger temporally early mismatch response than the 
omission in the xxxxX block, supporting the prediction by hierarchical predictive coding 
framework.  
To summarize, hierarchical predictive coding is capable of encoding a wide range of 
information types from concrete to abstract, using low to high levels within the hierarchy. The 
benefits of a hierarchical predictive coding model have been demonstrated through numerous 
behavioural and neuroimaging studies (Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011; Tervo, 
Tenenbaum, & Gershman, 2016; Wacongne et al., 2011). In terms of information processing within 
a sensory hierarchy questions remain about the effects that differing levels of sensory information 
i.e. low, cross-modal and abstract levels of information, have on predictive processing. An 
important feature of these models is that they have been shown to learn regularities and predict 
hidden causes at different spatial and temporal scales. Next I will review the evidence showing 
predictive processing is involved in different types of regularity learning, highlighting an often 
overlooked point, that in order to make a prediction about the future, first a system must learn 
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environmental regularities. 
 
 
 
1.4 Predictive processing and Regularity Learning 
The operation of predictive processing relies largely on adequate knowledge of environmental 
regularities. Effective predictions can only be made when the environmental regularities are 
successfully extracted and learned (Seriès & Seitz, 2013). Theorists have suggested that a system 
using predictive processing should be able to learn environmental regularities and model the causal 
regularities of the external world (Hohwy, 2014). Empirically, previous research has showed that 
the human brain is capable of learning complex statistical relationships (e.g. statistical learning, 
Fiser, Berkes, Orbán, & Lengyel, 2010). However, it is still unclear to what extent the regularities 
in the environment can be learned and incorporated into predictive processing to predict future 
events. In this thesis, I focus on three types of regularity learning: associative learning (Chapter 2), 
sequence learning (Chapter 3), and stimulus repetition (Chapter 4). The following are brief 
introductions to previous research into the relationship between predictive processing and these 
three types of regularity learning.  
1.4.1 Associative learning  
There is a growing body of evidence supporting the claim that neural responses of associative 
learning are compatible with the predictive processing framework (Kok, Brouwer, Gerven, & de 
Lange, 2013; von Kriegstein & Giraud, 2006). A good example carried out by Kok, Jehee, and 
22 
 
 
de Lange demonstrated that during an auditory-visual cross-modal association task there was task 
relevant predictive information located within the visual cortex (Kok, Jehee, & de Lange, 2012) 
using fMRI. In this study participants were required to compare orientations or contrast (in 
different blocks) of two consecutive grating stimuli in each trial. The two grating stimuli were 
always preceded by an auditory tone (the cue). The auditory cue consisted of either a low or high 
tone which 75% of the time predicted the orientation of the subsequent grating stimuli. Therefore, 
after several exposures, participants learned this audio-visual association. With multivariate pattern 
analysis (MVPA), they found when the orientations of the grating stimulus were predicted by the 
cue, MVPA classifiers were better able to classify the orientation from the visual cortex compared 
to unpredicted orientations, suggesting that the cross-modal association shaped the representation 
within the visual cortex. This result is consistent with the expectations of the predictive processing 
framework, which posits that high-level cortical areas can predict and modulate the states of 
low-level neurons. More importantly, Kok et al. found that the amplitude of BOLD signals was 
higher when orientations of the grating stimulus were unexpected compared to expected. A finding 
that is again compatible with a predictive processing framework and suggests the neural processing 
underlying the BOLD signals were driven by the prediction error. When the prediction is not 
consistent with the visual input, low-level visual areas generate larger prediction error signals. 
Additionally, a study by den Ouden et al. showed similar “prediction suppression” and 
prediction-error related neural activation in a cross-modal associative learning task (den Ouden, 
Friston, Daw, McIntosh, & Stephan, 2009). Activity in primary visual cortex and putamen 
progressively positive correlated learning-dependent surprise. Together, the results of these studies 
provide support for the predictive processing framework and suggest that at least some forms of 
associative learning may be driven by predictive processing.  
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1.4.2 Sequence learning  
Sequence learning is a well-studied ability among human and other animals (Conway & 
Christiansen, 2001; Goldstein et al., 2010). Neural systems are capable of learning consecutive 
events with deterministic or probabilistic spatial and temporal relationships. From a predictive 
processing point of view sequence learning is thought to occur due to a generative model, which 
encodes the transitional probabilities between consecutive events from the sequence history. 
Therefore, based on sequence histories, predictive processing is able to generate predictions about 
incoming sensory events. Recent evidence shows that when a sensory event is predictable, due to 
regularities within the sequence pattern, the neural responses elicited by an expected event is 
suppressed, a finding expected within the predictive processing framework (Karl Friston, 2005). 
For example, a study by Aizenstein et al., shows that implicit sequence expectation about colour 
and location is able to supress neural responses to visual input. In this study participants viewed 
consecutive sequences consisting of a series of items with two attributes, colour and location 
(Aizenstein et al., 2004). They were required to press different buttons according to the colour or 
shape of an item. The colours and shapes of items were determined independently and follow two 
different first-order Markov chains (see Figure 1-8). Therefore, this design allows for two sequence 
regularities to be embedded in the sequence, task-relevant (explicit) and task-irrelevant (implicit) 
features. They also monitored the awareness of the sequence knowledge for each participants 
during the whole experiment. The results showed that when the task-irrelevant feature was 
consistent with prediction visual regions (V1, V2, and V3) showed decreased activity, suggesting 
the implicit sequence learning may involve predictive processing.  
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Figure 1-8 The first-order Markov chain transition rules used by Aizenstein et al. (2004). Objects in 
a sequences have two changing attributes, colour and location. The colours and shapes of items 
were determined independently and follow two different first-order Markov chains (a and b). 
(figure adapted from Aizenstein et al., 2004) 
Similarly, Huettel, Song, and McCarthy manipulated sequence uncertainty of a binary 
sequence of eight stimuli so that the uncertainty changed dynamically over time (Huettel, Song, & 
McCarthy, 2005). They found activity in prefrontal, parietal, and insular cortices increased with 
increasing uncertainty, suggesting that predictable sequences elicited lower neural responses.  
A more recent study by Davis and Hasson (Davis & Hasson, 2016) showed that not only 
low-level sensory features, such as colour, shape, etc., but also high-level expected semantic 
features caused a reduction in activation. Suggesting that a marker of predictive processing can also 
be found when a sequence has high-level semantic regularities. The transition probabilities were 
determined by two first-order Markov chains for the location and semantic category of the next 
image. There were three conditions in this study. The sequence was embedded with either the 
location, semantic, or both regularities. All three conditions showed reduction of the BOLD 
response in left rostral anterior cingulate cortex, bilateral putamen, caudate, thalamus, right 
precentral gyrus, and left visual cortex. More importantly, the predictability of the semantic 
category decreased BOLD activity in areas of the ventral visual stream and lateral temporal cortex 
which is considered to be a key semantic processing area. Predictability of location of stimuli 
decreased activation in dorsal fronto-parietal areas which are thought to be responsible for the 
endogenous control of spatial attention. 
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In another study by Reithler, van Mier, and Goebel, participants learned movement sequences 
by continuously tracing paths of different predeﬁned mazes (Reithler, van Mier, & Goebel, 2010). 
They found BOLD signals of learning-related networks of cortical areas decreased over time 
during motor sequence learning. Further analyses showed decreased activation when task 
performance increased in bilateral supplementary motor areas (SMA), posterior intraparietal sulcus, 
and anterior insula. The authors state that continuous motor sequence learning yields efﬁcient 
neural processing in recruited cortical areas. The result can be also interpreted by a reduction in 
prediction errors that are generated when movements more precisely follow the maze paths. A 
similar result was found by Steele and Penhune (2010). They found that across several days of 
motor sequence learning, global BOLD signals decreased along with behavioural performance 
improved in the network for motor learning including cerebellum, premotor cortex, basal ganglia, 
pre-supplementary motor area, and supplementary motor area (Steele & Penhune, 2010).  
1.4.3 Stimulus repetition  
Stimulus repetition is the simplest form of statistical regularity in the environment. Previous 
research has shown neural systems are sensitive to this form of regularity (Kalanit Grill-Spector, 
Henson, & Martin, 2006). Here, I review two well studied neural correlates of stimulus repetition, 
repetition suppression and the odd-ball effect.  
1.4.3.1 Repetition suppression 
Repetition suppression refers to a reduction in neural activation when stimuli are repeated 
(Buckner et al., 1998; K. Grill-Spector et al., 1999; Henson, Shallice, & Dolan, 2000; Kourtzi & 
Kanwisher, 2001; Naccache & Dehaene, 2001; van Turennout, Ellmore, & Martin, 2000; Wiggs & 
Martin, 1998). Studies have demonstrated repetition suppression for different representations 
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across levels of the visual processing hierarchy (Kalanit Grill-Spector & Malach, 2001), suggesting 
a ubiquitous characteristic in neural systems. An earlier theory of repetition suppression suggests 
that decreases in activation are due to neuron fatigue as a result of stimulus repetitions (Kalanit 
Grill-Spector et al., 2006) . This point of view only considers bottom-up information ﬂow through 
sensory cortex.  
In contrast to these early theories, Summerfield and his colleagues showed that expectation 
plays a role in repetition suppression (Summerfield et al., 2008). In this study, the probability of 
stimulus (face) repetition was manipulated. Participants were required to identity inverted faces in 
a stimulus stream. In one block, the probability of face repetition in two consecutive presentations 
was high (75%). Therefore, after exposures to several presentations, participants developed an 
expectation about stimulus repetition. In the other block, stimulus repetition rate was only 25%, and 
hence, repetitions were not expected. The result showed that repetition suppression in the fusiform 
face area (FFA) was significantly larger when stimulus repetitions were expected compared to 
unexpected. This finding is consistent with the predictive processing framework suggesting 
top-down predictions are crucial in modulating neural responses for sensory inputs. When 
repetition is expected, the visual system is able to generate more precise predictions about the 
upcoming face stimulus, resulting in less prediction error.  In contrast with the neuron fatigue 
theory of repetition suppression, the predictive processing framework more parsimoniously 
explains how expectation influences neural responses during repetition of sensory information. In 
sum, the study of repetition suppression supports the notion that statistical regularities can be 
extracted from the environment by the neural systems yielding more precise predictions and lower 
prediction errors.  
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1.4.3.2 The odd-ball effect  
In contrast to repetition suppression, the neural correlates of an unexpected sensory event are 
usually tested with an odd-ball paradigm (Squires, Squires, & Hillyard, 1975). In the odd-ball 
paradigm, successive presentations of frequent stimuli (standard stimuli) are interrupted by 
infrequent stimuli (deviant stimuli). The infrequent stimuli elicit a “surprise response” in neural 
systems. By measuring the surprise responses, one can examine neural mechanisms of expectation 
and novelty (e.g., Folstein & Van Petten, 2008; Hruby & Marsalek, 2002).  
To interpret the result of the odd-ball paradigm within a predictive processing framework, 
when a deviant stimulus is detected, the change of stimulus property causes a prediction error 
which elicits a larger neural response than elicited by standard stimuli. 
One notable example of the odd-ball effect within the auditory domain is the mismatch 
negativity (MMN). MMN is an event-related potential (ERP) component usually shows in the 
auditory odd-ball paradigm. When human subjects are presented with a series of auditory stimuli 
consisting of standard and deviant stimuli, the deviant stimuli elicit larger electric potentials than 
the standard stimuli. The peak of MMN occurs about 100–200 ms from the onset of deviant stimuli 
(Garrido, Kilner, Stephan, & Friston, 2009; Näätänen, 1995). MMN can be elicited without 
attention (Näätänen, Paavilainen, Rinne, & Alho, 2007; Näätänen, Paavilainen, Titinen, Jiang, & 
Alho, 1993, but still under debate, see Sussman, 2007) and can even be found in coma patients 
(Fischer et al., 1999; Fischer, Morlet, & Giard, 2000; Morlet, Bouchet, & Fischer, 2000; Näätänen 
& Escera, 2000; Wijnen, van Boxtel, Eilander, & de Gelder, 2007). Therefore, MMN has been 
considered as a pre-attentive neural response.  
Similar to auditory stimulation, growing evidence shows visual odd-ball stimuli are also able 
to induce mismatch ERPs. The finding of visual mismatch negativity (vMMN) shows similar 
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novelty detection mechanisms between auditory and visual information processing (Stefanics, 
Kremláček, & Czigler, 2014).  
Early theories of MMN focus on two interpretations. The model-adjustment hypothesis 
suggests that MMN was driven by neural processes of the auditory change detection process, 
located in temporal and frontal regions (Näätänen, Jacobsen, & Winkler, 2005; Tiitinen, May, 
Reinikainen, & Näätänen, 1994). This theory emphasises a pre-attentive sensory memory 
mechanism that learns auditory regularities and auditory context in the environment. MMN then is 
driven by a comparison computation in which the current auditory input is compared with the 
memory trace of previous inputs (Näätänen, 1992). According this hypothesis, the MMN is thought 
to reflect a perceptual model updating processes.  
Another theory of the MMN suggests that it is driven by the adaptation of local neurons in the 
auditory cortex. The adaptation hypothesis is proposed by Jääskeläinen et al (2004), who suggests 
that adaptation to repeated auditory input causes attenuation and delay of the N1 (Loveless, 
Levänen, Jousmäki, Sams, & Hari, 1996). In contrast to the model-adjustment hypothesis which 
emphasises novelty detection, the adaptation hypothesis argues that MMN is caused by adaptation 
to standard stimuli. The N1 response to frequent auditory input is delayed and suppressed with 
stimulus repetition. Horváth et al., provides evidence that the amplitude of N1 component is 
affected by deviant stimuli (Horváth et al., 2008). Therefore, suggesting that the MMN may be due 
to adaptation of local neurons although the adaptation hypothesis is still not widely accepted (see 
Näätänen et al., 2005).  
Predictive processing has been considered as a candidate mechanism of MMN. According to 
predictive processing, the auditory system tracks input regularities and makes predictions. A 
comparison between bottom-up inputs and top-down predictions result in computation of 
prediction errors. The resulting comparison (prediction error) is then used to update internal models 
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encoding input regularities. In this framework, MMN is thought to be driven by neural response of 
prediction error. During the repetitions, the sensory inputs can be better predicted. This results in 
lower prediction error and absence of MMN (Baldeweg, 2006; Karl Friston, 2005).  
The predictive processing framework shares several properties with the model-adjustment 
hypothesis. Both theories describe an internal model which learns regularities and makes 
predictions about sensory inputs. Predictive processing further provides a neuronally plausible and 
computational framework for MMN. Friston (2005) therefore considers MMN as neural evidence 
of predictive processing in his model.  
Garrido et al. (2009) re-explained possible MMN mechanisms and proposed that predictive 
processing can also explain the contribution from neural adaptation to MMN as described by the 
adaptation hypothesis. The Bayesian inference nature of predictive processing considers precision 
of information source in inference processes. The result of inference is a weighted average between 
top-down prior and bottom-up sensory input based on their relative precisions. Therefore, when 
standard stimuli are repeated, top-down prior can more precisely predict sensory inputs. This 
results in more weight being assigned to top-down signals and less weight assigned to bottom-up 
input, causing less impact from sensory inputs. This prediction from predictive processing is 
consistent with the adaptation hypothesis. Therefore, predictive processing provides an integrated 
view of MMN that unifies the model-adjustment and the adaptation hypotheses. Garrido et al. 
directly tested potential computational models of MMN by Bayesian model comparison (Garrido et 
al., 2008). The result showing that, as predictive processing expected, the combination of the 
model-adjustment hypothesis and the adaptation hypothesis best explained the generation of MMN. 
More recently, as mentioned in section 2.3, Wacongne et al (2011) provided direct evidence 
showing that the MMN amplitudes in a hierarchical odd-ball paradigm can be best explained by the 
hierarchical predictive coding framework.  
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In summary, the predictive coding framework is able to combine apparently distinct models of 
the MMN, which embodies both adaptation and model-adjustment, while also reconciling previous 
empirical findings relating to MMN.  
1.5 Motivation and outline of dissertation   
As can be seen from the literature review, over the last two decades there has been 
considerable advance in theoretical frameworks and accumulating empirical evidence supporting 
the predictive processing framework. These breakthroughs have highlighted the explanatory power 
of this framework when describing neurophysiological responses, and even giving insights into the 
anatomical organization of the human brain.  
However, crucially we still have a limited understanding about fundamental aspects of 
predictive processing, such as how it deals with different types of information, learns statistical 
regularities and perhaps most fundamentally of all what its relationship to conscious experience is. 
The predictive processing framework has even been touted as a candidate unified theory of the 
brain (Karl Friston, 2010), however it still requires a systematic investigation into the role that 
predictive processing plays across different brain functions for this claim to be accepted. While 
validating a predictive processing based unified theory of the brain is beyond the scope of a single 
thesis, this thesis aims to investigate the major gaps in our current understanding of the predictive 
processing framework via three broad research topics: 
1.The relationship between unconscious statistical inference reflected by predictive 
processing and conscious access.  
2. The relationship between differing levels of information i.e. low level, cross-modal, etc. 
within the sensory hierarchy and the predictive processing framework. 
31 
 
 
3. Differing forms of regularity learning used to make predictions about future events within 
the predictive processing framework. 
The three topics will be addressed across three studies making up Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this 
thesis. Briefly, I will now describe the motivation behind each chapter. 
1.5.1 Chapter 2 (study 1): Predictive processing and conscious access  
In chapter 2, I investigate the relationship between predictive processing and conscious 
content. I examine whether predictions about visual events caused by auditory cues could facilitate 
conscious access to a visual stimulus. I trained participants to learn cross-modal associations 
between auditory cues and colour changes of a visual stimulus. I hypothesised that conscious 
access to such representations could be inﬂuenced by cross-modal cues if strong associations were 
formed via extensive training. To test this, I delivered an auditory cue while a visual target was 
rendered subjectively invisible via MIB, and I then gradually changed the colour of the target to 
assess how the congruency between the cue and the visual sensory event inﬂuenced the timing of 
subjective target reappearance. Timing was compared with that from control trials in which the 
target was physically removed. In this way, it was possible to quantify the effects of prediction on 
awareness while minimizing the impact of other cognitive processes such as attention and response 
bias. 
1.5.2 Chapter 3 (study 2): Predictive processing with low-level visual information 
In Chapter 3, I investigated how low level information within the sensory hierarchy is dealt 
with by the predictive processing and its relationship to regularity learning, and how this regularity 
learning can be used to make predictions about future events. A sign that the visual system actively 
processes and predicts sensory signals is revealed by the recently discovered ‘perceptual echo’, in 
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which the cross-correlation between a sequence of randomly fluctuating luminance values and 
occipital electrophysiological (EEG) signals exhibits a long-lasting periodic (~100ms cycle) 
reverberation of the input stimulus (VanRullen & Macdonald, 2012). As yet, the mechanisms 
underlying the perceptual echo and its function are unknown. Reasoning that natural visual signals 
often contain temporally predictable, non-periodic features, we hypothesised that the perceptual 
echo may reflect an underlying iterative learning process (governed by predictive processing) that 
is associated with regularity learning. To test this idea, I presented subjects with successive 
repetitions of a rapid non-periodic luminance sequences, and examined the modulation from 
sequence repetition to perceptual echo. To investigate the perceptual echo further I created a 
predictive processing model to simulate and explain key features of the perceptual echo in order to 
validate that the empirical findings of this could indeed be accounted for by predictive processing 
mechanisms.  
1.5.3 Chapter 4 (study 3): Temporal predictive processing using supra-modal information  
In chapter 4, I investigated how differing levels of information, this time regularity learning of 
temporal duration is dealt with by predictive processing and how this form of regularity learning is 
used to make predictions about future events. Temporal duration comprises abstract and 
supra-modal information that is independent from modality-dependent sensory features. Therefore, 
temporal duration allows us to understand how predictive processing works on high-level, abstract 
information. In this study, I examined predictive processing using a duration odd-ball paradigm 
(Chen, Huang, Luo, Peng, & Liu, 2010; Jacobsen & Schröger, 2003; Näätänen, Paavilainen, & 
Reinikainen, 1989; Tse & Penney, 2006; see also review Ng & Penney, 2014) and examined neural 
responses using EEG. I used a re-designed version of the duration odd-ball paradigm to isolate the 
neural correlates of predictive processing for duration information. I then used event-related 
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potentials (ERPs) and state-of-the-art multivariate pattern analyses (MVPA) to investigate the 
supra-modal nature of temporal predictive processing. Finally, I investigated the neural correlates 
of a high-level temporal regularity learning and prediction mechanisms that receives temporal 
information from visual and auditory inputs and integrates duration and rhythmic information to 
determine a unified temporal prediction about future events.  
1.5.4 An integrated approach  
The three studies were designed to specifically address how predictive processing deals with 
diverse types of predictive information in different contexts and tasks to further provide a broader 
understanding of the predictive processing framework.  
1.5.4.1 Conscious access  
To investigate the relationship between predictive processing and conscious content, Chapter 
2 focuses on quantifying the effects of prediction on conscious access, while Chapter 3 examines 
how low-level visual sequence learning that occurs unconsciously affects predictive processing. 
Chapter 4, investigates the temporal domain using information that is both abstract and 
supra-modal, using a paradigm that has been shown to automatically detect change in sensory 
features without the need for conscious access. Therefore, for each of these experiments it is 
possible to examine the mechanisms of predictive processing in operation at differing conscious 
levels.  
1.5.4.2 Sensory hierarchy 
In terms of information processing in a sensory hierarchy, Chapter 2 focused on cross-modal 
predictive information. Chapter 3 then examined low-level visual luminance dynamics, predictive 
information was embedded in the repetition of the modality-specific low-level visual features. In 
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Chapter 4 the predictive information was supra-modal duration information, in this case the neural 
system needs to extract the abstract temporal information to learn the regularity of duration 
repetition. This thesis will examine predictive processing through the three different levels of 
sensory information (modality-specific, cross-modal, and supra-modal). 
1.5.4.3 Regularity learning 
In terms of how different formats of regularity learning affect predictive processing, in the 
thesis I examined predictive processing via three common types of regulatory leaning utilized in 
previous studies from psychology and neuroscience. Chapter 2 focuses on predictive processing 
using associative learning. Chapter 3 examined predictive processing in sequence learning and 
sequence repetition. In Chapter 4, I examined predictive processing by stimulus repetition. The 
three types of regularity learning cover a broad range of cognitive aspects used in learning 
predictive information. I will investigate and discuss how the three types of regularity learning 
contribute to predictive processing. 
1.6 Unique Contribution 
Overall this thesis provides a global picture of predictive processing that aims to understand 
how the brain uses different types of predictive information in different contexts and tasks. 
This thesis has provided the following novel contributions to the field of predictive processing: 
1. Cross-modal predictive information, due to extensive training, facilitates conscious 
access. 
2. I Identified a new type of temporal regularity learning, reflected by the perceptual echo 
and placed the results within a predictive processing framework. 
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3. I identified a neural correlate of temporal prediction based on duration processing that 
was shared between visual and auditory sensory predictive processing. 
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Chapter 2 
Cross-modal prediction changes the timing of conscious access during motion-induced 
blindness 
2.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the increasingly influential framework of ‘predictive processing’ 
(PP) posits that the brain continuously generates and updates predictions about incoming sensory 
signals(Clark, 2012; Karl Friston, 2005; Seth, 2014)(Clark, 2012; Karl Friston, 2005; Seth, 2014) 
(Clark, 2012; Karl Friston, 2005; Hohwy, 2013; Seth, 2014) according to principles of Bayesian 
inference. Accumulating empirical evidence suggests that perceptual predictions or expectations 
strongly influence conscious perception. For example the perceptual hysteresis effect shows that 
prior knowledge can enhance and stabilise conscious perception: previously perceived stimuli can 
bias conscious perception to represent subsequent stimuli in the same form (Hock, Scott, & 
Schöner, 1993; Kanai & Verstraten, 2005; Kleinschmidt, Büchel, Hutton, Friston, & Frackowiak, 
2002; D. Williams, Phillips, & Sekuler, 1986).  
A central aim of this thesis is to link predictive processing with conscious access. Recent 
evidence also suggests that prediction facilitates conscious access (Pinto, Gaal, Lange, Lamme, & 
Seth, 2015). Melloni and colleagues showed that thresholds of subjective visibility for previously 
seen degraded targets were lower than for novel degraded targets, with changes in threshold 
accompanied by a shift in a neurophysiological signature of conscious awareness to an earlier time 
point (Melloni, Schwiedrzik, Müller, Rodriguez, & Singer, 2011). Similarly, Lupyan and Ward 
(2013) found that visually presented objects preceded by congruent auditory cues (spoken words) 
were faster to break through continuous flash suppression than those preceded by incongruent 
cues. These results, and others, collectively suggest that prior knowledge can enhance and 
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accelerate conscious access. However, research on how he development of expectation influences 
this acceleration effect is still lacking.  
The current study was designed to assess how the learning of prior expectations changes the 
timing of conscious access. I intensively trained participants on a cross-modal predictive 
relationship between an auditory tone and a colour change of a visual target, and they were tested 
on separate experimental sessions how the learned predictive association affected the timing of 
conscious access of the visual target. Training phases and test phases were interleaved in order to 
explore the temporal nature of the influence of cross-modal perceptual predictions on conscious 
access. 
To precisely measure the timing of conscious access, I employed the well-known 
motion-induced blindness (MIB) paradigm (Y. Bonneh, Cooperman, & Sagi, 2001). In MIB, a 
peripheral visual target disappears and reappears from awareness periodically when it is presented 
superimposed on a rotating background pattern. Because disappearances and reappearances are 
clear-cut in MIB (as compared to, for instance, binocular rivalry), participants can reliably report 
the timing of conscious access to the target. Moreover, previous research on MIB has shown that 
subjectively unseen visual information can still be integrated and updated to form new object 
representations unconsciously (Mitroff & Scholl, 2005). Furthermore, recently, Wu and 
colleagues demonstrated that a transient visual change (a flashed ring) can influence the timing of 
conscious access of an unseen target (Wu, Busch, Fabre-Thorpe, & VanRullen, 2009). These 
findings speak to the persistence of representations of target stimuli during periods of subjective 
invisibility during MIB. These characteristics of MIB allows us to induce visual expectation, 
while the persisting unconscious visual processing is on going and to examine how learning of 
visual expectation influence the timing of conscious access of the unconscious visual information.  
To establish visual expectation, I trained human participants to learn an audio-visual 
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cross-modal association. Previous studies on association learning have shown that a learned 
association can be reactivated when either a cue or a target is unconscious. For instance, after 
learning in classical conditioning, autonomic responses (e.g. changes in skin conductance) can be 
triggered without conscious knowledge of the CS-US contingencies (Hamm & Vaitl, 1996, 1996; 
Knight, Nguyen, & Bandettini, 2003; Morris, DeGelder, Weiskrantz, & Dolan, 2001; Morris, 
Ohman, & Dolan, 1999; Morris, Ohrnan, & Dolan, 1998; Whalen et al., 1998; M. A. Williams, 
Morris, McGlone, Abbott, & Mattingley, 2004). Moreover, unconscious visual processing has been 
found to be influenced by expectation from explicit cues. In a blindsight patient study, Kentridge et 
al. showed that an explicit valid spatial cue helped discriminate orientations of a target stimulus 
which were presented within the patient’s blind visual field without those targets eliciting 
awareness (Kentridge, Heywood, & Weiskrantz, 2004). This result suggests that informative 
expectations from an explicit cue can modulate visual processing even when the visual information 
is processed unconsciously. Taken together, I predicted that the learned expectation elicited by a 
firm audio-visual association should influence the unconscious visual processing which is visually 
supressed by MIB. 
Previous research has also shown that microsaccades can easily trigger target reappeance in 
MIB (Y. S. Bonneh et al., 2010; Hsieh & Tse, 2009; Martinez-Conde, Macknik, Troncoso, & Dyar, 
2006). Therefore, microsaccades may cause measuring noise in the reappearance timing. To avoid 
potential microsaccades and minimise visual interference in our experiment, it is necessary to 
present the cue through a modality other than vision. In the current study, an auditory informative 
cue was presented to elicit cross-modal expectation. Studies have been shown that concurrent 
presented cross-modal information from tactile (Lunghi, Binda, & Morrone, 2010), olfactory 
(Zhou, Jiang, He, & Chen, 2010), and auditory stimuli (Y.-C. Chen, Yeh, & Spence, 2011; Conrad, 
Bartels, Kleiner, & Noppeney, 2010) can modulate the suppression time of binocular rivalry based 
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on the perceptual or semantic congruency between the cross-modal information and supressed 
visual contents. Therefore, the auditory cue used in our experiment can serve the function of 
inducing visual expectations without interfering with the stability of MIB state.  
I hypothesised that conscious access to such representations could be influenced by 
cross-modal cues if strong associations were formed via extensive training. To test this hypothesis, 
I delivered an auditory cue while visual target was rendered subjectively invisible via MIB, and I 
then gradually changed the colour of the target to assess how the congruency between the cue and 
the visual sensory event influenced the timing of subjective target reappearance. Timing was 
compared with that from control trials in which the target was physically removed. In this way, I 
were able to quantify the effects of prediction on awareness and while minimizing the impact of 
other cognitive process such as attention and response bias. The main prediction was that this 
effect on conscious access can be modulated though the interleaved association training sessions 
across the whole experiment.  
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Participants 
Participants were 26 healthy students from the University of Sussex (7 male, 18–31 years; 
mean age 23.15 years, normal or corrected-to-normal vision). All of them provided informed 
consent before the experiment and received £15 or course credits as compensation. Two 
participants were excluded from data analysis because they misunderstood the instructions as to 
key responses. The experiment was approved by the University of Sussex ethics committee. 
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2.2.2 Stimuli and Procedure 
Stimuli were generated using the Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard, 1997) and all visual stimuli 
were presented on a Dell Trinitron CRT calibrated display (resolution 1048x768; refresh rate 100 
Hz) with a black background. Participants sat 50 cm away from the monitor, using a chin rest. A 
linearized colour lookup table was used for gamma correction (𝛾 = 2.2).  
Participants took part in a total of 4 training blocks and 4 MIB (testing) blocks across two 
consecutive days. As shown in Figure 2-1, each participant completed four interleaved training 
and MIB block on each day as follows: (i) Training (200 trials); (ii) MIB (90 trials); (iii) Training 
(100 trials); (iv) MIB (90 trials).  
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Figure 2-1: Organization of the experiment. Participants took part in two sessions on two 
consecutive days. Each session consisted of two 'training' and two 'MIB' blocks. Each MIB block 
consisted of 60 experimental trials interleaved with a block of 30 control trials.  
 
2.2.2.1 The training procedure.   
At the beginning of a training trial, participants were presented with a white fixation point 
and a blue target stimulus (Figure 2-2). The fixation point and the target were both circular dots 
subtending 0.2 degrees of visual angle. The fixation was presented at the centre of the screen and 
the target was to the upper-left of the fixation at 5.4 degrees of visual angle. Participants were 
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instructed to maintain their gaze at the central fixation point and to pay attention to the peripheral 
target during the entire trial. Following a delay (drawn from a random uniform distribution of 1-2 
sec) an auditory cue (500 Hz or 1000 Hz pure tone) was presented for 300 ms. One second 
following the auditory cue onset, the target changed its colour (instantaneously) from its initial 
blue to either red or green. Crucially, the pitch of the auditory cue predicted the colour change 
with 80% validity. For example, after the 500Hz tone there was an 80% chance of a blue-to-red 
colour change and a 20% chance of a blue-to-green change. In this training task, participants 
were required to indicate the new colour of the target by pressing key ‘.>’ (with the right index 
finger) or ‘/?’ (with the right middle finger) as accurately and fast as possible. Feedback was 
presented on the screen after each correct and incorrect trial. The probability mapping between 
the cue and the colour change of the target, and the mapping between the colour changes and the 
response keys, were counterbalanced between participants. 
 
Figure 2-2: The trial sequence during training blocks. A fixation and a target (the blue dot) 
display were presented for 1,000 to 2,000 ms and followed by a 300 ms auditory cue (500Hz or 
1000Hz). 1000 ms following the auditory cue, a colour change of the target occurred. 
Participants were instructed to respond to this colour change by pressing a key. The right panel 
illustrates the probabilistic relationships between the frequencies of the tone and the change of 
colours of the target. 
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2.2.2.2 The MIB procedure 
In the MIB blocks (Figure 2-3a and Figure 2-3b), each trial also started with a central 
fixation point and a peripheral target. To induce MIB of the peripheral target, I presented a 
rotating pattern consisting of an array of 64 (8 x 8) grey crosses occupying 15.6ºx15.6º in the 
background. The speed of rotation was 0.5 cycle/s. The rotating background temporarily induced 
the subjective disappearance of the target, this being MIB. Participants were instructed to indicate 
the target disappearance and reappearance by pressing and releasing the ‘z’ key respectively (with 
the left index finger). Immediately after the report of disappearance, the colour of the target 
started changing gradually and linearly in RGB space from blue to green or red. The complete 
colour change took 3 seconds. While this colour change was occurring, 1 second after target 
disappearance, a 500 Hz or 1000 Hz tone was delivered to the participants. The participants were 
instructed to ignore the tone and to release the key as quickly as possible following subjective 
reappearance of the target. The target remained on the screen for 300 ms after the key was 
released. This was followed by a colour judgement task in which participants had to report the 
new colour of the target with the same response keys as in the training block. In cases where 
participants released the key before the colour change had completed, they were instructed to 
indicate whether the colour was closer to red or green. This response ended the trial. If 
participants released the key (signifying subjective target reappearance) before auditory cue 
presentation, the trial was discarded. The probabilistic relationship between the pitch of the tone 
and the change of the colour remained the same as the training procedure (80%). The time to 
reappearance, defined as the duration between the onset of the cue and reappearance of the target 
reported by key release, was used to measure the influence of prediction on the timing of 
conscious awareness of the target. Before the first MIB block started, participants performed 
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several practice trials (> 20) to learn how to acclimatise to the MIB procedure in order to ensure 
they reliably experienced long periods of target invisibility. 
To exclude the effects of attentional bias and congruency effects at a response stage, 
participants undertook control trials in which the target was physically removed from the stimulus 
display (Figure 2-3c). Participants followed the same instruction in the control trials as in 
experimental trials: They needed to indicate the disappearance and reappearance of the target and 
make a subsequent target colour judgement. To match the individual MIB behavioural profiles 
(see Figure 2-4 for individual distribution of MIB disappearance duration), control trials were 
designed as ‘replays’ of experimental trials within the same block: Durations of subjective 
invisibility and reappearance colours were sampled from the within-block experimental trials. 
Each sampled experimental trial was used to construct four congruent control trials and one 
incongruent control trial. These control trials were randomly inserted into the remaining period of 
the same block. The duration between the onset of a trial and the onset of the physical 
disappearance was randomly selected between 2 to 4 seconds for each control trial. Each MIB 
block consisted of 60 randomly interleaved experimental trials and 30 control trials.  
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Figure 2-3: The trial sequence during motion-induced blindness (MIB) blocks: (a) the subjective 
perceived sequence (b) the experimental sequence. (c) the control sequence. Each MIB 
experimental trial (a, b) started with a central fixation point, a peripheral target, and a constantly 
rotating background. The rotating background temporarily induced the subjective disappearance 
of the target and participants were instructed to indicate subjective disappearance and 
reappearance times by pressing and releasing a key. After the key was pressed (i.e., the onset of 
subjective invisibility), the colour of the target started changing gradually from blue to green (or 
red); the complete change lasted 3 seconds. 1 second after the start of this colour change, a 500 
Hz or 1000 Hz tone (the cue) was delivered. The reappearance duration, defined as the duration 
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between the onset of the cue and the key release was used to estimate the influence of the 
prediction on the conscious awareness of the target. At the end of a trial, participants were 
instructed to indicate whether the colour was more similar to pure red or pure green. In a control 
trial (c), participants followed the same instruction in as in experimental trials. However, the 
target was physically removed from the stimulus display. (d) The time course of colour change in 
the experimental sequence. Note that the colours are highly distinguishable at the (average) 
reappearance time. 
 
Figure 2-4: Distributions of time-to-reappearance from individual participants. There are 
substantial individual differences in the timing of perceptual disappearances in MIB. To match the 
individual MIB behavioural profiles for control trials, I ‘replayed’ experimental trials as control 
trials within the same block: Durations of subjective invisibility and reappearance colours were 
sampled from the within-block experimental trials. Therefore, the timing distribution of physical 
disappearance in the control trials resembles disappearance duration the distribution of 
experimental trials. This design ensures our main results should not be affected by these individual 
differences. Red lines indicates the timing of the sound delivery. 
After completing the fourth MIB block, participants completed a brief questionnaire 
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concerning the subjective evaluation of the influence of the auditory cue on the disappearance 
duration of the visual target (a 5-point-scale question “Do you feel that the pitch of the sound 
influenced your perception of the target during the MIB state? From “1-not at all” to “5-I strongly 
felt the influence”). 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Training Blocks 
In the training blocks, analysis of response times (RTs) indicated that participants 
successfully learned the tone-colour probabilistic association. I defined the blockwise congruency 
effect (dependent variable) as the mean RTs of incongruent trials minus the mean of congruent 
trials, for a given block. The congruency effects of each block were submitted to 
Bonferroni-corrected one-tailed one-sample t-tests. I found that all congruency effects were 
significantly higher than 0 (all corrected ps < 0.05, see Figure 4). This indicates that participants 
learned the statistical relationship between the cue and the target in all training blocks. The mean 
accuracy in the training block was 97.65% (SD = 2.03%) and all participants showed above 90% 
mean accuracy. The high accuracy indicates participants correctly performed the task.  
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Figure 2-5: Response times (RTs) in the training blocks. The congruency effect was defined as the 
mean RTs of incongruent trials minus the mean RTs of congruent trials. Bonferroni corrected 
one-sample t-tests indicate that the congruency effect was significantly greater than zero in all the 
four training blocks. This indicates that participants learned the statistical relationship between 
the cue and the target at the very beginning of the experiment and maintained the learned 
association across the four training blocks. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean 
across participants. (* P < .05, ** P < .01, *** P < .001) 
Figure 2-6 shows the reaction time data separated by every 50 trials in the training blocks. The 
congruency effect was significant (ps < .05, uncorrected) except the first 50 trials in the first block 
and the last 50 trials in the fourth block. This result implies that participants learned the association 
after 50 trials. Our data shows the dynamics learning of probabilistic knowledge.  
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Figure 2-6: The reaction time data separated by every 50 trials in the training blocks. N.S.: No 
significant difference between conditions. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean 
across participants. 
2.3.2 MIB Blocks 
I next analysed the MIB blocks. The top panel of Figure 2-7 shows the mean 
time-to-reappearance in each condition. The overall time-to-reappearance in control trials was 
longer than in experimental trials (1780 and 1114 ms respectively, t(23) = -14.78, p < .001). This 
was expected due to the ‘replay’ nature of the control trials, which ensures that the response time 
for the experimental trials provides a lower bound on the response times possible in the control 
trials (excluding errors).   
To test if the learned associations modulated timing of conscious access in the MIB blocks, I 
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similarly defined the blockwise congruency effect as the mean time-to-reappearance of 
incongruent trials minus the mean time-to-reappearance of congruent trials. First, I found 
significant differences across block (one-way repeated-measure ANOVA with the four-level 
factor Block, F(3, 69) = 3.20, p = .03, η2 = .12). Next, polynomial contrasts revealed a strong 
linear trend in congruency effect from block 1 to block 4, F(1, 23) = 6.91, p = .015, η2 = .23 
(Figure 2-7 lower panel). Post hoc analyses revealed a significant difference between block 1 and 
3, t(23) = 2.90, p < .01 , and block 1 and 4, t(23) = 2.34, p = .028. These results indicate that the 
congruency effect in the MIB condition increased with successive blocks of training. No 
significant congruency effect was found by ANOVA and polynomial contrast analysis in any 
control blocks (all ps > 0.5). Thus, the learned cross-modal associations significantly accelerated 
conscious access, with this influence reliably increasing over time. 
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Figure 2-7: The upper panel show mean time-to-reappearance in each condition, and by block. The 
lower panel shows the corresponding congruency effects. The congruency effect showed a linear 
trend increment from Block 1 to Block 4 for experimental trials (left) but not for control trials 
(right). Post-hoc t-tests revealed that congruency effects in Block 3 and 4 were significantly 
larger than in Block 1. Error bars represent standard errors. (* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01)  
To assess that the results were not driven by outlying trial, I tested the congruency effect by 
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defining the blockwise congruency effect as the median time-to-reappearance of incongruent 
trials minus the median time-to-reappearance of congruent trials. First, one-way repeated-measure 
ANOVA with the four-level factor Block reached significance, F(3, 69) = 3.20, p = .03, η2 = .12. 
Next, polynomial contrasts revealed a linear trend in congruency effect from block 1 to block 4, 
F(1, 23) = 10.32, p = .04, η2 = .31. Finally, Post hoc analyses revealed a significant difference 
between block 1 and 3, t(23) = 3.17, p = .004 , and block 1 and 4, t(23) = 3.0, p = .006. No 
significant congruency effect was found by ANOVA and polynomial contrast analysis in any 
control blocks (all ps > 0.6). Therefore, our results were not biased by outliers. 
To ensure the results were not driven by outlying participants, I tested whether the 
congruency effect change was consistent across participants by adopting a general linear model 
(GLM) approach to estimate congruency effect at the individual level. For each participant, a 
GLM with one regressor (congruent versus incongruent) was applied to each block to estimate the 
congruency effect. The standardised regression coefficient of each block and each participant (i.e., 
beta) was computed and entered into the group level analysis as a dependent variable. The results of 
this analysis are highly comparable to the results computed by the mean time-to-reappearance 
difference mentioned above. First, I found significant differences across block (one-way 
repeated-measure ANOVA with the four-level factor Block, F(3, 69) = 4.4, p < .01, η2 = .161, see 
Figure 2-8). Next, a polynomial contrast performed on betas revealed a strong linear trend in 
congruency effect from block 1 to block 4, F(1, 23) = 11.26, p < .01, η2 = .329. Post hoc analyses 
revealed significant differences between block 1 and 2, t(23) = 2.07, p = .05 , 1 and 3, t(23) = 3.02, 
p < .01 , and block 1 and 4, t(23) = 3.2, p < .01. No significant congruency effect was found by 
ANOVA and polynomial contrast analysis in any control blocks (all ps > .3). The results indicate 
that the congruency effect change across blocks was reproducible at an individual-participant level 
and were not driven by outliers.  
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Figure 2-8: Congruency effect using the GLM approach. Error bars represent standard errors. (* 
P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01) 
To further establish that these congruency effects in the MIB blocks were associated 
specifically with the tone-colour training, I performed an additional analysis. I reasoned that if the 
changes of the congruency effects from the first MIB block to the fourth block were influenced by 
the training, then the magnitude of changes in congruency effect over the training blocks should 
predict the magnitude of changes of congruency effect during the experimental sessions. To 
balance training trial numbers in this analysis, I calculated the magnitude of mean congruency 
effect in the first two blocks and last two blocks and the difference between the two means for 
both training and MIB trials, and then examined the correlation in the differences across 
participants. Results confirmed our prediction. Applying a Spearman's rank correlation test, I 
found a significant correlation (rho = .45, p = .026, see Figure 2-9) indicating a linear relationship 
between the change of association strength and the change of influence of prediction on conscious 
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awareness as indexed by congruency effect. There was no significant correlation when the same 
analysis was applied to control trials (rho = -0.16, p = .43). I also performed this Spearman's rank 
correlation analysis with outliers excluded data (by a 3 SD criterion and one data point was 
excluded). The result shows marginal significance, very close to the significance level (p = .052). 
This suggests that the observed correlation was not driven solely by outliers but veridically driven 
by the trend across all participants. 
 
Figure 2-9: A Spearman's rank correlation test on MIB congruency change and the training 
congruency effect change between the first (block 1 and 2) and the second half (block 3 and 4) of 
the experiment. Data from the experimental trials showed a significant correlation. No effect was 
found in the control trials.  
To exclude any possible confound due to problems in discriminating target colour on 
reappearance, I computed the mean accuracy of the colour judgement in the MIB. The accuracy 
was nearly perfect (99.23%, SD = .7%) indicating that participants did not have difficulty in 
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discriminating the colour upon reappearance. Due to the ceiling effect, I did not observe any 
significant differences in accuracy between the congruent and incongruent conditions in both 
experimental and control trials (all p-values > .38). 
Finally, to test whether participants were aware of the influence of prediction on the 
time-to-reappearance, I computed the correlation between the self-evaluation scores from the 
post-experiment questionnaire and the congruency effects. I did not find a significant relationship 
between them (r = -.253, p = .233), suggesting that participants’ self-evaluation of the influence of 
the pitch was independent from the actual strength of influence from the predictive cues.  
2.3.3 Colour Vision Assessment 
In the current study, I did not conduct a formal assessment for colour vision. However, the 
results of our training and MIB trials ensure that our participants had the ability to discriminate the 
colours used in our present study. The Figure 2-10 shows the average accuracy from all participants 
from the training blocks and MIB blocks. All participant performed above 90% accuracy in both 
blocks. This result provides evidence that all participants had the colour vision needed to perform 
these tasks. 
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Figure 2-10: Average accuracy of colour judgments from individual participants in the training 
and MIB blocks. All participant performed above 90% accuracy in both blocks suggesting all 
participants had the colour vision needed to perform these tasks. 
2.3.4 Distributions of time-to-reappearance by blocks 
One potential confound of our main finding of congruency effect increasing by block is that 
participants may have performed the task better over time. Participants may have been able to 
maintain fixation more steadily and increase the time-to-reappearance longer. Therefore, in the 
later blocks, expectation may have had more chance to influence visual processing with more 
practice and enlarge the congruency effect. However, according to this account, the lack of 
congruency effect in earlier blocks was not due to weak learned association in the earlier stage of 
the experiment. Alternately, it may have been caused by larger variance and shorter duration of the 
MIB state. To rule out this potential confound, I compare the distributions of time-to-reappearance 
between blocks. Figure 2-11 shows the distribution of time-to-reappearance. Pairwise 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests showed no significant difference between distributions 
(Bonferroni-corrected ps > .05). Therefore, the difference of congruency effect between blocks 
was not driven by the time-to-reappearance profiles in different blocks.  
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Figure 2-11: Distributions of time-to-reappearance in each MIB blocks. The red lines indicate the 
onset of auditory stimuli. Pairwise Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests showed no significant difference 
between distributions (Bonferroni-corrected ps > .05), suggesting that the difference of congruency 
effect between blocks was not driven by the time-to-reappearance profiles in different blocks. 
2.4 Discussion 
This chapter has described psychophysical data showing that learned cross-modal 
associations influence the timing of conscious access during motion-induced blindness. In an 
interleaved training-testing design I trained participants to learn associations between tones and 
colours, and then – using tones as predictive cues – explored whether congruent tone cues 
modulated the subjective timing of reappearance of coloured target stimuli. The results showed that 
cross-modal predictive cueing accelerated time to conscious access, but only after extensive 
training. I found a linear relationship between the amount of training and the degree of facilitation, 
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further underlining that learning of predictive associations can regulate their influence on the 
timing of conscious access. This finding was further supported by a correlation between the 
individual improvements in prediction learning from day one to day two, with the magnitude of the 
prediction effect across the same time period.  
Crucially, the current design allowed us to exclude that the effects of prediction on the timing 
of conscious access were due to motor preparation or feature-based attention. First, the procedures 
and task goals were different for training and MIB blocks. In the training blocks, the task was to 
detect the colour change of target and to respond by pressing one of two keys to report the colour. In 
the MIB blocks, the task was to detect the reappearance of the target and to respond via a single key 
press. This difference in task makes it unlikely that participants adapted a similar motor preparation 
strategy acquired during the training to the MIB blocks. Second, it is well known that feature-based 
attention can facilitate the visual processing and detection performance of attended target features 
(Maunsell & Treue, 2006). One might wonder whether the prediction effect I found in the MIB 
blocks could be attributed to the facilitation of feature-based attention triggered by the auditory cue 
to a specific target colour. However, the control trials exclude this possibility, because the control 
trials were designed to replicate the subjective experience of the experimental trials but with 
physical disappearance and reappearance of the target from the stimulus array. In both experimental 
and control trials, participants performed the same task (detection of target reappearance). 
Crucially in these control trials, I found no difference in subjective time-to-reappearance between 
congruent and incongruent trials. Therefore, feature-based attention cannot account for the 
congruency effects of predictions on the timing of conscious access in this paradigm. In sum, these 
results taken together support that learned cross-modal predictive associations were responsible for 
the shift in the timing of conscious access. 
One important innovation of this study is the demonstration of the flexibility that arbitrary, 
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cross-modal predictions can influence the timing of access to subjectively suppressed visual 
information through training. Previous studies focus on the prediction between long-term bound 
representations, e.g. semantic-object identity (Y.-C. Chen et al., 2011; Lupyan & Ward, 2013) or 
audiovisual speech (Alsius & Munhall, 2013; T. D. Palmer & Ramsey, 2012a) and motion 
integration (Conrad et al., 2010). For example, Conrad and colleagues (Conrad et al., 2010) show 
that, in binocular rivalry, motion sounds can stabilise and lengthen dominance periods for 
congruent visual motion. Similarly, Chen, Yeh, and Spence found that auditory cues shortened the 
suppression period of congruent visual objects. Taken together, these findings suggest that 
cross-modal predictive information exerts substantial influences on unconscious processing, 
conscious perception, and their interaction. 
It is known that saccadic eye movements during MIB can cause immediate target 
reappearance. Previous research have also shown that microsaccades can modulate target 
perceptual transitions (Y. S. Bonneh et al., 2010; Hsieh & Tse, 2009; Martinez-Conde et al., 2006). 
Based on these previous findings, one might wonder whether these results might be explained by 
eye movements occurring preferentially when colour changes were congruent with auditory cues. 
I first note that participants were asked to maintain fixation during each trial, so saccades could 
be expected to be rare. In addition, in this experiment, colour changes happen both gradually and 
during perceptual suppression by MIB, making it is highly unlikely such eye movements could be 
triggered in such specific manner. Additionally, during data analysis, I discarded those trials in 
which the target reappearance preceded the predictive sound onset, where plausibly saccadic 
effects could have caused target reappearance. To sum up, the current result was unlikely caused 
by any impact of eye-movement. 
What implications do the current results have for possible neural mechanisms? One possibility 
is that cross-modal predictions modulate the strength of low-level cortical stimulus representations. 
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Recent findings by Kok, de Lange, and colleagues show that learned auditory to visual predictions 
can create a neuronal template of the expected visual stimulus in the visual cortex (Kok, Failing, & 
de Lange, 2014) and bias visual representations as a result of the facilitation of information 
processing for the expected stimulus (Kok et al., 2013). This direct impact from cross-modal 
prediction to low-level visual representations may lead to a change in timing of conscious access, 
especially if these visual representations can be construed as a stimulus specific priors in a 
Bayesian framework. More generally these results strongly indicate the existence of neural 
pathways capable of conveying cross-modal predictive information. Previous studies have shown 
that, during associative learning, brain connectivity between cortical regions responsible for 
associated events increases in strength with training (Büchel, Coull, & Friston, 1999; den Ouden et 
al., 2009; Mcintosh & Gonzalez-Lima, 1998; von Kriegstein & Giraud, 2006). This suggests the 
possibility that, in the current study, the incremental change of the facilitation effect may be due to 
a gradual build-up of functional connectivity for conveying predictive information across the 
sensory modalities. Future investigations combining psychophysics with neuroimaging 
connectivity analyses could test this hypothesis. 
In the current study, the congruency effect in the second day MIB blocks (the block 3 and 4) 
was much stronger than that in the first day MIB blocks (the block 1 and 2). A potential explanation 
for the second day ‘boost’ is that sleep between the two days facilitated and consolidated the 
associative learning from the first day. It is well known that sleep plays a beneﬁcial role in memory 
consolidation (Stickgold & Walker, 2007; Walker & Stickgold, 2006) as previous studies have 
shown sleep facilitates associative memory (Stickgold, Scott, Rittenhouse, & Hobson, 1999), 
statistical learning (Durrant, Taylor, Cairney, & Lewis, 2011), and perceptual learning (Fenn, 
Nusbaum, & Margoliash, 2003; Karni, Tanne, Rubenstein, Askenasy, & Sagi, 1994; Stickgold, 
James, & Hobson, 2000; Yotsumoto et al., 2009). In the current study, participants learned the 
61 
 
 
statistical relationship between the auditory cue and the visual target. Given the extent literature on 
the role of sleep in learning, it is plausible that sleep strengthened the predictive value of the 
auditory cues, thereby facilitating conscious access to predicted visual events on the second day. 
However, in the current study was not explicitly designed to examine the effect of sleep in this 
experimental paradigm. Thus, I leave this possibility open for future studies. 
The design of the current control trials is unable to rule out possible effect from response bias. 
The auditory cues may lower the response threshold of congruent visual targets. Therefore, in the 
experimental trial, when the visual targets are supressed in the MIB state, the evidence 
accumulation reaches the response threshold in congruent trials than in incongruent trials. However, 
in the current control trials, the visual target physically reappeared immediately avoiding the 
unconscious evidence accumulation process. Therefore, the control trials are unable to verify if the 
current congruency effect is led by the change of the response threshold. Future studies can make 
visual target reappear gradually allowing similar evidence accumulation processes to occur in 
control trial and examine the potential effect of change of response threshold.  
The current results lend support to predictive coding (or predictive processing) frameworks 
for understanding perception (Clark, 2012; Karl Friston, 2005; Rao & Ballard, 1999). On these 
views, perceptual content is determined by probabilistic inference of the most likely external 
causes of sensory signals. The data support the view that conscious access occurs when predictive 
models are verified against sensory inputs so that prediction errors are minimized. On this view, 
valid predictive cues will engage predictive models that are validated against sensory signals more 
rapidly, leading to more rapid conscious access (Lupyan & Ward, 2013; Melloni et al., 2011; Pinto 
et al., 2015; Sherman, Seth, Barrett, & Kanai, 2015). The present results extend this approach by 
showing how predictive influences on perception develop across time via training, and by 
underlining the flexibility of these influences by demonstrating their efficacy using cross-modal 
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and arbitrary associations. These results together suggest that predictive influences may permeate 
and shape conscious experiences more deeply and broadly than previously thought.  
63 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Visual Perceptual Echo Reflects Learning of Temporal Regularities in Rapid Luminance 
Sequences 
3.1 Introduction  
This Chapter aims to investigate how low level information within the sensory hierarchy is 
dealt with by predictive processing via unconscious visual sequence learning. However, relatively 
little is known about how the human visual system tracks, or learns about, such rapidly changing 
stimulus sequences. One recent finding relevant to this question is the ‘perceptual echo’ (VanRullen 
and MacDonald, 2012). This is long-lasting reverberation between a rapidly changing visual input 
and evoked neural activity, apparent in cross-correlations between occipital EEG and the stimulus 
itself. Specifically, when visually presenting a non-periodic dynamic sequence, whose luminance 
randomly fluctuated at a rate of 160 Hz, VanRullen and MacDonald found that the occipital EEG 
response displayed a periodic reverberation or ‘echo’ of the input sequence, which persisted for at 
least one second, and was found specifically in the alpha (~10 Hz) frequency range of the 
cross-correlation function, primarily over occipital electrodes and was observable at the group 
level. 
Specifically, when presenting a random dynamic sequence, whose luminance randomly 
fluctuated at a rate of 160 Hz, the occipital EEG response displayed a periodic reverberation or 
‘echo’ of the input sequence, which persisted for at least one second, and was found specifically in 
the alpha (~10 Hz) frequency range of the cross-correlation function, primarily over occipital 
electrodes. Importantly, the absence of such a reverberation when the luminance sequence of each 
trial was cross-correlated with EEG recorded on a different trial underlines that the perceptual echo 
is a true oscillatory response to the visual stimulation sequence, and not a general property of 
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ongoing EEG signals in response to this kind of stimulation. Furthermore, the seconds-long 
duration of the perceptual ‘echo’– suggests a long-lasting representation of fast-changing sensory 
information over time. However, the functional relevance and the underlying mechanism of the 
perceptual echo have so far remained unclear. 
One interpretation of perceptual echo is that the visual cortex repeatedly “replays” neural 
activation associated with afferent visual information. Supporting this view, studies in awake 
monkeys (Eagleman & Dragoi, 2012), mice and rats (Gavornik & Bear, 2014; Xu, Jiang, Poo, & 
Dan, 2012) found that after learning an association between a cue and a sequence stimulus, 
presenting the cue alone can elicit the same neural activation pattern as evoked by the actual 
stimulus. This replay activation pattern has been interpreted as a mechanism that may facilitate 
learning and memory consolidation (Euston et al., 2007; Skaggs and McNaughton, 1996).  
I reasoned that, if the perceptual echo is indeed associated with visual regularity learning, the 
perceptual echo response should change across repeated presentations of the same luminance 
sequence, as the visual cortex encodes regularities across sequence repetitions. In two experiments, 
I tested this prediction by using random dynamic luminance sequences that were predictable across 
repeated presentations. In Experiment 1, I presented random dynamic luminance sequences that 
were each repeated four times and I calculated the perceptual echo for each presentation. In 
Experiment 2, I added an ‘inverse’ luminance sequence (which has the inverse luminance polarity 
of the original sequence) following the presentation of the fourth repetition of a sequence, which 
was followed by an additional presentation of the original sequence, to test whether changes in 
perceptual echo were specific to the (non-periodic) temporal and luminance information within a 
given sequence.  
Altogether, this data provides first evidence for a predictive mechanism by which the human 
visual system rapidly learns temporal regularities in fast non-periodic sequences, and in doing so 
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provides a functional account of the alpha-band ‘perceptual echo’ response. 
 
3.2 Experiment 1 
3.2.1 Methods 
21 healthy students participated in this study from the University of Sussex (11 male, 18–36 
years; mean age 24.9 years, all had normal or corrected-to-normal vision). All of them provided 
informed consent before the experiment and received £10 or course credits as compensation for 
their time. The experiment was approved by the University of Sussex ethics committee. 
 Participants were seated in a dimly lit electromagnetically shielded room and their heads were 
stabilised in a head-and-chin rest to maintain centrality 50 cm away from a LaCie Electron blue IV 
22" CRT Monitor at a 160Hz refresh rate, which had been manually gamma corrected. Stimuli were 
generated and presented using the Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard, 1997).  
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Figure 3-1: Example of trial structure in Experiment 1. For each trial a specific random luminance 
sequence (e.g. sequence A) was presented four times. Each luminance sequence lasted 3.125s and 
consisted of a disc with randomly changing luminance at 160 Hz. Sequences were separated by an 
inter-sequence-interval (ISI) of 3s. ’Response’ sequences, which contained an embedded square 
image (1s duration, random onset time within sequence), were distributed at random points 
in-between trials throughout the experiment. Participants were requested to press a key after each 
sequence if they noticed a square.  
 
Each experimental session comprised 60 trials utilising 60 unique random non-periodic luminance 
sequences. Each trial consisted of four presentations of the same sequence. Each presentation lasted 
for 3.125s and successive presentations were separated by an inter-sequence-interval (ISI) of 3s. 
Luminance-sequence stimuli were constructed based on VanRullen and Macdonald (2012) as 
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follows. Each sequence consisted of a disc stimulus subtending a visual angle of 7 degrees and its 
centre was placed at 7.5 degrees above a fixation point (a dim grey circle with 0.2 degrees of visual 
angle). The luminance of the disc altered randomly at a rate of 160 Hz, so that each sequence 
consisted of 500 luminance frames (see Figure 3-1). Thus, each sequence comprised a rapid 
non-periodic sequence of luminance changes. To ensure equal power of all temporal frequencies 
within each sequence, all sequences were processed by a whitening procedure. Fourier components 
of each sequence were obtained by fast Fourier transform. Power at all frequencies of each random 
sequence were equalised by normalizing the amplitudes of its Fourier components. An inverse 
Fourier transform was then applied to reconstruct the sequence. Thus, sequences were not 
distinguishable by power characteristics of their temporal frequencies. 
To ensure participants maintained attention, sixty ‘response sequences’ were distributed 
throughout the experiment. Each ‘response sequence’ contained an embedded square image (3.75 
degrees). The target appeared for 1s with onset time selected from a uniformly distributed random 
time during the sequence presentation. Participants were informed that the experiment was a visual 
detection task in which they were required to press the spacebar on a standard keyboard at the end 
of a sequence whenever they detected the target. Each response sequence was randomly assigned to 
a position in-between experimental trials. This was done individually for every response sequence, 
resulting in the possibility of there being one, more than one, or zero, response sequence between 
any two experimental trials. This design made it unlikely that participants could predict the onset of 
an experimental trial based on the occurrence of a response sequence. 
Participants were not informed that there would be any repetition of the luminance sequences. 
The entire experimental session consisted of 300 (240 standard and 60 response) sequences and 
took approximately 1 hour to complete. In a post-experiment interview participants were asked if 
they noticed any repetition of luminance sequences in the experiment. The following questions 
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were asked:  
Did you notice any experimental manipulation during this experiment?  
Did you notice any relationship between any two sequences?  
Did you notice any repetition of any of the sequences? 
 
EEG data were recorded using a 64 channel ANT Neuro amplifier at a sampling rate of 2048 
Hz. A 64 channel Waveguard EEG cap (ANT Neuro, Enschede) employing standard Ag/AgCl 
electrodes placed according to the 10-20 system was used. Horizontal and vertical eye movements 
were recorded using two independent electrode pairs. Impedances of recording electrodes were 
maintained below 10kΩ. No analogue filter was applied during on-line recording.  
 
3.2.1.1 Data Processing and Statistical Analysis 
Pre-processing and data analyses were performed using the EEGLAB toolbox (Delorme and 
Makeig, 2004) under Matlab (Mathworks, Inc. Natick, MA, USA), and custom Matlab scripts. The 
acquired EEG data were downsampled to 160Hz and filtered using a 2-80 Hz bandpass ﬁlter. 
Independent component analysis (ICA) was used to identify and remove ocular artefacts. Data in 
each trial were then epoched from 0 to 3.125 seconds time-locked to the stimulus onset (start of the 
luminance sequence).  
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Figure 3-2: Recording and computation of perceptual echo for a representative subject. A. For 
each luminance sequence presentation and EEG sensor, I computed the cross-correlation 
(-1.5s:1.5s) between the luminance value series and the EEG time series. This provides an 
ensemble of cross-correlation time series for each luminance sequence, indexed by sensor and 
presentation number. B. As in VanRullen and Macdonald (2012), averaging the cross-correlations 
for each luminance sequence revealed a long lasting post-onset oscillation (~1.5 sec) in the alpha 
range: the ‘perceptual echo’ (blue line). The red line shows the same analysis with shuffled data 
(see methods), in which no perceptual echo is observed. C. The phase coherence (across trials) of 
the cross-correlation time series shows that the perceptual echo is due to the strong phase 
coherence within the alpha frequency range (~10 Hz).  
 
To identify the perceptual echo, I calculated cross-correlations between EEG time series and 
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luminance time series for all experimental sequences and sensors. Cross-correlations were 
evaluated with lags between -1.5s and 1.5s (Figure 3-2a) by the following definition: 
𝑥𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑡) =  ∑ 𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚(𝑇). 𝑒𝑒𝑔(𝑇 + 𝑡)
𝑇
 
xcorr is the cross-correlation value. stim and eeg denote the standardized stimulus sequence 
and the corresponding standardized EEG response, respectively. 
For each participant, I then averaged the cross-correlations across each sequence for all 
sensors, which revealed a long-lasting post-onset oscillation in the alpha range (Figure 3-2b). This 
revealed a perceptual echo, replicating the results of VanRullen and Macdonald (2012). To quantify 
the amplitude of the echo response, I applied a Fast Fourier Transform on the average 
cross-correlation between 0s and 1s for each participant and sensor to extract the alpha-range (8-12 
Hz) power.   
To compare the echo response across successive presentations of a luminance sequence, the 
cross-correlations were averaged by the order of presentation for each sensor, across trials (e.g., all 
cross-correlations for the first presentation of a given random luminance sequence were averaged 
across trials, and the same for all second, third, and fourth presentations). I then computed the 
amplitude of the echo response for each presentation and participant. 
To verify that the perceptual echo was driven by the EEG response to a specific luminance 
sequence and not by variations in ongoing alpha activity in the raw EEG signal, I created a 
‘shuffled’ set of cross-correlations by randomly rearranging the EEG time series with stimulus 
sequences from different trials. As can be seen from Figure 3-2b (red line), this procedure leads to a 
complete absence of echo response, confirming that the echo response is not driven by the ongoing 
alpha-band EEG response.  
I found that the magnitude of the echo response varied across individuals. Participants with no 
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significant perceptual echo were excluded from the data analysis, as follows. First, 
cross-correlation time series were averaged across all trials, then the distribution of absolute values 
across lags were derived from the averaged cross-correlation for real and shuffled data separately. 
The non-parametric Kolmogorov–Smirnov test was then performed to examine the similarity of the 
two distributions. I excluded those participants with p >.001 (i.e., those participants for whom echo 
responses were not significantly different between the shuffled and non-shuffled data). Seven out 
of twenty-one participants were excluded using this procedure (Figure 3-3). 
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Figure 3-3: Individual echo response and its data distribution for Experiment 1. The magnitude of 
the echo response varied from individual to individual (the left panels in each column). To 
determine a rigorous exclusion criterion, cross-correlation time series were averaged across all 
trials (left panel). Distribution of absolute values across lags were derived from the averaged 
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cross-correlation (the right panels in each column) for non-shuffled (red) and shuffled data (blue). 
An average cross-correlation close to zero leads to a distribution skewed towards zero. The 
non-parametric Kolmogorov–Smirnov test was then performed to examine the similarity of the two 
distributions. We excluded those participants who showed the p-value of the comparison was larger 
than .001 (highlighted in orange). The order of participants is sorted by the result of the 
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test.  
 
3.2.2 Results 
Figure 3-4 shows the average alpha (8-12 Hz) power of the cross-correlation, i.e., the 
amplitude of the perceptual echo response, across all participants and sequence presentations. I 
found a maximal echo response over occipital sensors, centred over POz, consistent with previous 
findings (VanRullen & Macdonald, 2012). To maximize the sensitivity to any potential effect of 
stimulus sequence repetition on echo response, the following analyses were therefore conducted 
with data from POz only.  
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Figure 3-4: The topography of the echo response averaged across all sequence presentations and 
participants. Each line represents data from a single electrode. The topographic plot displays the 
8-12 Hz envelope of the echo response and reveals a maximum at POz with a gradual decrease 
from posterior to anterior electrodes (Arbitrary Units (a.u.)). 
 
To test whether repetitions of a luminance sequence modulated perceptual echo, I compared 
the average amplitude of the perceptual echo for each sequence presentation using polynomial 
contrasts. Supporting this hypothesis that successive presentations would increase echo amplitude, 
I found a strong linear trend from presentation 1 to presentation 4 (F(1, 13) = 7.32, p = .018). 
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Post-hoc paired t-tests revealed a larger echo amplitude for presentation 4 compared to presentation 
1 (bootstrapping test with 10,000 resamples, p < .01), see Figure 3-5a. 
 
Figure 3-5: A. Experiment 1. Perceptual echo amplitude for each sequence presentation, averaged 
across all participants, for electrode POz. The echo amplitude displayed a linear increase across 
successive presentations. B. t-value map of the echo amplitude comparing presentation 4 to 
presentation 1 across all participants. The maximum difference in echo amplitude was located over 
occipital electrodes. (× indicates areas of significant difference between presentations, multiple 
t-test between all electrodes, Bonferroni corrected) C. Average of all participants’ power from 
8-12 Hz (µV2) for each sequence presentation for all trials for electrode POz. Average alpha power 
of the EEG time series was not affected by the repetition of a luminance sequence. D. 
Time-frequency analysis of the effect of sequence repetition on perceptual echo power. The plot 
shows the difference in time-frequency analysis of the perceptual echo between presentation 4 and 
presentation 1, averaged across luminance sequences and subjects, for POz. The echo differs 
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significantly between presentations 4 and 1 within the alpha frequency range from ~375 to 505ms 
(8-12Hz). The outlined area highlighted with a red arrow indicates significant differences using 
multiple t-tests, p<.05, False Discovery Rate (FDR) corrected. Average echo amplitude is 
measured in Arbitrary Units (a.u.); Average power is measured in microvolts squared. To 
effectively represent the variance within subjects, error bars show standard error of the difference 
between the first presentation and all subsequent presentations. 
 
One might wonder whether the increase described above could be attributed to a general effect 
of the repetition of luminance sequences on the spectral power of the occipital EEG. To test this 
possibility, I computed the EEG amplitude spectra of the 3.125 epoch for every luminance 
sequence presentation and then averaged the amplitude spectra across each sequence presentation. I 
compared the average EEG amplitude spectra for each sequence presentation using polynomial 
contrasts, which did not reveal a significant linear relationship between presentation 1 to 
presentation 4 (F(1, 13) = .65, p = .44). Further post-hoc paired t-tests between the 4 presentations 
confirmed this result (all ps > .28). Thus, the increase in echo response amplitude with successive 
sequence presentations cannot be attributed to a general effect of EEG alpha response to these 
stimuli (see Figure 3-5c). 
To examine the topography of the change in echo response from the first to the last 
presentation, I performed t-tests on echo amplitude between presentation 1 and presentation 4 
across subjects and electrodes and plotted the t-values. The largest difference in echo response was 
observed over occipital electrodes (see Figure 3-5b). 
I next computed the difference in echo response between presentations 1 and 4 in 
time-frequency space. This confirmed the repetition enhancement of the echo response, by 
showing that the alpha power of the echo response for presentation 4 was significantly larger than 
for presentation 1, with this effect concentrated within the period of the cross-correlation between 
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375 - 505 ms after sequence onset (ps < .05 FDR corrected, Figure 3-5d). 
In the post-test questionnaire, all participants responded ‘no’ to all of the questions, ruling 
out explicit learning of a sequence as driving the increase in echo response with repeated 
sequence presentations. 
Summarising, the results from Experiment 1 demonstrate that the amplitude of the 
perceptual echo response increases in a linear fashion with successive repetitions of a specific 
dynamic luminance sequence, even though participants were not aware of these repetitions. This 
finding shows that the visual system can encode temporal regularities defining repetitions of a 
specific luminance sequence. I next set out to determine the robustness and stability of this finding.  
3.3 Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 investigated the robustness of the increase in echo amplitude with repeated 
sequence presentations, across time and intervening sensory input. In this experiment, repeated (4) 
presentations of a specific luminance sequence were followed, firstly by an inverse luminance 
sequence, and secondly by another instance of the original (non-inverse) sequence. Each inverse 
sequence was created by inverting the luminance polarity, of the original sequence i.e. reversing 
black and white relative to the middle grey level (see Figure 3-6). This preserved the relative 
luminance values of the sequence while also maintaining a flat luminance power spectrum. I 
reasoned that, if the echo response reflects temporal regularity learning, the dissimilar luminance 
polarities of the inverse sequence should abolish any signature of sequence learning in the echo 
response, since the temporal contingencies of the sequence as a whole (luminance polarities) 
would be completely different while all other temporal and visual characteristics are preserved. I 
further reasoned that, if the learning process is robust across time and to intervening sensory input, 
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the echo response amplitude should recover or further increase in amplitude when the original 
sequence re-appeared following the inverse luminance sequence.  
 Experiment 2 was also designed to eliminate a potential confound in Experiment 1. In 
Experiment 1, each trial consisted of 4 presentations of the same sequence, and response sequences 
were randomly assigned to positions in-between experimental trials. This was done individually for 
each response sequence, resulting in the possibility of there being one, more than one, or zero, 
response sequences between any two experimental trials. This may have led to a potential, but 
highly unlikely, scenario that the distribution of response sequences fell by chance into a regular 
pattern between trials. In this unlikely situation participants may have developed strategies to 
deploy more attention towards the end of a trial in anticipation of a possible response sequence. 
Previous research has shown that increased attention can amplify the perceptual echo (VanRullen & 
Macdonald, 2012), raising the possibility that the increase in perceptual echo amplitude with 
repeated sequence presentations may have been caused by increased attention to the later 
presentations (i.e. presentation 4). To avoid this potential confound, in Experiment 2 the previous 
response sequences were no longer used. Instead, participants were required to estimate the average 
luminance level of the sequence in every trial, judging if the current sequence was on average 
brighter or darker than the fixation point. This modification meant that all sequences were 
‘response’ sequences, ensuring that participants had to maintain equal attention to all sequences.  
3.3.1 Methods 
18 healthy students from the University of Sussex participated in this study (6 male, 20–36 
years; mean age 25.2 years, normal or corrected-to-normal vision), none of which took part in 
Experiment 1. All provided informed consent before the experiment and received £10 or course 
credits as compensation. The experiment was approved by the University of Sussex ethics 
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committee. The apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1. There were a total of 120 trials. In the 
control condition (60 trials), a specific 3.125s sequence was presented for six times with 3s 
inter-sequence-interval. In the experimental condition (60 trials), a sequence was repeated four 
times. Then, on the fifth presentation, the inverse luminance sequence was presented. Following 
the inverse luminance sequence, the original sequence was presented again, making a total of six 
presentations of a sequence for each trial, see Figure 3-6.  
In cases in which permutation t-tests did not display significant results I quantified how close 
to the null (no difference in amplitude) or alternative hypothesis (difference in amplitude) each 
result was by additional Bayes Factor (BF) analyses of paired sample t-tests using JASP (JASP 
Team, 2016) with a Cauchy prior of .707 half-width at half-maximum suggested by Rouder et al. 
(Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009).  
Participants were asked to indicate whether the average luminance level of each sequence was 
brighter or darker than the luminance of the fixation circle, by pressing the left arrow for darker and 
right arrow for lighter, after each sequence presentation. The average luminance of a sequence was 
closely comparable across all sequence presentations (the standard deviations of the average 
luminance of all sequences relative to the entire luminance dynamic range of all sequences 
were .018% in Experiment 1 and .019% in Experiment 2). Therefore, participants could not use the 
average luminance of a sequence as a potential cue to encode a sequence. The luminance of the 
fixation circle was constant, meaning that the participant’s judgements about the average 
luminance after each sequence were always based on similar information. Across all response 
sequences, participants rated 63.5% of sequences as being brighter than the fixation. One 
participant indicated for all sequences that the average luminance was brighter than the fixation, 
this may have been due to a perceptual bias when rating similar information across sequences, the 
data from this participant still showed a robust echo response and survived the exclusion criteria.  
80 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-6: Experiment 2 trial structure. In a control trial, 6 presentations of the same sequence 
were shown. In an experimental trial, after 4 presentations of a given sequence, the inverse-polarity 
luminance sequence was presented, followed by a final replay of the original (non-inverse) 
sequence. Each sequence lasted 3.125s, separated by an inter-sequence-interval of 3s. 
 
I adopted the same exclusion criterion as in Experiment 1, to exclude participants with no 
significant perceptual echo. Four participants were excluded using this procedure, meaning that 14 
participants’ data were retained for further analyses. 
3.3.2 Results 
To assess whether the main effect of sequence repetition on perceptual echo amplitude was 
present, I compared the amplitude of perceptual echo from presentation 1 to presentation 4 (data 
was pooled from experimental and control conditions) using a polynomial contrast analysis to test 
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the linear dependence between presentations 1 to 4. Although showing an unexpectedly high 
average echo amplitude for the 3rd presentation, the results remain supportive of a linear trend from 
presentation 1 to presentation 4, F(1, 13) = 6.35, p = .026, see Figure 3-7a. 
 
Figure 3-7: A. Echo amplitude as a function of repetition of luminance sequences. For the first 4 
presentations of a given sequence, I observed a linear increase in echo amplitude with successive 
presentations, similar to Experiment 1 (data pooled across experimental and control trials). B. 
Critically, a subsequent ‘inverse’ sequence (experimental trials) showed a reduction in echo 
amplitude to a level similar to initial presentation of a luminance sequence, as compared to a fifth 
presentation of a non-inverse sequence. C. Re-presenting the original sequence following the 
inverse sequence (Replay, experimental trials), showed a recovery of echo amplitude 
indistinguishable from a 6th successive presentation. Perceptual echo amplitude is measured in 
Arbitrary Units, a.u. To effectively represent the variance within subjects, error bars show standard 
error of the difference between the first presentation and all subsequent presentations.  
 
I next examined whether presentation of an inverse luminance sequence would abolish the 
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increase in echo amplitude seen after four successive presentations. I compared the echo amplitude 
elicited by the 5th presentation between experimental (i.e. the inverse luminance sequence) and 
control conditions. In this comparison, the two echo amplitudes were both evoked by the fifth 
presentations: either an inverse sequence (experimental condition), or another presentation of the 
same (non-inverse) sequence (control condition). If the new sequence is able to interrupt the 
repetition effect, we should expect the analysis yields a null-result. The echo amplitude elicited by 
the inverse sequence was significantly lower than elicited by a 5th (non-inverse) presentation 
(two-tailed paired t-test, t(13) = 4.36, p < .002, bootstrap, 10,000 resamples)(see Figure 3-7b). I 
also compared the echo amplitude elicited by the inverse sequence and presentation 1 in 
experimental trials and found no significant difference in echo amplitude between the two 
presentations (two-tailed paired t-test, t(13) = .02, p = .71, bootstrap, 10,000 resamples). 
Traditional statistics hypothesis testing (i.e., t-test) does not provide a quantitative measure about 
how strongly the data supports the null hypothesis. I additionally used Bayes factor analysis to 
further evaluate to what extent the echo amplitude elicited by the inverse sequence supported the 
null hypothesis (i.e. a conclusion of no difference in echo amplitude between the 1st presentation 
and inverse sequence.) or the alternative hypothesis, (i.e. echo amplitude was different between the 
1st presentation and inverse sequence). As expected, I found BF = .29 (less than .33), which 
moderately supports the null (i.e., no difference) over the alternative hypothesis (Dienes, 2011).   
Together these results indicate that an inverse luminance sequence, carefully controlled for a 
range of perceptual and temporal properties, was processed in a similar manner as a new luminance 
sequence, in terms of perceptual echo. This confirms that the visual system is encoding precise 
sequence information, rather than only general temporal properties of luminance sequences (e.g. 
time-frequency dynamic, auto-correlation) or its visual characteristics (e.g. luminance range and 
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variance), since these more general features are shared with the inverse luminance sequence. 
I next compared the topography of the echo response amplitude for the 5th sequence 
presentations between experimental and control trials. I performed t-tests on echo amplitude 
between these presentations across subjects and electrodes and plotted the resulting t-values, see 
Figure 3-8a. Similar to Experiment 1, the largest difference in the echo response was found over 
occipital electrodes, with a maximum over POz. 
 
 
Figure 3-8: A. t-value map of echo amplitude difference between presentation 5 (control condition) 
and the inverse luminance sequence (experimental condition) for all subjects, in Experiment 2. A 
significant difference was centred over occipital electrode POz (outlined, FDR corrected). B. 
t-value map of echo amplitude difference between presentation 6 (control condition) and the replay 
sequence (experimental condition) for all subjects, in Experiment 2. There were no significant 
differences in echo amplitude between the two presentations. 
I then examined whether sequence information encoded across presentations 1 to 4 could 
persist even after the presentation of an inverse luminance sequence. I reasoned that if such 
information does persist, re-presenting the original sequence after the inverse luminance sequence 
should restore the amplitude of the perceptual echo to a level comparable to six sequential 
presentations of a particular sequence. I therefore compared the echo amplitude elicited by the 
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‘replay’ sequence in the experimental condition, and the 6th presentation in the control condition. 
No significant difference was observed (Figure 3-7c); indeed, echo amplitudes for these two 
presentations were almost identical (t = .01, p = .99). I computed BF to evaluate whether the echo 
amplitude elicited by the replay sequence was supportive of the null hypothesis (i.e. no difference 
in echo amplitude between the replay and presentation 6) or the alternative hypothesis, (i.e. echo 
amplitude is different between replay and presentation 6). I expected that the BF should support 
null-hypothesis more than alternative hypothesis. A BF = .27 provides strong evidence (less 
than .33) for accepting the null over the alternative hypothesis, indicating that sequence-specific 
information about a particular luminance sequence persists, for over 9 seconds, even in the 
presence of intervening visual input.  
Finally, I examined the topography of the difference in echo response amplitude between 
presentation 6 (control) and replay (experimental) sequences. I performed t-tests on echo amplitude 
between these presentations across participants and electrodes and plotted the resulting t-values, 
see Figure 3-8b. There were no significant differences at any sensor, indicating that the echo 
response to the replay luminance sequence displayed a similar topography and magnitude as 
presentation 6 (All BF < .79, supporting the null hypothesis).  
3.4 Discussion  
In two experiments, I investigated the functional relevance of the perceptual echo response, 
testing the hypothesis that it reflects a predictive processing mechanism which can encode and 
learn dynamic visual sequences within the visual cortex. 
Supporting this hypothesis, Experiment 1 showed that the perceptual echo response is enhanced by 
repetitions of an identical rapid luminance sequence, suggesting that the perceptual echo reflects a 
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neural signature of temporal regularity learning. 
Control analyses using shuffled data excluded the possibility that increases in perceptual echo 
amplitude could be attributed to general changes in induced alpha-band EEG responses resulting 
from sequence repetitions. 
Experiment 2 established that the repetition-dependent changes in perceptual echo reflect 
specific sequence information. Following 4 presentations of a specific sequence I presented an 
inverse luminance sequence, which preserved all non-sequential spectral and temporal properties 
of the original sequence. Strikingly, the echo amplitude for the inverse sequence returned to a 
level comparable to presentation of a novel sequence (see Figure 3-7b). When the original 
stimulus sequence was presented again (following the inverse sequence), the echo amplitude 
recovered to a level consistent with the number of presentations of this sequence, demonstrating 
that information about an encoded sequence persisted for over 9 seconds and was robust to 
intervening visual input.  
Behavioural studies have demonstrated that humans are able to learn temporal sequences 
presented at different rates (1.7-8.3 Hz) consisting of spatiotemporal information (Song, Jr, & 
Howard, 2008), combinations of visual features (colour and spatial) (Gheysen, Van Opstal, 
Roggeman, Van Waelvelde, & Fias, 2011) and object orientations (Luft, Meeson, Welchman, & 
Kourtzi, 2015). These results extend these findings by showing that the visual system is capable of 
sequence learning even with stimuli presented orders of magnitude faster (160 Hz) than previously 
used. This sensitivity to rapidly changing input is in line with known properties of the human 
auditory system, where auditory sequence learning has been described behaviourally for random 
and meaningless input signals (Gaussian random noise). Notably, as in the present study, signatures 
of sequence-specific learning were found to persist for seconds and be robust to intervening 
auditory inputs (Agus et al.,(2010). 
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Regarding neural substrates of sequence learning, both human and animal studies have 
implicated brain regions outside primary sensory areas. For example, in monkeys, information 
about spatiotemporal sequences is encoded in inferior temporal cortex and also V4 (Li & DiCarlo, 
2008; Meyer & Olson, 2011). However, Gavornik and Bear (2014) found that, in mice, it was 
possible to detect the encoding of spatiotemporal sequence information early in the visual stream, 
within the primary visual cortex. These findings are compatible with the localisation of the 
perceptual echo – and its increase across repeated sequence presentations – to (human) visual 
regions.  
What mechanisms could be responsible for the increase in echo response that I observe with 
successive presentations of luminance sequences? One possibility is that this increase may be a 
consequence of the increasing similarity across sequence repetitions between luminance changes in 
the stimulus sequence and changes in the evoked EEG response. This would result in stronger 
cross-correlations between the EEG and the luminance sequence, with successive presentations, 
and hence an increase in echo amplitude. This could be thought of as ‘sharpening’ of the neuronal 
assemblies representing visual sequences, reflecting increasingly precise representations of 
repeated sequences. Supporting this interpretation, previous studies on perceptual learning have 
shown that repeated exposure to the same visual input sharpens the responsiveness of neuronal 
assemblies representing these inputs (Seitz & Dinse, 2007). For instance, monkeys trained on an 
orientation discrimination task show a post-training decrease in response variability and an 
increase in the slope of orientation-tuning curves in V4 for the trained orientations (Yang & 
Maunsell, 2004). Similarly, the phenomenon of repetition suppression may be caused by a 
sharpening or tuning mechanism, which occurs when repeated exposure to a stimulus leads to a 
more precise and more efficient neural representation of that stimulus (Desimone, 1996; Kok et al., 
2012). At a mechanistic level, neuronal sharpening is thought to depend on Hebbian processes, 
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among which spike-timing dependent plasticity (STDP) is particularly significant when dealing 
with temporal relationships (Bi & Poo, 1998). Markram et al., (1997) found that STDP displayed 
the highest speed and efficacy when spike timing was reliable. Additionally, STDP has been shown 
to make neurons extremely sensitive to repeating spatio-temporal patterns (Guyonneau, VanRullen, 
& Thorpe, 2005; Markram, Lübke, Frotscher, & Sakmann, 1997; Masquelier, Guyonneau, & 
Thorpe, 2008a, 2008b). The repeated presentation of a luminance sequence may have increased 
both the sensitivity and reliability of neural responses facilitating the rapid encoding of sequence 
information found in this study. 
An alternative explanation for the primary finding is that the amplitude of specific evoked 
EEG responses to the luminance sequence could increase across successive repetitions. This would 
lead to an increased signal to noise ratio and thus also to stronger cross-correlations between the 
EEG time series and luminance sequences. While the opposite phenomenon is commonly observed 
(repetition suppression), a wide range of studies investigating perceptual learning have found that 
the neural response to a stimulus can also be enhanced by repeated exposure to identical sensory 
input (Karni & Sagi, 1991; Vogels, 2010). However, the results do not support this alternative 
interpretation since I found no difference in alpha power in the raw EEG signal across repetitions of 
the same luminance sequence, as would be expected if the amplitude of the alpha-band evoked 
EEG signal was driving the increases in echo response across sequence repetitions (Figure 3-5c).  
In summary, the enhancement of the echo response with successive presentations of a 
sequence is most plausibly due to an increase in similarity between luminance changes in the 
stimulus sequence and changes in the evoked EEG response. A candidate mechanism for this 
process is STDP, which has the effect of sharpening the population response for each specific 
sequence, leading to an enhanced echo response with successive presentations of a sequence. 
Could the perceptual echo be a signature of active visual processing? A striking feature of the 
88 
 
 
echo response is its periodicity, this feature suggests that the visual system is actively engaging in 
repeated patterns of activity in response to ongoing sensory stimulation. One might speculate that 
periodicity of the perceptual echo reflects an underlying iterative learning process that updates and 
replays temporal representations at a rate defined by occipital alpha. This interpretation is 
motivated by the influential ‘predictive processing’ account of perception and brain function, in 
which the brain continuously generates and updates predictions about incoming sensory signals 
(Clark, 2012; Karl Friston, 2005; Hohwy, 2013; Seth, 2014). Extended formulations of this account 
suggest that hierarchical predictive generative models update prior knowledge by extracting and 
encoding hidden spatial and temporal regularities in the environment (Tenenbaum et al., 2011). In 
this study, increases in echo response amplitude with successive repetitions of a sequence 
demonstrate that participants were implicitly learning information about each sequence, which may 
reflect perceptual predictions (Bayesian priors) being updated with each sequence. In this view the 
echo response may reflect an iterative process that updates priors about the luminance dynamics of 
a sequence, communicating perceptual predictions at rate defined by the alpha frequency band. 
Further research will be needed to tie perceptual echo to predictive processing more substantively, 
for example by manipulating expectations about temporal regularities, within or across sequence 
presentations. 
Another question that was not fully explored in the present study was the persistence of the 
encoded sequence information. These results demonstrated that this information can persist for 
more than 9 seconds, however the constraints on retention time of this information was not 
systematically examined. If as I suggest the repetition of a luminance sequence selectively 
strengthens synaptic pathways through STDP, then I expect that a long-term enhancement of the 
echo response should be detectable. I also predict that it should be possible in animal studies to 
disable the sequence learning effects found in the present study by using optogenetics to ‘switch’ 
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off receptors critical for long-term potentiation (LTP) , such as NMDA receptors. In such studies 
there should be no effect of sequence repetitions on the perceptual echo.  
To further investigate the perceptual echo responses role in regularity learning within a 
predictive processing framework, future studies could investigate how manipulating the 
predictability of a sequence affects the echo response. Another possibility to verify the perceptual 
echo responses involvement in predictive processing would be to test whether it plays a role in 
periodically transmitting prior information within an alpha defined frequency. By using 
transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS) over the visual cortex it is possible to entrain a 
specific alpha phase and frequency. This manipulation would allow for the time locking of 
sequence onset to a specific alpha phase. I predict that, if the alpha cycle is critical for the 
transmission of prior information, then sequences presented in-phase with alpha should lead to an 
enhanced echo response in later repetitions of the same sequence.  
Future studies could also investigate a more diverse range of stimuli in the context of 
perceptual echo, since the current study, used only a low-level visual feature: luminance. By 
exploring sensory dimensions including orientation, colour spatial information, it will be possible 
to examine the extent to which perceptual echo responses (and their enhancement with sequence 
repetitions) generalise. These results also motivate investigation into the persistence of the 
encoded sequence information. These data show that this information can persist for more than 9 
seconds, however the constraints on retention time of this information were not systematically 
examined. If as I suggest the repetition of a luminance sequence selectively strengthens synaptic 
pathways through STDP, a long-term enhancement of the echo response may be expected.  
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3.5 Modelling the perceptual echo using a predictive processing framework 
3.5.1 Introduction  
The previous section demonstrated that perceptual echo was modulated by repetitions of a 
specific luminance sequence, suggesting that it reflects a signature of regularity learning within the 
visual system. This result supports predictive processing accounts of the low-level visual system, 
which suggests that perception is an active learning and inference process. In this section, I propose 
a simple predictive coding model that captures several aspects of the perceptual echo and 
demonstrates that the perceptual echo can be generated by this simple system using minimal 
assumptions.  
 
3.5.2 The aims of the model  
This model intends to simulate two intriguing characteristics of perceptual echo. First, the 
10Hz periodical fluctuation in the cross-correlation between luminance sequences and EEG signals 
only shows at positive lags (after stimulus onset) but is absent at negative lags (see Figure 3-2). 
Cross-correlation theorem states that the power spectrum of the cross-correlation of two time series 
is equal to the product of the individual power spectrum, where one of them has been complex 
conjugated (Bracewell, 2004). Therefore, one may expect that the perceptual echo may be driven 
by the alpha oscillations in the raw EEG. However, the perceptual echo is only visible after 
stimulus onset at positive lags. In terms of the cross-correlation analysis this feature indicates that 
all of the sequence information is maintained and embedded in the EEG signal, leading the peak in 
the cross-correlation. This observation implies that the echo reflects a ‘memory trace’ in the human 
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visual system, rather than being driven by the raw EEG alpha, which would affect the 
cross-correlation at both positive and negative lags.  
 
This result is also consistent with the experimental finding of this Chapter that repetitions of 
stimulus sequences only enhanced the echo response (cross-correlation) and was not observed in 
changes in the alpha power of the raw EEG, suggesting that the raw EEG alpha is not related to the 
regularity learning process reflected by the perceptual echo. Therefore, a crucial aim of the model is 
to simulate the asymmetrical cross-correlation pattern between positive and negative lags.  
The second aim of this model is to account for the results of a pilot experiment, in which I 
found a different temporal dynamic of the perceptual echo when the stimulus sequence was 
presented centrally instead of peripherally. In this pilot study, the experiment procedures and design 
were the same as Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 as described in Chapter 3.2 and 3.3 except that 
the luminance sequence was presented at the centre of the visual field instead of peripheral areas. 
Data from 5 subjects showed that when the stimulus sequence was presented centrally the 
morphology of the echo response changed dramatically, showing a more abrupt and greater 
deflection at early lags followed by a quick decay at later lags (Figure 3-9) compared to the echo 
responses elicited by peripheral stimulation (see Figure 3-2). 
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Figure 3-9 Perceptual echo elicited by stimulus sequences presented in the centre of the visual field, 
data from a pilot study. Perceptual echo showed a sharp fluctuation at early lags (before 200ms) 
and a quick decay.  
 Examining these two characteristics, the first that the perceptual echo displays multiple peaks 
at positive lags, suggests that the sensory sampling of the external luminance values persists in the 
visual system and influences subsequent EEG signals around every 100ms (10Hz cycle). Therefore, 
I assume that EEG signals are influenced by both the current luminance value of the sample as well 
as the memories of previous luminance samples (this can also be viewed as a Bayesian prior). The 
second characteristic, that the eccentricity of stimulus sequences influences the perceptual echo 
response suggests that the eccentricity influences the weighting between the current visual 
luminance sample and the memories of previous luminance samples on the EEG signal. It is well 
known that the spatial resolution (precision) of central and peripheral vision differ greatly (Loschky, 
McConkie, Yang, & Miller, 2005). Therefore, the sampling precision may plausibly be a factor in 
influencing how the visual system combines the current visual sample and memories of luminance 
values, which may be best explained by a Bayesian/predictive processing framework.  
I propose a simple predictive coding model that uses minimal assumptions in an attempt to 
account for the two perceptual echo characteristics outlined above. An import feature of Bayesian 
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inference and the predictive processing framework is that information is integrated based on the 
weighting derived from their precision (Hohwy, 2012; Knill & Pouget, 2004). The more reliable 
information source is weighted more for computing the result of the integration (Bayesian posterior, 
also see Chapter 1). Therefore, central vision, which has a high precision may lead to a stronger 
weighting on the current sensory sample compared to the prior. When the precision is high, the 
perceptual echo should display higher amplitudes initially and then decay rapidly, due to the 
influence from priors being low, indeed I found the result when using stimuli presented centrally in 
a pilot study. In contrast, peripheral vision, which has lower precision may rely more on prior than 
new sensory evidence. When the precision is low, the perceptual echo should be longer lived as the 
memory of a sample is able to impact perceptual inference on more following samples.  
 
3.5.3 Model computation 
This model is inspired by Kalman filter (Kalman, 1960), a prediction-based perceptual 
inference system. The model consists of two units, a prediction unit and a prediction error unit 
(Figure 3-10a). The prediction unit generates predictions about the next sensory sample, in this case 
of the next luminance value and sends the value to the prediction error unit via a top-down pathway. 
After about 50ms, information transmission time, the prediction error unit samples the next 
external luminance value and computes the difference (prediction error) between the top-down 
luminance prediction about the current luminance value and the actual luminance value from the 
current sensory sample. The prediction error value is then sent to the prediction unit through a 
bottom-up pathway with about 50ms transmission time. The prediction unit integrates and updates 
the prediction by computing a weighted average between the prediction error and the current 
prediction using a weighting factor w. Finally, the new prediction is send to the prediction error unit 
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to initiate the next iterations of the cycle (Figure 3-10b). The model assumes that the information 
transmission time is 50ms and, therefore, a cycle of 100ms is created. 
 
 
Figure 3-10. A predictive coding model of perceptual echo (a) The model consists of a prediction 
unit and a prediction error unit. The prediction unit sends prediction though a top-down pathway. 
The prediction error unit sends a prediction error signal via a bottom-up pathway. The model 
assumes that the information transmission time is 50ms and, therefore, a cycle of 100ms is created. 
(b) Illustration of the model processing steps across time. The model samples external luminance 
values every 100ms. At every sensory sampling point, the low level prediction error unit computes a 
prediction error by computing the difference between a top-down prediction and the current 
sensory input. The high level unit then updates the predictions by computing the weighted average 
between the current prediction and the prediction error using a weighting factor w. This updating 
and prediction error computations causes signal changes in the raw EEG.  
3.5.4 Model implementation and simulation  
Luminance sequences were generated using the same parameters and methods as the two EEG 
experiments of this chapter. Therefore, each luminance sequence was 3.125s and the range of 
luminance values was between 0 to 255.  
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 The EEG time series in each trial was simulated using Eq. 3-1.  
EEG fluctuation was determined by an updated prediction and a prediction error at updating 
(𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒) and sampling (𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒) time, respectively. Otherwise, EEG fluctuation was only 
influenced by Gaussian random noise (see Eq. 3-1 and 3-2) added to a baseline EEG activity b. 
𝜖𝐸𝐸𝐺 is a Gaussian random noise sampling from a Gaussian distribution with a mean 𝜇𝐸𝐸𝐺 and a 
standard deviation 𝜎𝐸𝐸𝐺 added to each EEG time series data point (Eq. 3-2). In this simulation, 
𝜇𝐸𝐸𝐺 was fixed to 0 and 𝜎𝐸𝐸𝐺 was fixed to 16% of the dynamic range of luminance values. The 
baseline EEG activity was fixed to the midpoint of the luminance dynamic range (i.e. 127.5).  
When the predictive processing model sampled a luminance value at time 𝑡 (i.e., 𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒
𝑖 ∈
𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒), a prediction error was computed by subtracting the last prediction 𝐸𝐸𝐺(𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑖−1 ) from 
the sampled luminance value 𝑠𝑒𝑞(𝑡) and reflected in a EEG amplitude change (Eq 3-1). The 
prediction error was then used to update a new prediction at the next update time 𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑖  after 
information transmission time 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 (Eq. 3-3). 
 
As mentioned above, I assumed the after information transmission time between the 
prediction and the prediction error units is about 50ms. Therefore, I sampled 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 from a 
 
(3-1) 
𝜖𝐸𝐸𝐺~𝑁(𝜇𝐸𝐸𝐺 , 𝜎𝐸𝐸𝐺) (3-2) 
𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑖 = 𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒
𝑖 + 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 (3-3) 
𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒
𝑖+1 = 𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑖 + 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 (3-4) 
𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛~𝑁(𝜇𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝜎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 ) (3-5) 
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Gaussian distribution with a mean 𝜇𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 50𝑚𝑠 and a standard deviation 
𝜎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 10𝑚𝑠 (Eq. 3-5). 
At updating time 𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑖 , a updated prediction was computed by summing the current 
prediction 𝐸𝐸𝐺(𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑖 ) and a weighted prediction error 𝑤×𝐸𝐸𝐺(𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒
𝑖 ) computed from the 
last sample time 𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒
𝑖  and reflected in a EEG amplitude change (Eq. 3-1). The updated 
prediction was then used to compute next prediction error after information transmission time (Eq. 
3-4). 
In each trial, the initial luminance prediction was set to 0 because no stimulus was presented before 
the sequence onset (dark background). The model started to sample at t = 0ms, i.e., 𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒
1 =
0𝑚𝑠.  
To simulate the temporal dependence between adjacent sample points found in real EEG 
signals, a 1D Gaussian filter with a 31ms window size and a 19ms standard deviation was applied 
to the simulated EEG time series in each trial.  
I tested the weighting (w) parameter value changing it from 0.1 (sensory evidence is not 
reliable) to 0.9 (sensory evidence is very reliable) to simulate different reliabilities of sensory 
evidence.  
The simulation was run for 1000 trials for each w. Cross-correlations were computed and 
averaged across trials using the same methods as the two EEG experiments.  
3.5.5 Critical model assumptions  
The model makes two major assumptions. First, based on the fact that perceptual echo mainly 
fluctuates at about 10Hz, the model assumes that information transition time between prediction 
and prediction error units through top-down and bottom-up pathways takes about 50ms, and 
therefore, takes 100ms to complete a cycle for each iteration. Second, the notion that the human 
97 
 
 
visual system samples visual information in a discrete manner at about a 10Hz frequency has been 
proposed and empirical evidence supporting this notion has been accumulating (VanRullen & Koch, 
2003). According to this idea, the model assumes the visual sampling is discrete. Sensory sampling 
only occurs when the prediction error unit needs to compute a prediction error. Based on the first 
assumption, the interval between visual samples is about 100ms. Therefore, this assumption yields 
the visual sampling frequency of this system is 10Hz.  
3.5.6 Results 
Figure 3-11 shows the results of this model. As can be seen this simple predictive processing 
model captures two important aspects of echo responses from the experimental studies of this 
chapter.  
Firstly, the periodical cross-correlation fluctuation only was found in the positive time lags. 
This result confirms that perceptual echo is not only caused by the alpha oscillation in raw EEG 
data but by stimulus-relevant memory in a perceptual system.  
Second, the precision of sensory input modulates the temporal dynamics of the echo response 
(Figure 3-12). As can be seen from this figure higher sensory weights elicited an echo response 
with greater amplitude at early time lags followed by a rapid decay. In contrast, lower sensory 
weights elicited smaller echo responses at early time lags but sustained a longer response. To 
quantify the decay rates, I fitted a two-parameter exponential function 𝑎𝑒𝑏𝑥 to the envelope of 
each cross-correlation from the pick value to the end (Figure 3-13). The exponential terms b 
(growth rate) from the fitting result showed a nearly monotonic increase along w decrease, 
suggesting a faster decay when w is high than when w is low. This result fits the empirical data 
showing that the eccentricity of a stimulus sequence modulates the temporal dynamics of the echo 
response.  
98 
 
 
 
Figure 3-11. The cross-correlation between simulated EEG and repetitions of a luminance 
sequence averaged across trials (for details of trial number etc. refer to methods of Experimental 
sections). The parameter w represents the weights of sensory evidence (precision) in the model, 
with higher values representing higher precision of sensory input. Abscissa represents 
cross-correlation lags in time.  
 
Figure 3-12 A expanded view of Figure 3-11 within positive time lags.  
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Figure 3-13 Fitting envelopes of cross-correlation using exponential functions. Cross-correlation 
data were selected from the maximal value (red dot line) to the end of each cross-correlation series. 
The exponential terms b (growth rate) from the fitting result showed a nearly monotonic increase 
along w decrease. 
To further quantitatively test the difference between perceptual echo at positive and negative 
lags, shuffled cross-correlation data were recruited by computing cross-correlation between EEG 
time series and luminance sequence from different trials. Similar to the experimental results 
showed in Section 3.2, shuffled cross-correlation data showed no perceptual echo response (Figure 
3-14), indicating the sequence-specific nature of perceptual echo. More importantly, even though 
50ms transmission time was explicitly assigned to the model which may cause a large alpha 
oscillation in the simulated EEG data, shuffled cross-correlation data with no phase coherence 
between trials (Figure 3-2) was still unable to generate perceptual echo. 
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Figure 3-14 Comparison between actual data (cross-correlation between a EEG time series and a 
luminance sequence was computed from the same trial) and shuffled data (from different trials). 
Shuffled cross-correlation data showed no echo-like periodic oscillation.  
Similar to the examination of perceptual echo significance for each participant in Section 3.2, 
I compared cross-correlation data distributions at positive and negative lags ranging from -0.7s to 
0.7s for actual and shuffled data with w = 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9 (Figure 3-15). The result showed that 
only non-shuffled data with w = 0.1 and 0.5 showed a significant difference of cross-correlation 
data distribution between positive and negative lags (p < 10-5 and p < 10-3, respectively), suggesting 
perceptual echo only presented at positive lags. The null result of actual data when w was 0.9 
confirmed that with large sensory weight perceptual echo only presented in a short period and 
decayed very quickly. In sum, the model successfully simulated the experimental phenomenon that 
perceptual echo only was found in the positive time lags, suggesting stimulus-relevant memory in a 
perceptual system.  
101 
 
 
 
Figure 3-15 Echo response data distribution from non-shuffled (nonshuffled, the first row) and 
shuffled (the second row) data. Three different weighting factors (w = 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9, indicated 
by columns) were used. When w is 0.1 and 0.5, cross-correlation data distributions from positive 
lags were significantly different from data distributions from negative lags.  
3.5.7 Discussion 
This simple model provides a computational account of how a predictive coding system 
generates the perceptual echo. As can be seen from this section the resemblance between the echo 
produced by this model and those found experimentally is striking, suggesting that the predictive 
processing interpretation of the perceptual echo as an iterative learning process that updates and 
replays temporal representations is well founded. This model also provides an explanation for the 
basic characteristics of the perceptual echo, via the change in weighting between a prediction and a 
prediction error unit. Finally, this model has explained two essential characteristics of perceptual 
echo that is best accounted for by the predictive processing framework. 
3.6 Conclusion  
The perceptual echo is a long-lasting periodic reverberation in the EEG response to dynamic 
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visual stimulation, reflected by an alpha-band peak in the cross-correlation function between a 
rapidly changing random dynamic luminance sequence and the raw occipital EEG response. I 
investigated the functional properties of the perceptual echo, finding that it can be enhanced by 
repeatedly presenting the same visual sequence, indicating that the human visual system can 
rapidly and automatically learn temporal regularities embedded within such fast-changing dynamic 
stimulus sequences. By comparing echo responses for inverse and non-inverse luminance 
sequences, I further showed that the increase in echo response was sensitive to specific sequence 
information. Finally, I show that the encoded sequence information can persist over many seconds 
even in the presence of additional intervening sensory input. Using a simple predictive coding 
model, with minimal assumptions, I show that the model can capture many of the features of the 
perceptual echo, further supporting the notion that predictive processing underlies the perceptual 
echo. 
Together, these results provide strong evidence for the existence of a previously 
undiscovered predictive temporal regularity learning mechanism that appears to be governed by 
predictive processing, this process being reflected by the perceptual echo.  
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Chapter 4 
Examine temporal prediction from duration processing 
4.1 Introduction 
Complicated human behaviour requires the ability to make predictions about when events will 
occur in the environment. There is a long history of treating perception as a the outcome of 
predictive processes (Gregory, 1968; Helmholtz, 1867), and recently this idea has developed into 
the increasing influential predictive processing approach (Clark, 2012; Karl Friston, 2005; Seth, 
2014). Much previous work has attempted to find the neural correlates of prediction and/or 
prediction error. One classic example is based on neurophysiological event-related potential (ERP) 
component called the mismatch negativity (MMN)(Friston, 2005). MMN is a neural response that 
can be found following experience of infrequent or unexpected events in a sequence.  
The classical version of MMN was reported using rhythmic sequences of auditory events 
wherein the majority of presentations, standard trials (e.g. 80%), are of one pitch (e.g. low pitch) 
and infrequently (20%) a deviant pitch (e.g. high pitch) is presented (references). Under these 
conditions, a difference in ERP is found such that the waveform is deflected, deviating from the 
ERP recorded in standard trials (Näätänen, Gaillard, & Mäntysalo, 1978; Näätänen & Michie, 1979; 
Sams, Paavilainen, Alho, & Näätänen, 1985). Similar findings have also been reported when the 
deviant is temporal rather than features, such that the rhythm of a sequence of events is disrupted by 
one event in the sequence occurring earlier or later than expected based on the rhythm – a temporal 
oddball paradigm (temporal MMN; TMMN, Chen, Huang, Luo, Peng, & Liu, 2010; Jacobsen & 
Schröger, 2003; Näätänen, Paavilainen, & Reinikainen, 1989; Tse & Penney, 2006; see also review 
Ng & Penney, 2014). TMMN has been reported as a neural response of pre-attentive interval timing 
processes that track interval regularities and detect deviants (Grimm, Roeber, Trujillo-Barreto, & 
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Schröger, 2006; Tse & Penney, 2006). However, interpretation of previous TMMN findings is 
complicated by the use of fixed inter-trial-intervals (ITI) (Hsu et al., 2010; Jacobsen & Schröger, 
2003, 2003; Joutsiniemi et al., 1998; Okazaki, Kanoh, Takaura, Tsukada, & Oka, 2006; Roger, 
Hasbroucq, Rabat, Vidal, & Burle, 2009; Takegata, Tervaniemi, Alku, Ylinen, & Näätänen, 2008; 
Tse & Penney, 2006; for non-fixed ITIs see also Chen et al., 2010; Grimm et al., 2006; Grimm, 
Widmann, & Schröger, 2004). Using fixed ITIs, stimulus events across trials inevitably create a 
rhythmic temporal structure. Recent evidence shows that the neural mechanisms of interval timing 
(also called duration-based timing) can be considered as distinct from rhythmic processing (also 
called beat-based timing) (Grube, Cooper, Chinnery, & Griffiths, 2010; Teki, Grube, & Griffiths, 
2012; Teki, Grube, Kumar, & Griffiths, 2011). The transition of rhythmic structures has already 
been shown to cause mismatch responses in both ERPs (Ford & Hillyard, 1981; Vuust et al., 2011) 
and event-related ﬁelds (ERF) recorded by magnetoencephalography (Vuust, Ostergaard, Pallesen, 
Bailey, & Roepstorff, 2009). Therefore, in studies that use a temporal oddball paradigm to assess 
neural correlates of temporal prediction, it could be the rhythmic structures caused through fixed 
ITIs that drive the MMN response, not neural mechanisms dedicated to predictions of interval 
timing itself. Considering the evidence for distinct processing of rhythm and duration processing it 
is reasonable to think that a temporal predictive mechanism may exist independently of rhythmic 
structure and, consequently, that violations of predictions about temporal interval (non-rhythmic) 
could also elicit neural processes that may generate mismatch responses. Therefore, TMMN might 
not be driven by predictions about time itself, but prediction of rhythmic structure alone. To 
investigate this possibility we compared mismatch responses in isochronous and anisochronous 
stimulus sequences, in which the ITI was fixed or randomly sampled from a distribution that rules 
out the contribution of global rhythmic structure. We also examined whether the neural 
mechanisms underlying temporal prediction are modality-general or specific. Some studies have 
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suggested that temporal processing might result from modality specific operations (Wearden, Todd, 
& Jones, 2006). However, accurate temporal predictions may benefit from the integration of  
temporal information from different sources (Shi, Church, & Meck, 2013). In such a case we would 
expect to find evidence for similar patterns of neural activation (measured using EEG) elicited by 
violations of temporal prediction across auditory and visual domains, despite the differences in 
sensory evoked potentials between the two modalities.  
To examine these hypotheses, we used a combination of classic (ERP) and cutting edge 
machine learning analysis techniques - multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) and temporal 
generalisation analysis (TGA; J.-R. King & Dehaene, 2014). We used MVPA to decode neural 
response patterns to violations of temporal prediction embedded in EEG signals. We then used 
TGA to investigate whether decodable neural patterns can be used to decode neural activations at 
other time points both within a given condition, and between conditions that differ in temporal 
properties and/or sensory modality of presentation. If the topographical patterns between standard 
and deviant trials are distinguishable across conditions, a binary classifier should be able to classify 
topographic patterns recorded from different conditions and reach above chance classification 
performance. The combination of MVPA and TGA allowed us to examine the commonalities and 
differences of the neural responses related to temporal predictive mechanisms both between 
isochronous and anisochronous sequences, and between modalities as they evolve over time 
following unpredicted sensory events.  
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Participants 
16 healthy students with normal or corrected-to-normal vision were recruited from the 
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University of Sussex (8 males, age range 18–31 years). Written informed consent was acquired 
from all participants prior to the study, which was approved by the University of Sussex ethics 
committee.  Participants received £15 as compensation for their time.  
4.2.2 Procedure and Design 
Participants were seated in a dimly lit electromagnetically shielded room and asked to 
maintain fixation ~ 50 cm away from a gamma corrected LaCie Electron blue IV 22" CRT Monitor. 
Stimuli were generated and presented using the Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner, 
Brainard, & Pelli, 2007). Auditory stimuli were played through stereo speakers with an intensity 
level of  ~ 65 dB SPL.  
To investigate the processes underlying prediction of temporal intervals, we employed a 
typical temporal oddball paradigm. In each trial, two transient stimuli were presented, the first 
stimulus (S1) defining the beginning and the second stimulus (S2) the end of the specified interval 
(i.e., inter-stimulus-interval, ISI). The interval could be either 150ms or 400ms (Figure 4-1). There 
were two blocks for each experimental condition. In one block an interval of 150ms in duration was 
presented in 200 trials (standard) with an interval of 400ms presented in 50 trials (deviant). In the 
other block, the standard and deviant interval were switched. The position of the deviants within 
the sequence was pseudo-randomised but constrained so that the deviant was presented at least 
once in every five trials. 
Three experimental conditions were examined in this study, auditory isochronous, auditory 
anisochronous, and visual anisochronous. In the auditory conditions, the stimuli consisted of 10ms 
pulses of 1500 Hz pure tones. In the visual condition, the stimuli were 10ms flashes of luminance 
defined Gaussian blobs against a grey background (Michelson contrast of 1). The 
inter-trial-interval (ITI, the time between the first event in one pair and the next) in the isochronous 
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condition was fixed at 1750ms. In the anisochronous conditions, the ITIs were drawn from two 
uniform random distributions between 1000-1500ms or 2000-2500ms (minimum of 1000ms and 
max of 2500 ms) so that the average presentation rate was the same as the ITIs in the isochronous 
condition, but no set of trials ever occurred at that average repetition rate (Figure 4-1).  
There was no explicit task performed in this study. Participants were instructed simply to 
attend to the sequence of events. The order of completion of the six blocks was pseudo-randomised 
across participants. Each block of 250 trials took approximately 10 minutes to complete and the 
entire experiment took approximately 1 hour.  
 
Figure 4-1 Examples of stimulus sequences. (a) An isochronous sequence consisted of short 
standard intervals (150ms) and long deviant intervals (400ms, depicted by red dots). S1 and S2 
denote the first and second transient consecutive stimuli defining a temporal interval. 
Inter-trial-intervals (ITI) were fixed to 1750ms in isochronous sequences. (b) An anisochronous 
sequence with varied ITIs. (c) An isochronous sequence consisting of long standard intervals 
(400ms) and short deviant intervals (150ms). 
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4.2.3 EEG Acquisition 
All EEG data were recorded using a 64 channel ANT Neuro amplifier at a sampling rate of 
2048 Hz. A 64 channel Waveguard EEG cap (ANT Neuro, Enschede) employing standard Ag/AgCl 
electrodes placed according to the 10-20 system was used. Horizontal and vertical eye movements 
were recorded by two independent pairs of electrodes. The impedances of recording electrodes 
were maintained below 10kΩ. No analog filter was applied during on-line recording. 
4.2.4 EEG Preprocessing 
Pre-processing was performed using the EEGLAB toolbox (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) under 
Matlab (Mathworks, Inc. Natick, MA, USA), and custom Matlab scripts. Continuous data were 
first down-sampled to 512 Hz. The signals were then band-pass ﬁltered at 0.5-30 Hz and epoched 
between -140ms and 1400ms relative to onset of the first stimulus in each stimulus pair. Each epoch 
was baseline corrected automatically identified and removed using the automated Independent 
Component Analysis (ICA) rejection algorithms ADJUST (Mognon, Jovicich, Bruzzone, & Buiatti, 
2011) and MARA (Irene Winkler, Haufe, & Tangermann, 2011). Epochs containing signal values 
exceeding a threshold of ±75𝜇𝑉 and deviations greater than by subtracting the signal average of 
the prestimulus interval (-140-0ms). Artefacts were 6 standard deviations of the mean probability 
distribution on any single channel were automatically rejected. For the multivariate pattern 
analyses (MVPA, mentioned below), epochs were further down-sampled to 128 Hz.  
4.2.5 ERP Analysis 
For each ERP analysis, epochs were averaged separately within each comparison condition for 
each participant. Statistical analyses of the ERP data were performed at the group level (16 
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participants, see Statistical Analyses and significance testing) 
4.2.6 Multivariate Pattern Analysis (MVPA) 
4.2.6.1 Decoding EEG activation patterns between standard and deviant evoked responses  
To test whether standard and deviant temporal intervals elicited distinct topographical patterns, 
we applied MVPA to EEG topography. We reasoned that if the topographical patterns between 
standard and deviant trials are distinguishable across conditions, a binary classifier should be able 
to classify topographic patterns recorded from different conditions and reach above chance 
classification performance. We employed a Linear Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier 
(Vapnik, 2013) for every classification analysis. In the current study, an unbalanced trial number 
between standard and deviant trials (close to 4:1, different trials were excluded during 
pre-processing) was expected because of the nature of the oddball paradigm. To avoid biased 
classification due to training on unbalanced data sets, every MVPA analysis was performed on 
subsampled data sets (Maimon & Rokach, 2005). A subsampled data set consisted of all deviant 
trials and randomly subsampled standard trials with equal trials number of deviant trials.  
For each time point and each participant, we performed the MVPA on the data from 64 
channels as features in two steps. First, to find the optimized regularization parameter (C: Cost), a 
subsampled data set was selected and normalised to z-scores (mean subtracted and divided by 
standard deviation within features, i.e., electrodes) to examine the optimized C. We searched the 
parameter space from 2^-3 to 2^3 (exponentially spaced) and evaluated the classification 
performance (classification accuracy) by stratified ten-fold cross-validation (CV). For each fold of 
the ten-fold CV the subsampled data set was split into training and testing trials with a 9:1 ratio. An 
SVM classifier was fit on the training trials (training set) and tested on the testing trials (testing set). 
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The classification accuracies across ten folds were than averaged as the CV accuracy. The C that 
maximised the CV accuracy was selected as the optimal C value.  
In the second stage, a new subsampled data set was used. The new subsampled data set 
contained no overlapping standard trials from the first step. We performed the same CV procedure 
as the first step except that the C was fixed at the optimal value obtained from the first step. The CV 
accuracy was then computed as the classification accuracy.  
We repeated this procedure 50 times with different subsampled data sets in each repetition. 
The classification accuracies across repetitions were then averaged to obtain a stable and unbiased 
classification performance across entire data set. All classification analysis were conducted by 
LIBSVM library (Chang & Lin, 2001) included in e1071 and Caret packages in R software (Team, 
2014). 
4.2.6.2 Temporal generalization analysis 
To examine the possibility that temporal intervals presented in isochronous and anisochronous 
sequences, and auditory or visual modalities, share some common underlying neural processes, the 
temporal generalisation analysis (TGA) was used (adapted from King & Dehaene, 2014). The 
standard decoding analysis mentioned above is adequate to assess whether EEG signals is 
informative to successfully distinguish standard and deviant evoked activation pattern in a single 
comparison analysis. However, because information processing may evolve differently between 
conditions, an analysis approach that considers potential latency difference between condition is 
needed. For this purpose, TGA was used to evaluate common processing between condition. If a 
classifier trained on activation patterns at a specific time point can also classify activation patterns 
at another time point with an above chance accuracy, there should be similar neural processes 
eliciting the similar topography at the two time points. Therefore, TGA provides an estimation of 
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common processing and can be used to examine the latency difference of common processes 
between conditions (J.-R. King & Dehaene, 2014, p. 2).  
As for the above described MVPA, the TGA procedure was repeated for 50 runs for each 
training time point and participant. In each run, a subsampled data set containing an equal number 
of standard and deviant trials (the training set) for a given training time point (training time, i.e., 
ttraining) in one condition was trained. This classifier was then used to test subsampled, balanced data 
sets in which each data set (testing sets) was the data from a time point (testing time, i.e., ttesting) in 
another condition. Therefore, a trained linear SVM model from one condition was used to predict 
the trial types (standard or deviant) at time points in the data from another condition. For example, 
one can train a classifier using EEG data at 300ms (training set) in auditory anisochronous 
sequence to classify standard and deviant trials. If the trained classifier is able to successfully 
predict the trial types using data at 350ms (testing set) in auditory anisochronous sequence, the 
result suggests that similar decodable information is embedded in the training and testing sets and 
can be captured by the classifier even from different time points and conditions. This procedure 
yielded 198 generalisation accuracies (1.54s epoch with 128Hz sampling rate). The same 
procedure was applied to each training time point (198 training time point in total).  A 
generalization matrix with training time x testing time (198 x 198) was obtained to examine the 
possible shared neural processes between conditions. Finally, the 50 generalisation matrixes from 
the 50 runs were then averaged.  
In a generalization matrix, an above chance generalisation accuracy on the diagonal (training 
time = testing time) suggests shared processes occurring at the same latencies between conditions. 
If a matrix shows an off-diagonal pattern, the shared processes occurs at different timings in the two 
conditions (J.-R. King & Dehaene, 2014; J.-R. King, Gramfort, Schurger, Naccache, & Dehaene, 
2014).   
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4.2.7 Statistical Analyses and significance testing  
Cluster-based permutation analysis with Monte Carlo randomization (Maris & Oostenveld, 
2007) was performed for both ERP and MVPA analyses using custom scripts adapted from the 
FieldTrip (Nichols & Holmes, 2002; Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, & Schoffelen, 2010) and Mass 
Univariate Toolbox’s (Groppe, Urbach, & Kutas, 2011). This method was conducted to reduce the 
family-wise type I error rate due to multiple comparisons. The algorithm considers an effect is a 
true positive when a group of adjacent analysis points (neighbours) reach statistical significance 
together. Two steps were taken in this procedure. First, for every testing point, a statistic across 
participants was computed (e.g. t-value). A critical value was then used for thresholding testing (e.g. 
p < .05, one-tail). Second, adjacent data points that exceeded the critical value together were 
defined as a cluster. For each cluster, the cluster “mass” was computed by summing all statistics 
from each data point within a given cluster. To construct a null distribution from permutations, the 
same procedure was repeated 5000 times with shuffled condition labels for each data point and 
participant. The maximum cluster mass from each permutation was then used to construct the null 
distribution. Finally, the cluster-level p-value was computed by identifying the rank of cluster mass 
from real data in the null distribution (Monte Carlo p value).  
For ERP analyses, the neighbours were defined as adjacent channels and sample time points. 
The adjacent channels were computed by Delaunay triangulation in 2D projection of the sensor 
position. In the first step, critical values were computed using a two-tailed dependent t statistic with 
a p < .05 criterion. 
For, MVPA analyses for 1D data (time only), the neighbours were defined as adjacent sample 
time points. For the TGA, the neighbours were defined as adjacent training and testing time points 
in a 2D space. Because we only considered above chance level classification accuracy, critical 
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values were computed from one-tail one-sample t statistics again using 50% accuracy with a p < .05 
criterion.  
For the robust multilinear regression analysis, a one sample t-test was performed to test the 
Fisher’s z-score for each time point against an average score calculated from the pre-stimulus 
period.  
4.3 Results 
 
Figure 4-2 Unexpected sensory input elicited mismatch responses. ERP mismatch spatiotemporal 
clusters by the contrast between standard and deviant intervals with physically identical stimuli 
(150ms interval). The durations of statistically significant positive and negative clusters are 
depicted by blue and red lines respectively. The representative topographical distributions of each 
cluster are selected from representative time within the time range of each clusters. Electrodes 
marked by symbols indicate spatial ranges of each cluster at the representative time. A-ISO: 
Auditory isochronous sequence. A-ANISO: auditory anisochronous sequence. V-ANISO: visual 
anisochronous sequence.  
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Figure 4-3 Average temporal decoding accuracy across all participants. Classiifiers were trained 
and tested to classify standard and deviant intervals with data from 64 channels. Highlighted red 
areas are statisitcally signnificant time windows by cluster-based permutation with 1D (time) data. 
Unexpected Sensory Input is defined by analyses on trials with short (150ms) stimulus 
intervals.Unexpected omission is defined by analyses on trials with long (400ms) stimulus intervals. 
A-ISO: Auditory isochronous sequence. A-ANISO: auditory anisochronous sequence. V-ANISO: 
visual anisochronous sequence.   
 
 
Figure 4-4 Unexpected omission elicited mismatch response. ERP mismatch spatiotemporal 
clusters by the contrast between standard and deviant intervals with physically identical stimuli 
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(400ms interval). The durations of statistically significant positive and negative clusters are 
depicted by blue and red lines respectively. The representative topographical distributions of each 
cluster are selected from a representative time within the time range of each cluster. Electrodes 
marked by symbols indicate spatial ranges of each clusters at the representative time. A-ISO: 
Auditory isochronous sequence. A-ANISO: auditory anisochronous sequence. V-ANISO: visual 
anisochronous sequence. 
4.3.1 Neural correlates of temporal prediction driven by duration processing 
4.3.1.1 Evidence from unexpected sensory events 
Neural correlates of temporal prediction were first examined by neural responses to 
unexpected sensory events. In a long standard interval block of trials, participants were presented 
with the long standard interval (400ms) and a short interval (150ms) deviant. Consequently, the 
second stimulus (S2) arrived at an unexpected timing (150ms). By comparing the short interval 
(150ms) with physically identical short intervals in the standard trials (150ms) from the 
counterbalanced block, we can examine neural responses driven by temporal predictive processing 
with physically identical sensory stimulation. 
We first replicated the results from previous temporal oddball studies in which rhythmic 
information, due to fixed ITIs (isochronous sequences), also contributed to temporal prediction of 
sensory events. The results from the ERP comparison between standard and deviant trials with the 
same short intervals on the auditory isochronous sequences showed two pairs (both significant 
positive and negative parts within similar time windows) of significant clusters (Figure 4-2). The 
early paired clusters at 227ms-313ms showed a negative ERP deviation in response to the 
unexpected auditory input, with a central to frontal distribution (p = .025 and .014 for the positive 
and the negative cluster, respectively). The late paired clusters showed a similar but 
polarity-reversed distribution at 326ms-475ms (p = .003 and .019 for the positive and the negative 
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cluster, respectively.) These results are consistent with previous findings indicting EEG correlates 
of prediction for rhythmic temporal sequences (Y. Chen et al., 2010; Jacobsen & Schröger, 2003; 
Joutsiniemi et al., 1998). Note that, the latency from the second stimulus onset was 77ms (227ms – 
150ms) and 176ms (326ms – 150ms) for the early and the late effects respectively. The notably 
early 77ms latency suggests the temporal prediction influenced neural responses of early auditory 
processing (Katz, 2014).  
We next examined whether EEG patterns across channels contained information about trial 
types with MVPA. This approach shows better sensitivity than the above univariate ERP analyses. 
Linear SVM could classify standard and deviant EEG patterns in two time windows with above 
chance performance. The later time window showed a longer time range from 203ms to 805ms (p 
< .002) than the ERP analysis suggesting that information about trial type (standard or deviant) was 
embedded across multiple electrode channels and was not captured by traditional univariate 
analyses.  
Surprisingly, we found a remarkably early significant window ranging from 55ms to 125ms (p 
= .03). Note that this time range is earlier than the disclosure of trial types (i.e., 150ms). Therefore, 
the early EEG pattern difference cannot be attributed to any violation of temporal prediction, but 
was more likely due to preparation processing for incoming S2 caused by the rhythmic structure of 
isochronous sequences.  
Having broadly replicated previous results reported for rhythmic sequences, we examined 
whether our anisochronous stimulus sequences that, by design, are free from global rhythmic 
components could also provide evidence for neural correlates of temporal predictive processing. 
For the auditory anisochronous sequences, the ERP analysis (Figure 4-2) revealed a pair of 
significant early clusters (ps < .002 for both positive and negative clusters) and a late negative 
cluster (600ms to 801ms, p < .002). These ERP differences between standard and deviant trials 
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demonstrate that neural correlates of temporal predictions can be found for duration itself, in 
isolation from rhythmic temporal information. 
Similar to the results from the auditory isochronous sequences, a significant early cluster pair 
showed that unexpected auditory input elicited a central-to-frontal negative response at 227ms and 
309ms. The early onset of these clusters suggests that prediction about temporal interval influenced 
very early auditory processing occurring only 77ms from S2 onset time (227ms – 150ms = 77ms). 
In combination with the results from presentation of isochronous sequences, these data indicate that 
both duration and rhythmic predictions modulated early auditory processing.  
However, contrary to the auditory isochronous sequences, ERP analysis of anisochronous 
sequences did not show evidence for the existence of a second cluster (from around 300ms - 
400ms), indicating a unique contribution from rhythmic information to temporal predictive 
processing. Conversely, we found that a late central-to-frontal negative cluster only in auditory 
anisochronous sequences, suggesting a unique contribution of prediction about temporal interval 
distinct from rhythm. 
Next, linear SVMs were used to decode EEG patterns. The results show two time windows 
with above chance decoding accuracies. The early time window is consistent with the early ERP 
cluster and further extends the time range to 383ms (250ms to 383ms, p < .002), suggesting MVPA 
is more sensitive to the neural response difference between standard and deviant trials with 
auditory anisochronous sequences. The second time window occurred at 398ms to 508ms (p 
< .011). This result suggests that some neural responses elicited by unexpected auditory input were 
distributed in a global pattern across multiple electrodes that could not be fully captured by 
traditional univariate ERP analyses.  
With the same ERP and MVPA approaches as applied to the auditory sequences, we also 
examined the neural correlates of temporal prediction for rhythm-free visual sequences. The ERP 
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cluster-based analysis revealed unexpected visual input elicited a significant mismatch cluster 
between 406ms to 580ms (p < .002) around central to frontal areas. With MVPA, again, we showed 
a much longer significant time window with above chance decoding accuracies at 375ms to 719ms 
(p < .002), suggesting that visual prediction about temporal interval was partially encoded by a 
global pattern of neural response that cannot be fully captured by traditional univariate ERP 
analyses. Note that, as compared with the auditory sequences, both ERP and MVPA approaches 
show that the visual mismatch response was much later than auditory one, suggesting a 
fundamental difference in information processing speed between auditory and visual systems, 
consistent with what is known about the difference systems (A. J. King & Palmer, 1985; Regan, 
1989). 
4.3.1.2 Evidence from unexpected omission 
Violation of temporal prediction can also occur for the timing at which a sensory input is 
expected but omitted, rather than being unexpectedly presented. To examine the neural processes 
elicited by unexpected omissions, we compared neural responses from the long standard trials 
(400ms) with those in the long deviant trials (400ms) in which a short (150ms) interval was 
expected and thus S2 was expected to occur 150ms after the S1 onset. In such circumstances, 
anticipation of S2 would be entirely driven by top-down expectation. We would expect that a 
certain noise level in the temporal expectation process would lead the anticipated timing of S2 
arrival to distribute around 150ms across trials. Therefore, we predict that (i) because the time 
course of neural response for the unexpected omission was not aligned across trials, a smaller effect 
was expected in the ERP analysis and the MVPA. (ii) the average neural response driven by 
unexpected omission across trials should be earlier than by unexpected sensory input. This is 
because anticipated time for S2 in some trials is earlier than the time of S2 in standard trials 
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(150ms). However, the neural response for unexpected sensory inputs was always aligned well and 
triggered after a real S2 at 150ms. 
We first examined temporal prediction from isochronous auditory sequences. The ERP 
analysis showed that unexpected omission elicited only a negative ERP at centre-to-frontal areas 
from 217ms to 309ms (p = .023, see Figure 4-4). The MVPA further showed that the EEG pattern 
across channels from standard and deviant trials can be decoded from 188ms to 867ms (p < .002). 
As for the findings driven by unexpected sensory input, this result shows that the human neural 
system can learn temporal regularities and form temporal prediction from rhythmic sequences. 
Note that both the ERP analysis and MVPA show a very early onset time of the effect which is 
earlier than the effect driven by unexpected sensory input (227ms and 203ms for the ERP analysis 
and MVPA, respectively)Error! Bookmark not defined... 
We next tested whether sequences without rhythmic information can also demonstrate 
temporal prediction. Even though the ERP based analyses did not show any significant cluster 
(Figure 4-4), MVPA (Figure 4-3) still showed several significant time windows starting from 
203ms to 727ms (p = .03, .01, .04, and < .001, ordered chronologically) and a very late time 
window at 961ms to 1008ms (p = .04). Again, this result suggests information regarding 
predictions of temporal interval was embedded in the global neural activation pattern that the 
univariate ERP analysis was unable to detect. The onset time of the first significant window (203) 
was again early compared to the effect driven by unexpected sensory input in auditory 
anisochronous sequence (227ms and 250ms for the ERP analysis and MVPA). 
Unexpected visual omission also elicited mismatch responses for visual anisochronous 
sequences. Here, we found an early ERP cluster (352ms to 422ms, p = .02) and a late pair of ERP 
clusters (from 668ms to 951ms, ps < .001). MVPA showed two significant time windows. The first 
window (383ms to 430ms, p = .04) is consistent with the time range of the early ERP cluster. The 
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second cluster starting from 555ms to 711ms (p < .001) partially overlaps with the late ERP cluster, 
showing that the ERP cluster-based analysis and MVPA both captured unique neural response 
differences between standard and deviant trials. Compared to neural responses elicited by 
unexpected auditory omission, the onset of earliest visual response to unexpected visual omissions, 
again, showed a longer delay from S2 onset time in MVPA (383ms for visual omission vs 203ms 
for auditory omission). Importantly, this result suggests that the temporal prediction process takes 
sensory information processing speed into account. Even though the unexpected auditory and 
visual omissions were physically identical (nothing occurred), a delay was still present between the 
onsets of auditory and visual mismatch responses. Similar to the finding in the auditory domain, the 
unexpected visual omission elicited mismatch responses started earlier than the one by unexpected 
visual inputs in ERP analysis (352ms vs 406ms, but similar in MVPA 383ms vs 375ms).  
4.3.1.3 Interim summary  
We replicated TMMN responses elicited using isochronous sequences as reported in previous 
research (Y. Chen et al., 2010; Joutsiniemi et al., 1998; Näätänen et al., 1989, 2007). Examining the 
neural responses in anisochronous sequences by ERP cluster-based analysis and MVPA, we found 
neural responses elicited by violations of prediction for temporal interval for both auditory and 
visual sensory inputs – an explicitly duration MMN. Generally, MVPA showed higher sensitivity 
for EEG differences between standard and deviant trials and could capture information embedded 
in global patterns of neural response that were not detected by the univariate ERP approach.  
4.3.2 Finding cross-modal temporal prediction between audition and vision 
Next, we examined whether the neural responses related to predictions about temporal 
intervals elicited by auditory and visual sequences contained shared information that may be driven 
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by a supramodal temporal predictive processing system. More specifically, if both auditory and 
visual deviant intervals were detected by the same supramodal temporal prediction system we 
expected that we should observe similar neural response patterns embedded within the EEG signal. 
In such a case, a neural pattern classifier trained to decode EEG signals from auditory standard and 
deviant trials should be able to decode EEG signals from visual standard and deviant trials. 
However, as shown above, the information processing speeds of auditory and visual inputs are 
different (auditory was always faster than visual). To accommodate the perceptual latency between 
modalities (A. J. King & Palmer, 1985; Regan, 1989),  we adopted temporal generalisation 
analysis (TGA; J.-R. King & Dehaene, 2014). 
If a classifier trained on EEG signals at a specific time point (training time) is able to classify 
EEG patterns at another time point (testing time) with an above chance accuracy, EEG signals 
between the two time points is likely to contain shared information about trial types (J.-R. King & 
Dehaene, 2014).  
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4.3.2.1 Supra-modal predictions of unexpected sensory input 
 
Figure 4-5 Temporal generalisation analysis for unexpected sensory input between conditions. 
Classifiers were trained on the data at each training time point and tested on data at each testing 
time point. Three diagonal panels depict cross-validation decoding accuracy for within condition 
temporal generalisation analyses. The non-diagonal panels illustrate between condition temporal 
generalisation analyses. Outlines indicate statistically significant clusters. In each panel, along 
diagonal clusters show EEG signals at close training and testing time points share similar 
information. Below diagonal clusters indicate that information at training time point occurs in late 
testing time. Above diagonal clusters indicate that information at training time point occurs in 
early testing time. 
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We first examined whether shared information was embedded in neural patterns elicited by the 
temporally unexpected visual input and unexpected auditory input. At every sample point (training 
time) in the epoch range (-140ms to 1400ms), linear SVM classifiers were trained to classify neural 
patterns elicited by auditory standard and deviant anisochronous sequences (see methods for 
details). These classifiers were then used to classify EEG signals at every time point (testing time) 
in visual anisochronous standard and deviant trials. After repeating the training and testing 
procedure for all combinations of training and testing time, the method created a generalisation 
matrix. The result shows a below-diagonal cluster with above chance classification accuracies (p 
= .021, Figure 4-5). Importantly, the below-diagonal pattern illustrates that the information used to 
decode auditory standard and deviant trials can also be found in the later neural response patterns 
elicited by visual sequences. This result supports the existence of supra-modal temporal interval 
predictions, triggered by auditory information earlier than by visual information.  
Similar results were also found when we reversed the training and testing data sets. That is, we 
trained the classifiers on EEG signals from visual anisochronous sequences and tested on data from 
auditory anisochronous sequences. The generalisation matrix showed an above-diagonal cluster (p 
= .025, Figure 4-5), indicating that the information used to decode neural responses in visual 
standard and deviant trials could successfully classify the neural patterns at earlier time windows.  
We quantified the delay between visual and auditory information processing by computing the 
average delays within the significant clusters. The TGA on anisochronous sequences from auditory 
to visual and from visual to auditory show an average 131ms delay (t(399) = 42.52, p < 10^-149) 
and an average 142ms (t(387) = 46.07, p < 10^-158) delay, respectively. Therefore, our results 
support the existence of a supra-modal temporal predictive process responsible for extracting 
regularities in temporal interval to generate temporal predictions.  
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4.3.2.2 Supra-modal predictions of unexpected omission 
 
Figure 4-6 Temporal generalisation analysis for unexpected omission 
 
We further examined the shared neural response pattern elicited by auditory and visual 
unexpected omissions. However, the TGA showed no cluster with above chance classification 
accuracies (Figure 4-6). This asymmetry between the result from unexpected sensory input and 
unexpected omission may be due to the impact from internal noise to the expected S2 onset 
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timeError! Bookmark not defined.. The internal noise led the expected S2 onset time generated from internal 
top-down prediction vary across trials. This resulted in the classifiers being unable to learn a stable 
neural pattern to classify standard and deviant trials presented in different sensory modality.  
4.3.3 Temporal dynamic of temporal prediction processing: different temporal generalisation 
patterns driven by unexpected presence versus unexpected omission 
The detection of unexpected sensory omission relies on top-down temporal predictions of S2 
onset time which is inevitably biased by random noise in neural systemError! Bookmark not defined.. As a 
result, the expected S2 onset time may vary across different trials. Therefore, a classifier trained on 
data at a certain training time point would be able to decode brain patterns (generalisation) in a 
longer period centred to the training time. For instance, a classifier trained on the data at 250ms 
would be able to decode EEG pattern at 230ms or 270ms because expected S2 onset time in some 
trials, due to the internal noise, would be shifted to earlier or later time points. Compared to 
unexpected sensory omission, unexpected sensory inputs always trigger neural processing 
precisely at the S2 onset time (150ms). This leads to the neural responses elicited by unexpected 
sensory inputs being time-locked to S2 onset time and temporally more consistent across trials. 
Therefore, a decoder would achieve higher decoding accuracies but a shorter range of decoding 
generalisation time.  
We performed the within condition temporal generalisation analysis on the EEG responses 
from unexpected sensory events and unexpected omission. According to previous experimental and 
simulation studies (J.-R. King & Dehaene, 2014; J.-R. King et al., 2014), a narrow diagonal pattern 
in a generalisation matrix represents a series of consecutive but briefly sustained processes. On the 
contrary, a broad distributed pattern suggests long lasting processes across time. We therefore can 
examine within condition generalisation matrixes. The results showed that the temporal 
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generalisation for unexpected sensory inputs in two conditions yielded a narrow diagonal pattern 
(Figure 4-5Figure 4-4). In contrast, the temporal generalisation for unexpected omission revealed a 
broader pattern (Figure 4-6). This result indicates that, as we expected, neural processes elicited by 
unexpected omissions were distributed in a wider time range across trials. 
 
4.3.4 Contribution to temporal prediction from rhythmic information  
 
 
Figure 4-7 Comparison between mismatch responses in auditory isochronous sequence and 
auditory anisochronous sequence. The red highlighted area indicates the time range of the cluster. 
ERP waveforms were averaged from electrodes marked by x.  
When presenting an isochronous sequence, temporal predictions can be derived from both 
rhythmic and interval regularities, and therefore, should be more precise than temporal predictions 
derived from only interval information. Previous research has demonstrated that unexpected 
auditory events elicit larger neural response amplitudes when predictability of events is higher 
(Bendixen, Schröger, & Winkler, 2009; Wacongne et al., 2011). We reasoned that violations of 
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more accurate predictions should lead to a larger prediction error reflected by an increase in 
response amplitude, but no difference in the temporal dynamics of neural response. We tested this 
hypothesis by comparing ERP mismatch responses elicited by unexpected auditory inputs between 
isochronous and anisochronous sequences. 
The results showed a significant central-to-frontal positive cluster within a time window 
around 400ms (354 to 422ms, p <.01, Figure 4-7) indicating that unexpected sensory inputs in the 
isochronous sequence elicited a larger positive mismatch response than in the anisochronous 
sequence. This result confirms the data presented in the previous ERP analyses indicating that 
unexpected auditory inputs in isochronous sequences elicit a pair of ERP clusters from 326ms to 
475ms that are absent in anisochronous sequences, suggesting a unique contribution from rhythmic 
information to temporal predictive processing.  
More importantly, the temporal dynamic of ERP mismatch response was comparable between 
isochronous and anisochronous auditory sequences in this time window (Figure 4-7), suggesting 
that the extra rhythmic information only changed the amplitude of the mismatch response, but not 
the spatial-temporal dynamic of the neural activation pattern. To test whether similar activation 
patterns were shared between the two conditions, we performed TGA to examine whether 
information used to decode EEG patterns in the anisochronous sequence can also be used to decode 
EEG patterns in isochronous sequences even with the involvement of rhythmic-related processes. 
The results showed a significant cluster along diagonal when training using data from the auditory 
isochronous sequence and testing on data from the auditory anisochronous sequence. The decoders 
were able to classify EEG patterns (p < .01) with above chance decoding accuracies. Note that the 
significant period along diagonal was from 219ms to 523ms, suggesting a similar dynamic of EEG 
patterns shared between isochronous and anisochronous sequences within this period. The reverse 
temporal generalisation analysis (training on data from auditory isochronous sequences and testing 
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on data from auditory anisochronous sequences) also showed a significant cluster with a similar 
generalisation pattern and time range (diagonal significant period from 219ms to 516ms, p < .01), 
suggesting robust common predictive neural activity shared by auditory isochronous and 
anisochronous sequences.  
4.4 Discussion  
Here we examined the neural correlates of temporal prediction using EEG. We first 
re-examined the temporal oddball design using a combination of univariate (ERP cluster-based 
permutation analysis) and multivariate (multivariate pattern analysis) approaches. We found that, 
in the absence of a rhythmic structure in an auditory stimulus sequence, human subjects could still 
acquire temporal prediction from repeated exposure to a temporal interval. The violation of the 
temporal prediction yielded a deviation of EEG responses similar to previous findings using 
sequences that included rhythmic information. These results provide evidence for an explicitly 
duration based process of temporal prediction. We further found similar but delayed neural 
response patterns induced by visual stimulus sequences as found for auditory sequences, 
suggesting the involvement of a supramodal temporal prediction mechanism. Finally, we identified 
unique contributions from duration and rhythmic information to temporal prediction. Together 
these results suggest the existence of a unified neural mechanism for temporal prediction which 
integrates temporal information from different sources, including different sensory modalities, to 
generate an integrated temporal prediction about sensory events. 
4.4.1 Temporal prediction from duration and rhythmic processing  
Our results are consistent with previous findings suggesting independent neural substrates 
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underlying duration and rhythmic processing (Teki et al., 2011). We showed that, in the absence of 
rhythmic information, regularity of duration was sufficient to elicit neural responses to prediction 
violation. Sequences containing both duration and rhythmic information elicited larger ERP 
responses than sequences with duration information only, implying the unique contribution from 
rhythm. This finding agrees with studies suggesting a dissociation between duration-based and 
beat-based timing (Grube, Cooper, et al., 2010; Grube, Lee, Griffiths, Barker, & Woodruff, 2010; 
Teki et al., 2012, 2011).  
4.4.2 Duration predictions are processed supramodally 
Our results showed that decoders trained on data from one modality (auditory or visual) could 
successfully decode EEG patterns elicited by deviant intervals from the other modality, suggesting 
shared neural processes for temporal prediction between the two modalities. It has long been 
debated whether duration information is processed in a modality specific or a modality-general 
manner (Buonomano & Karmarkar, 2002; Grondin, 2010; Mauk & Buonomano, 2004). The 
modality-specific hypothesis suggests that the representation of temporal information is encoded 
independently and specific to the sensory modalities (Bueti, Bahrami, & Walsh, 2008; Droit-Volet, 
Meck, & Penney, 2007; Ivry & Schlerf, 2008; Lustig & Meck, 2011; Penney, Gibbon, & Meck, 
2000; Takahashi & Watanabe, 2012). The supramodal hypothesis suggests that duration exists as an 
abstract feature and is encoded in a supramodal/amodal representation (N’Diaye, Ragot, Garnero, 
& Pouthas, 2004; Rammsayer & Ulrich, 2005; Shih, Kuo, Yeh, Tzeng, & Hsieh, 2009; van 
Wassenhove, Buonomano, Shimojo, & Shams, 2008; Wassenhove, 2009; Wearden et al., 2006). 
Using the temporal generalisation analysis, we showed similar, though delayed, neural response 
patterns elicited by the presence of unexpected sensory information for auditory and visual stimuli. 
That a similar pattern was found at the delayed time point indicates that latencies of information 
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processing between modalities should be taken in to account when comparing neural responses 
from different modalities, something typically not easily addressed in standard ERP analyses of 
MMN.  
 
4.4.3 Relation of duration MMN to previous MMN 
Our ERP cluster-based analyses showed that violations of temporal prediction caused by 
unexpected auditory inputs in both isochronous and anisochronous sequences elicited an earlier 
central-to-frontal negative cluster. The topographical distribution and the significant time window 
of this cluster is consistent with previous reported temporal MMN typically found in auditory 
temporal oddball paradigms with peak at  100~250 ms after S1 onset or 50~150 ms after S2 onset 
(Y. Chen et al., 2010; Joutsiniemi et al., 1998; Näätänen et al., 1989, 2007).  This result suggests 
that temporal MMN identified in previous research using temporal oddball paradigms was not 
merely triggered by temporal prediction from rhythmic structure but also contributed to by 
temporal prediction from interval timing. A similar cluster was also elicited by unexpected auditory 
omission in isochronous but not in anisochronous sequences. The weaker temporal MMN-like 
activation elicited by unexpected omission may due to internal noise1. 
In addition to the temporal MMN-like cluster, violations of temporal prediction in the auditory 
isochronous sequence elicited a central-to-frontal positive cluster which was absent in the 
anisochronous sequence. The topographical distribution and the significant time window (176 ms 
to 325 ms after S2 onset) of the later cluster was comparable with P2 auditory ERP component with 
a latency of approximately 150–250 ms (Crowley & Colrain, 2004; Katz, 2014). P2 was found to 
be modulated by deviant auditory stimuli in oddball paradigms and was considered an index of 
stimulus classiﬁcation processes (Canales-Johnson et al., 2015; Novak, Ritter, & Vaughan, 1992). 
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Using auditory anisochronous sequences, unexpected auditory events elicited a late frontal 
negative cluster. The time window and polarity was close to the reorienting negativity (RON) 
reported in a previous study using the temporal oddball paradigm (Roeber, Widmann, & Schröger, 
2003). In that study, participants were asked to discriminate spatial location of auditory stimuli and 
ignored infrequent changes of stimulus presentation duration. The result showed a larger RON 
elicited by infrequent duration (deviant) suggesting a re-orientation from the detected change to the 
original attentional focus. This RON-like component in the current study was only present in 
anisochronous auditory sequences, suggesting that the rhythmic structure in the isochronous 
sequence may serve a function in maintaining participants’ attention to the stimulus sequence and 
preventing distractions from temporally unexpected events.  
Unexpected visual inputs elicited a central-to-frontal positive cluster. The topographical 
distribution and time window (256-430 ms after S2 onset) is close to the p300, more specifically 
p3a, component found using passive oddball paradigms and considered an index of an automatic 
orienting to novel and salient stimulus features (Polich, 2007). Interestingly, instead of this positive 
cluster, we found that unexpected visual omission elicited an earlier central-to-frontal negative 
cluster suggesting distinct neural activities during computations of prediction errors caused by 
actual visual inputs and absences.  
Unexpected visual omissions in the visual anisochronous sequence elicited a late cluster pair. 
To our knowledge, no previous study has reported similar late ERP components using visual 
temporal oddball designs. The very late component may reflect higher-order cognitive processes, 
e.g. attention reorientation, sensory updating, or error correction (Horváth, Roeber, & Schröger, 
2009; Schröger & Wolff, 1998; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). Further research is needed to 
elucidate the functional rule of this effect in predictive processing.  
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4.4.4 Auditory and visual information differ in  duration prediction access time 
Our data showed a longer neural response latency for unexpected visual than auditory events. 
This suggests that visual information takes longer to access temporal predictive processes than 
auditory information. When examining the latency difference (the onset of the first significant time 
window) from unexpected sensory input, ERP analyses and MVPA showed 179ms (406ms – 
227ms) and 125ms (375ms – 250ms) delays between visual and auditory evoked responses, 
respectively. The temporal generalisation analyses on data from auditory and visual sequences 
showed averages of 131ms (trained on auditory and tested on visual data) and 142ms (trained on 
visual and tested on auditory data). These results indicate that access to temporal predictive 
processing for visual information was, at least, 125ms slower than auditory information. This 
difference was longer than previous studies showing that brain responses occur roughly 30ms to 
50ms earlier for the auditory signal (A. J. King & Palmer, 1985; Regan, 1989). Therefore, the larger 
difference gives a rough estimate of the difference in processing time (~100 ms longer for vision) 
for generating predications for auditory and visual duration information. However, it is important 
to note that, in the current design, we did not  make any attempt to equate the saliency and intensity 
level of the visual and auditory stimuli, properties which have been shown to affect sensory 
information processing speed (Nissen, 1977; Töllner, Zehetleitner, Gramann, & Müller, 2011). 
Further research is needed to evaluate the impact of stimulus saliency on duration prediction 
processing speed across sensory domains. Future studies should test this idea more thoroughly by 
examining whether temporal predictions consider knowledge about processing latencies when 
standard and deviant durations are presented in different modalities, for example, presenting the 
standard duration in audition and the deviant in vision, or vice versa. 
Interestingly, when examining the difference in neural response latency between unexpected 
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visual and auditory omissions, the result showed a similar latency difference of 180ms (383ms – 
203ms), even though the inputs were physically the same (no input presented). This result is 
consistent with previous studies on unexpected omission (NITTONO, 2005; Simson, Vaughan Jr., 
& Walter, 1976), suggesting that neural processing of temporal prediction takes modality-specific 
latencies of information processing into account.  
4.4.5 Neural response to unexpected omission 
In the current study, we found asymmetrical neural responses between unexpected sensory 
inputs and unexpected omissions. This finding replicates previous studies in finding a difference 
between “increment” (deviant intervals are longer than standard intervals) and “decrement” 
(deviant intervals are shorter than standard intervals) temporal MMN. (Takegata et al., 2008). A 
parsimonious explanation is the presence of internal noise within the temporal predictive 
processing mechanisms. In the current experiment, the unexpected sensory inputs were perfectly 
time-locked 150ms after S1 onset time. Therefore, neural responses elicited by unexpected sensory 
inputs would be expected to be triggered at similar timing across trials. However, the onset time of 
neural responses to unexpected omissions must be determined by only predictions for S2 onset time. 
Consequently, by contrast with unexpected sensory inputs, the onset time of neural responses to 
unexpected omissions is more susceptible to noise within the predictive processing mechanisms 
generating predictions of S2. This may result in larger variance in the time course of the neural 
responses across trials. Our data showed convergent results supporting this possibility. First, we 
expected that temporal prediction of S2 onset time would occur earlier in some trials and lead to 
earlier onset time due to the internal noise1. Both our data and the data from Takegata et al (2008) 
showed, in most analyses, that the onset time of the mismatch response to unexpected omission was 
earlier than for unexpected sensory input (see Table 1 and Table 1 in Takegata et al 2008). Second, 
134 
 
 
we expected a smaller effect size for unexpected omission than unexpected sensory input due to the 
variance of temporal predictions of S2 onset time across trials. Both our data and Takegata et al 
2008 are consistent with this prediction (see Table 1 in Takegata et al 2008). Third, we directly 
examined an internal noise account using the within condition temporal generalisation analyses. 
The results showed that temporal generalisation patterns were notably broader in unexpected 
omission than in unexpected sensory input. This result indicates that the neural response pattern 
elicited by unexpected omissions can be found at other time points within a broader temporal 
window, suggesting less temporal specificity of neural response to unexpected omissions across 
trials. In sum, our results suggest that the neural processes that rely only on internal prediction to 
detect prediction violations are more vulnerable to internal noise and cause larger temporal 
variation in neural dynamic across experimental trials. 
Standard vs Deviant 
 
ERP 
 
MVPA 
  
unexpected 
sensory input 
unexpected 
omission   
unexpected  
sensory input 
unexpected 
omission 
A-ISO 227 217 
 
203 188 
A-ANISO 227 N.A. 
 
252 203 
V-ANISO 406 352  375 382 
Table 1 The first significant time points of neural responses elicited by violation of temporal 
predictions in ERP analyses and MVPA 
4.4.6 Null results in this study 
The null results I presented in this chapter should be interpreted with caution. A more 
reasonable way to present these null results is to provide Bayes factors. However, because all the 
statistical tests in this chapter were performed by the cluster-based permutation analysis with 
Monte Carlo randomization, I cannot derive an intuitive way to compute Bayes factors. Future 
research is needed to develop Bayesian statistics for cluster-based permutation analysis.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
Complex human behaviour requires the ability to make predictions about the temporal 
properties of events occurring in the environment. Our findings demonstrate that humans can 
acquire and maintain predictions specifically related to duration, in the absence of rhythmic 
information. We further showed that similar processing components are present when a prediction 
of duration is violated regardless of presentation modality, indicating that processing of prediction 
for duration occurs supramodally. Our data suggest that duration as a property of sensory events 
can be encoded and used to generate predictions, and further, that the associated temporal 
predictive mechanisms are shared across sensory modality, in line with a general predictive 
processing framework for perception. 
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Chapter 5 
General Discussion 
In this chapter, I will first summarise the results of my three studies (Chapter 2, 3, 4) and 
interpret them in my three key research questions according to the predictive processing framework. 
I will move on to discuss the time course of regularity learning and neural signatures of predictive 
processing in an integrated view across the three current studies. In the final section, I will discuss 
limitations of this thesis. 
5.1 Overview of findings 
5.1.1 Cross-modal prediction changes the timing of conscious access during motion-induced 
blindness 
Chapter 2 investigated the relationship between predictive processing and conscious content. I 
examined whether predictions of visual events by auditory cues facilitated conscious access to 
visual stimuli. I trained participants to learn associations between auditory cues and colour 
changes. I then asked whether congruency between auditory cues and target colours would speed 
access to consciousness. I did this by rendering a visual target subjectively invisible using 
motion-induced blindness and then gradually changing its colour while presenting congruent or 
incongruent auditory cues. Results showed that the visual target gained access to consciousness 
faster in congruent compared to incongruent trials; a control condition excluded the potential 
confounds of attention and motor responses influencing the results. The expectation effect was 
gradually established over successive blocks suggesting a role for extensive training in 
accelerating conscious access. These findings indicate that predictions learned through 
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cross-modal training can facilitate conscious access to visual stimuli, lending support to predictive 
processing frameworks of perception (Clark, 2012; Friston, 2005; Rao & Ballard, 1999). Within 
the context of these predictive processing frameworks perceptual content is determined by 
probabilistic inference of the most likely external causes of sensory signals. The data from this 
Chapter supports the view that conscious access occurs when predictive models are verified against 
sensory inputs leading to the prediction errors being minimized. The results are also consistent with 
previous findings showing that valid expectation can accelerate conscious access of supressed 
visual contents using continuous flash suppression (Pinto et al., 2015) and shift a 
neurophysiological signature of conscious awareness to an earlier time point (Melloni et al., 2011). 
I suggest that effective predictive cues in this study facilitated the validation of predictive models 
with sensory signals, leading to more rapid conscious access for this sensory information. 
Furthermore, the present results extend the predictive processing framework by showing how 
predictive influences on perception develop across time due to training, and by underlining the 
flexibility of these influences by demonstrating their efficacy using cross-modal arbitrary 
associations. Together these results suggest that predictive influences may permeate and shape 
conscious experiences more deeply and broadly than previously thought.  
5.1.2 Visual Perceptual Echo Reflects Learning of Temporal Regularities in Rapid Luminance 
Sequences 
In Chapter 3, I investigated predictive processing for low-level visual features via unconscious 
visual sequence learning. A sign that the visual system actively processes and predicts sensory 
signals is revealed by the recently discovered ‘perceptual echo’, in which the cross-correlation 
between a sequence of randomly fluctuating luminance values and electrophysiological (EEG) 
signals exhibits a long-lasting periodic (~100ms cycle) reverberation of the input stimulus 
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(VanRullen & Macdonald, 2012). I hypothesised that the perceptual echo may reflect a periodic 
process associated with regularity learning using predictive processing. In two experiments and a 
simulation, I investigated the functional relevance of the perceptual echo response, testing the 
hypothesis that it reflects a predictive processing mechanism which can encode and learn dynamic 
visual sequences within the visual cortex. 
In Experiment 1, I found that the perceptual echo response was enhanced by repetitions of an 
identical rapid luminance sequence, indicating that the information about such sequences is 
encoded by the visual system. Control analyses using shuffled data excluded the possibility that 
increases in perceptual amplitude could be attributed to general changes in induced alpha-band 
EEG responses resulting from sequence repetitions. 
Experiment 2 first replicated the main finding of Experiment 1, that echo amplitude increases 
with successive presentations of a random dynamic luminance sequence, and confirmed that the 
perceptual echo reflected specific sequence information. Following 4 presentations of a specific 
sequence I compared the echo response elicited by a 5th presentation with that elicited by an 
‘inverse’ sequence, which preserved all non-sequential spectral and temporal properties of the 
original sequence. Strikingly, the echo amplitude for the inverse sequence returned to a level 
comparable to presentation of a novel sequence, while a 5th presentation of a non-inverse sequence 
continued to elicit a strong echo response. I also found that information about an encoded sequence 
persisted over 9 seconds and was robust to intervening visual input, by showing that the echo 
response to a re-presented (non-inverse) sequence, following an inverse sequence, recovered to a 
level indistinguishable from a 6th successive presentation of a given luminance sequence. 
To investigate the perceptual echo further I created a predictive processing model, inspired by 
the Kalman filter (Kalman, 1960), to simulate key features of the perceptual echo. This model 
provided a computational account of how a predictive coding system may generate the perceptual 
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echo and also provided insights into the temporal dynamics and morphology of the echo response. 
The results of this study results extend those of VanRullen & Macdonald (2012) by providing a 
functional account of the perceptual echo response, demonstrating that it reflects a neural index of 
the encoding of fast-changing dynamic luminance sequences. 
Altogether, this data indicates that human visual areas are capable of rapidly encoding 
fast-changing dynamic stimuli that appear to be governed by the predictive processing framework, 
this process being reflected by the perceptual echo. This information persists in the visual system 
for at least 9 seconds, even in the presence of novel intervening sensory input. 
5.1.3 The neural correlates of temporal predictive mechanisms based on interval timing 
Chapter 4 investigated the neural correlates of temporal predictive processing in a temporal 
oddball design using EEG. The interpretation of previous findings using temporal oddball designs 
to study temporal predictions about interval is complicated due to the use of fixed 
inter-trial-intervals (ITI), which inevitably confound temporal predictions based on rhythmic 
information with those based on duration per se. I hypothesized that violations of predictions about 
temporal intervals (non-rhythmic) could also elicit neural responses related to temporal (rhythmic) 
violations.  
With ERP analyses and MVPA, I found that without rhythmic information in the sequence 
structure violation of prediction about temporal intervals still elicited neural responses related to 
temporal violations. This finding suggests the existence of specific neural correlates of temporal 
prediction that are based on interval timing. In addition, I also found a unique ERP component 
related to rhythmic sequence structures. I further found a central-to-frontal positive ERP 
component with a larger but similar amplitude when the sequence contained both interval and 
rhythmic information, compared to sequences with only an interval prediction. This finding 
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suggests a unified predictive mechanism that integrates both interval and rhythmic information to 
make more precise temporal predictions about incoming events.  
I further investigated whether the neural mechanisms for temporal prediction are modality 
specific or supra-modal. Using temporal generalisation analysis (J.-R. King & Dehaene, 2014), I 
found that the neural response patterns elicited by violation of predictions about auditory temporal 
intervals at earlier time points were similar to those elicited by violation of prediction about visual 
temporal intervals at later time points. Even though the information processing speeds are very 
different between these modalities, the results from the temporal generalisation analysis (TGA) that 
predictive information from auditory and visual temporal intervals can be acquired through a 
supra-modal predictive mechanism and can be used to generate predictions about both auditory and 
visual events.   
In summary, combining traditional univariate ERP analyses with MVPA and TGA, I 
successfully identified neural correlates of prediction for temporal intervals (independently of 
rhythm) and revealed the supra-modal nature of the temporal predictive mechanism. In general, 
with multivariate approaches, neural responses to the violation of temporal predictions can be 
detected in longer time windows suggesting that temporal predictions that influence neural 
processes are more profound than previously thought. 
5.2 Thesis research questions: 
5.2.1 Predictive processing, conscious access and unconscious inference  
Overall, the experimental results of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 support the notion that neural 
computations of predictive processing mainly operate unconsciously. This finding fits traditional 
interpretations of predictive processing, an implementation of the Bayesian brain hypothesis, 
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which generally posits “perception as unconscious inference” (Gregory, 1980; Helmholtz, 1866; 
MacKay, 1956; Neisser, 1967; Rock, 1983). According to this view information processing and 
computation for perception occurs at the unconscious level. Only the final decision of statistical 
inference reaches conscious awareness and forms the content of conscious experience. In Chapter 2, 
visual information was supressed during the MIB state. However, I found that cross-modal 
predictive information can nevertheless facilitate conscious access of visual information supressed 
under the MIB state, suggesting an unconscious integration between cross-modal predictive 
information and supressed visual information. These results confirm traditional predictive 
processing concepts, that information integration and computations associated with perceptual 
inference operate at the unconscious level, with only the final result of this inference being 
accessible consciously. 
Note that Chapter 2 only examined the impact on conscious access from predictive 
information learned from a simple cross-modal association. Whether other types of predictive 
information (e.g., information represented at higher levels in the sensory hierarchy) are also 
processed and computed at the unconscious level is still unknown. I will discuss this limitation in 
the following Limitations and Future Research Section.  
The MIB study was also designed to assess how cross-modal predictions can influence the 
timing of access to subjectively suppressed (unconscious) visual information. Previous studies that 
have investigated how valid predictive cues accelerate conscious perception across modalities have 
focused on the predictions between long-term representations, e.g. semantic-object identity (Y.-C. 
Chen et al., 2011; Lupyan & Ward, 2013), audio-visual speech (Alsius & Munhall, 2013; T. D. 
Palmer & Ramsey, 2012b) or motion integration (Conrad et al., 2010). For example, Conrad and 
colleagues show that, in binocular rivalry, motion sounds can stabilise and lengthen dominance 
periods for congruent visual motion (Conrad et al., 2010). Similarly, Chen, Yeh, and Spence found 
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that auditory cues shortened the suppression period of congruent visual objects (Y.-C. Chen et al., 
2011). In contrast to these findings, the present study further showed that predictive information 
learned through short-term, flexible, and learned associations demonstrated a similar impact on 
conscious perception. Taken together, these findings suggest that cross-modal predictive 
information exerts substantial influences on unconscious statistical inference, conscious perception, 
and their interaction.  
I theorized that the validity of the predictive information provides different prior information 
for visual perceptual inference and therefore should affect the inference process. Valid predictive 
information should accelerate conscious access as the result of unconscious inference, biasing the 
inference to rapidly arrive at the “correct result” and therefore minimizing the prediction error. 
Supporting this theory, I found that predictions that were in line with sensory evidence accelerate 
conscious access. This finding is comparable with previous research showing that perceptual 
decision criteria shift in different directions based on congruency between perceptual expectations 
and actual sensory inputs, suggesting decision bias in unconscious inference (Sherman et al., 
2015).These results extend the theoretical knowledge about how predictive information affects 
conscious access by showing how predictive influences on unconscious perceptual inference 
develop across time as the result of training. . 
In Chapter 3, I found that in two experiments, all participants were unaware of repetitions of 
luminance sequences although the amplitude of the perceptual echo was still able to reveal the 
effects of sequence learning. From a predictive processing perspective, after the first presentation 
of a sequence, an interpretation might be that the specific sequence information is encoded as  
prior knowledge and modulates the perceptual echo in subsequent presentations of the same 
sequence. The fact that participants failed to explicitly recognise sequence patterns suggests that 
the sequence knowledge (prior) and the computations underlying the perceptual echo were 
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unconscious in nature. Furthermore, we observed a peak echo response at approximately 400ms 
post stimulus onset, suggesting that the visual system was able to detect repetitions of a specific 
sequence extremely rapidly, within half a second. This result points to the rapid integration between 
prior knowledge and current sensory signals that operates at an unconscious level. Additionally, we 
found that the encoded sequence information can persist over many seconds even in the presence of 
additional intervening sensory input. This finding highlights a number of interesting observations, 
firstly that sequence specific information (prior knowledge) had been encoded by the visual system 
unconsciously, an observation supported by the fact that the results of unconscious inference are 
still available over 9 seconds after the original sequence was presented. Secondly, that the results of 
unconscious inference between sensory input and prior occurred in this study extremely rapidly, by 
approximately 400ms. Note that due to the limitation of the current design, this study did not assess 
the impact from the rapid unconscious inference on conscious perception of the luminance changes. 
Further research is needed to examine how prior knowledge sequence patterns influences 
conscious luminance perception.  
A central question of this thesis has been to explore the relationship between unconscious 
statistical inference reflected by predictive processing and conscious access. This thesis has added 
to our understanding of this question by demonstrating that predictive information is processed 
unconsciously, and that this information can influence unconscious inference speeding conscious 
access. 
5.2.2 Differing levels of information within the predictive processing framework 
As mentioned in the introduction hierarchical predictive coding is capable of encoding a wide 
range of information types from concrete to abstract. This framework predicts that in humans both 
low and high level information should operate through the same predictive processing mechanisms. 
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The studies in this thesis were designed to manipulate the level of information presented and 
examine predictive mechanisms across these different levels of sensory information. Chapter 3, 
used low-level sensory information (luminance), Chapter 2 used cross-modal information 
(auditory-visual) while Chapter 4 utilized supra-modal information (temporal duration).  
In Chapter 3, I found increases in echo amplitude with successive repetitions of a sequence 
demonstrating that participants were implicitly learning information about each sequence, which 
may reflect perceptual predictions (priors) being updated with the presentation of each sequence. 
The results of modelling this process (Section 3.3) suggests that the echo response reflects an 
iterative process that updates priors about the luminance dynamics of a sequence, communicating 
perceptual predictions at rate defined by the alpha frequency band. Taken together the findings of 
Chapter 3 support the idea that predictive processing may operate using low-level visual 
information.  
Chapter 2 demonstrated that a visual target gains access to consciousness faster when 
cross-modal predictions are congruent with the supressed visual inputs. The result is in line with 
the view that predictive processing in the neural system is organised in a hierarchical manner in 
which high-level units integrate information across modalities and generate top-down predictions 
about modality-specific sensory data (Altieri, 2014; Arnal, Wyart, & Giraud, 2011). Previous 
research on Bayesian brain hypothesis has emphasised the importance of cross-modal perceptual 
inference (Deneve & Pouget, 2004; Ernst & Banks, 2002; Körding et al., 2007; Shams & 
Beierholm, 2010). Because an external event typically causes multimodal information which can 
be perceived by multiple sensory channels, perceptual inference should consider information 
across modalities to accurately infer the sensory cause. In the predictive coding framework, 
information from one modality can be used to establish prior of sensory causes and generate precise 
predictions about sensory inputs from another modality. Therefore, prediction about sensory inputs 
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can be effectively constrained (Alais & Burr, 2004) by cross-modal predictive information. The 
current result suggests that cross-modal predictive processing exists in the sensory hierarchy and 
facilitate perceptual inference by using predictive information from different modalities. 
Chapter 4 showed that when an infrequent temporal duration was presented either by visual or 
auditory modalities the surprise EEG response pattern contained similar and decodable 
topographical information, suggesting a common predictive mechanism tracking temporal duration 
regularities across modalities. The result point to a high-level predictive mechanism which operates 
on abstract supra-modal temporal information that is not modality specific.  
Collectively, the results of this thesis answer one of my primary research questions by 
showing that predictive processing appears to operate across differing levels of sensory information, 
low-level, cross-modal, and supra-modal.  
5.2.3 Regularity learning within the predictive processing framework 
How are differing forms of regularity learning used to make predictions about future events 
within the predictive processing framework? This thesis examined predictive processing via three 
common types of regulatory leaning utilized in previous studies from psychology and neuroscience. 
Chapter 2 focused on predictive processing using extensive training to establish predicative 
relationships between cross modal information. The results showed that cross-modal predictive 
cues accelerated time to conscious access – but only after extensive training associating specific 
visual and auditory stimuli. I found a linear relationship between the amount of training and the 
degree of facilitation, highlighting that the learning of predictive associations can regulate their 
influence on the timing of conscious access. The results showed how predictive associations 
develop across time as the result of extensive associative training and how this influences 
conscious perception. Note that, as discussed in Chapter 2, although this training is extensive it is 
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still much shorter as compared to the long-term bound representations, e.g. semantic-object 
identity and audio-visual speech.  
The results of Chapter 3 showed that the human visual system is capable of rapidly and 
automatically encoding and learning temporal regularities embedded within fast-changing dynamic 
stimulus sequences. This study showed an enhancement of the perceptual echo due to sequence 
repetition, suggesting the involvement of predictive processing in low-level sequence learning. 
In Chapter 4 I identified the neural correlates of predictive mechanisms that tracks temporal 
duration regularities. The temporal predictive mechanisms were able to acquire the predictive 
temporal information from duration repetition in a duration oddball paradigm. Based on the 
temporal information it was able to make temporal predictions about future sensory inputs. 
Previous studies on temporal duration using duration oddball paradigm have always suffered from 
a fundamental confound of having two types of temporal information embedded within the 
paradigm, rhythmic and duration information. This experiment successfully isolated and identified 
the neural responses relating to temporal duration tracking within this paradigm, independently of 
rhythmic information. The findings of this study suggest that predictive mechanisms are involved 
in detecting, extracting, and learning regularities from repetitions of abstract sensory information in 
the environment, in this case the temporal duration between sensory events. 
Together these studies suggest that predictive mechanisms use distinct types of regularity 
learning to generate valid predictions about future events.  
5.3 The time course of regularity learning and conscious access within predictive 
processing 
The EEG results of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 showed that the neural signatures of sequence and 
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duration regularity learning can be detected within seconds. Chapter 3 showed that the echo 
enhancement due to sequence repetition linearly increased and rapidly became observable, 
reaching significance after 4 successive presentations of the same sequence. My data suggests that 
the regularities encompassing a given sequence was encoded by the 4th repetition (around 24.5 s). 
This finding is compatible with the learning of random noise sequences in the auditory domain 
(Agus et al., 2010). In their study Agus et al., demonstrate that the human auditory system can 
rapidly learn temporal sequence (1s) properties of a random and meaningless input signal 
(Gaussian random noise) within 10 repetitions (Agus et al., 2010).  
Chapter 4 showed that the neural responses of temporal prediction violations were able to be 
detected using a sequence with 4:1 standard and deviant duration ratio which has often been used in 
previous MMN studies (Näätänen, Pakarinen, Rinne, & Takegata, 2004). Previous research using 
the odd-ball paradigm has shown that the MMN elicited by a deviant stimulus is detectable after 
just a few repetitions of the standard stimuli (Baldeweg, Klugman, Gruzelier, & Hirsch, 2004; 
Haenschel, 2005). For example, the MMN latency decreases with only two repetitions of deviant 
stimuli after over 30 repetitions of standard stimuli (Liégeois-Chauvel, Musolino, Badier, Marquis, 
& Chauvel, 1994). These results suggest that the mechanism of regularity learning underlying 
MMN can be elicited with just a few repetitions.  
Together, the regularity learning of sequence repetition in Chapter 3 and acquisition of 
temporal information from duration repetition in Chapter 4 suggests a short-term, flexible, and 
adaptive mechanism that operates in the timescale of seconds. However, Chapter 2 showed that the 
facilitation of conscious access caused by predictive information was gradually established over a 
much larger time-scale using cross-modal associative training, suggesting that the impact on 
conscious access is through a long-term (at least several minutes) regularity and extensive (tens to 
hundreds samples) learning process.   
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What are the possible reasons behind the differences in the timescale of regularity learning 
found in this thesis? 
One possibility is that predictive processing underlying the results of Chapter 2 compared to 
Chapters 3 and 4 used different prior knowledge acquired from regularity learning. The regularities 
in the environment between chapters may have been extracted by different predictive processing 
systems working at different time scales. This notion is compatible with the taxonomy of sensory 
expectation proposed by Seriès and Seitz, who suggest two different categories of sensory 
expectation. (Seriès & Seitz, 2013). Seriès and Seitz described the two types of expectation as 
contextual and structural expectations (Figure 5-1): 
“Structural expectations are the ‘default’ expectations that human observers use based on 
implicit learning of the statistics of the natural environment. These expectations usually reﬂect 
long-term learning over the lifetime, or may be innate… Contextual expectations, on the other hand, 
can be manipulated rapidly, explicitly or implicitly, through sensory, or by the spatial, temporal, or 
stimulus context in which a stimulus is shown” (Seriès & Seitz, 2013, p. 2). 
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Figure 5-1 Structural vs. contextual expectations. (A) Our priors tells us that light must come from 
the top of the figure, known as the “light-from-above” prior. Therefore, this percept is biased by a 
long-term prior knowledge of the light direction (structural expectation). (B) This ambiguous and 
bistable figure was more frequently perceived as a duck, rather than the alternative (a rabbit) due 
being paired with the presentation of a prime of flying ducks. This biased percept shows the 
short-term influence from the context (context expectation). (figure adapted from Seriès & Seitz, 
2013). 
Following from this perspective, the associative learning used in the MIB study in Chapter 2 
may have caused structural expectations to develop, which were established through extensive 
training between the auditory cue and the colour of the target. Through the intensive exposure of 
the contingency between auditory and visual stimuli, the neural system may have built firm 
long-term knowledge of the cross-modal regularity. In contrast the sequence and duration 
repetitions in Chapter 3 and 4 may have formed a temporary context across stimuli leading to a 
short-term, flexible contextual expectation. The contextual expectation quickly adapts to the new 
context, as shown by the rapid enhancement of the echo response to a new stimulus sequence found 
in Chapter 3. The new sequence immediately re-established the linear enhancement of echo 
response. Similarly, the results of Chapter 4 demonstrate that the MMN can quickly adapt to new 
stimulus features. A deviant duration can immediately change the neural response elicited by the 
following standard duration, suggesting that at least for the MMN neural systems can very rapidly 
form contextual expectations. Note that, although the associative training described in Chapter 2 is 
extensive, whether the training is able to establish a firm structural expectation (e.g., the light from 
above effect) is still unknown. Future research is needed to clarify how extensive training 
influences structural expectations.  
Together the results of this thesis show that the time course of regularity learning varied across 
experiments. This may have been due to the differing structural and contextual expectations 
developed by each experimental manipulation. I suggest that the change of conscious access speed 
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found in Chapter 2 may be affected by structural expectations that are developed by a large amount 
of learning, such as the associative training used in the MIB experiment in Chapter 2. 
5.4  The neural signatures of predictive processing may not always be dissociable 
Previous neurophysiological evidence of predictive processing has mainly focused on the 
neural correlates of the prediction error (See review in Bastos et al., 2012; Karl Friston, 2005). That 
is, if neural responses are enhanced when predictions are inconsistent with sensory inputs, the 
activities are considered to represent prediction errors. Evidence for this claim has been found in 
human EEG and MEG (Baldeweg, 2006; Khouri & Nelken, 2015; Stefanics et al., 2014, p. 2; István 
Winkler & Czigler, 2012), human fMRI (Alink, Schwiedrzik, Kohler, Singer, & Muckli, 2010; Kok 
& de Lange, 2014; Summerfield & Egner, 2009), and also at the neuronal level in an animal study 
(Keller, Bonhoeffer, & Hübener, 2012). Consistent with these findings, Chapter 4 showed that 
when sensory events were presented at unexpected timing (the deviant duration) the EEG signal 
showed a large deflection, which I suggest represents a neural signature of the prediction error.  
However, Chapter 3 shows that the perceptual echo, a potential neurophysiological index of 
low-level visual predictive mechanism, was enhanced by repetitions of a stimulus sequence. 
Furthermore, the enhancement was not associated with a power change in the raw EEG alpha 
oscillation. As discussed in Section 3.4, this result suggests that the activation level of raw neural 
responses (raw EEG alpha) in this low-level visual predictive processing were not modulated by 
the predictability of sensory inputs. The enhancement of perceptual echo by sequence repetitions 
was more likely caused by the increasing similarity between sequence specific information 
(luminance) and the evoked EEG response (see 3.4). As mentioned in the Chapter 3, this effect can 
be thought of as sharpening of the neural assemblies encoding the visual sequences in order to form 
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a more precise representation of the sequence. The central assumptions of the model created in 
Chapter 3 also suggests that the simulated EEG signals was modulated not only by prediction error 
computation but also by neural activity representing the prediction of luminance values.  
Taken together, the results of Chapter 3 suggest that the prediction and prediction error 
neurons may be spatially indistinguishable using a spatially coarse neural imaging method, such as 
EEG. Previous research has shown that neurons responsible for prediction and prediction error 
computations can be found within the same cortical areas. For example, in a mouse study, Keller, 
Bonhoeffer, and Hübener (2012) investigated predictive neural signals from motor areas and 
prediction error signals in the primary visual cortex by manipulating visual-ﬂow feedback during 
locomotion in a virtual reality environment using two-photon imaging of neurons expressing a 
genetically encoded calcium indicator. The results showed that neural activates in mouse primary 
visual cortex were driven by locomotion and by the mismatch between actual and expected visual 
feedback, suggesting that mouse early visual areas are involved with both predictions and 
prediction error computations. More importantly, the result showed no indications for spatial 
clustering of different response types, confirming that different neural indexes of predictive 
processing would not be dissociable using scalp recorded EEG.  
In summary, the results of this thesis related to the perceptual echo demonstrates that the 
neural evidence of predictive processing may not always be revealed by prediction error activity 
alone. In the case of the perceptual echo I did not observe an increase in neural activity (alpha 
oscillation) as would be expected with a prediction error when a new sequence was presented. 
Therefore, it is possible to observe neural indexes of predictive processing without an explicit 
prediction error signal. 
Future research requires more sophisticated methods of data analysis to validate the predictive 
processing framework across multiple experiments. Promising methods have already been applied 
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to this aim. For example, Garrido et al. showed that MMN, an index of prediction error, could be 
explained by changes in the strength of the functional connectivity between cortical sources 
(Garrido et al., 2008). Additionally, Arnal et al. found, using MEG, that delta neural oscillations (3–
4 Hz) conveyed prediction signals from higher-order speech areas, while low-beta (14–15 Hz) / 
high-gamma (60–80 Hz) coupling represented prediction errors within multisensory areas (Arnal et 
al., 2011; see also Sedley et al., 2016).  
5.5 Limitations and future research  
5.5.1 How does the method of acquisition of predictive information affect predictive processing?  
Participants in all the studies within this thesis acquired predictive information from exposure 
to environmental regularities manipulated experimentally. This thesis focused on experimental 
manipulations which meant that predictive information and the statistical regularities had to be 
spontaneously extracted and learned from the experimental environments.  In Chapter 2, 
participants learned statistical relationships between auditory cues and visual targets from intensive 
associative learning training. In Chapter 3, participants were not informed about the repetitions of 
luminance sequences and when probed about their experiences in the study reported that they were 
unaware of any repetitions throughout the whole experiments. In Chapter 4, participants were not 
informed about the statistical structure of standard and deviant trials. However, in real life, 
predictive information is not always learned through the statistical structure of external events. 
Instead, humans are able to learn and update prior knowledge and predictive relationships by other 
means, for example verbal instruction. To my knowledge, no study has been conducted to 
systematically investigate the difference of using prior knowledge learned from exposure to 
statistical regularities compared to explicit linguistic information about the same predictive 
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relationship.  
Nevertheless, some behavioural and neural evidence suggests that neural systems processes 
predictive information acquired through different routes in dissimilar ways. For example, linguistic 
rules when learning a second language (L2) can be acquired either by exposure to form implicit 
knowledge or by overtly being taught the form explicit knowledge (Ellis, 2005). Hulstijn (2002) 
suggests that implicit and explicit L2 knowledge involve different acquisition mechanisms that are 
represented in different brain areas (Paradis, 1994), and the different types of L2 knowledge need to 
be accessed by different tasks (Ellis, 2005). Additional support for the idea that predictive 
information may be processed in differing ways comes from imaging studies that find that implicit 
and explicit predictive knowledge induces different neural responses. In a fMRI study by 
Aizenstein et al. participants viewed consecutive sequences consisting of a series of items with two 
attributes, colour and location (Aizenstein et al., 2004). Participants were required to press different 
buttons according to the colour or shape of an item. The colours and shapes of items were 
determined independently and follow two different first-order Markov chains. Participants were 
only informed about the existence of the statistical relationship of one stimulus feature and 
responded to it as quickly as possible (task-relevant) and learned the sequence rule of the other 
feature (task-irrelevant) implicitly through exposure. The results showed that when the 
task-relevant feature was consistent with predictions that were generated from explicit knowledge, 
visual regions (V1, V2, and V3) showed increased activity. Interestingly, when the task-irrelevant 
features were consistent with predictions from implicit knowledge, the same visual regions showed 
decreased activity. These results suggest that different neural mechanisms were involved in 
predictive processing when using explicit and implicit knowledge.  
Taken together, future behavioural and imaging studies should consider the impact of 
explicitly and implicitly learned knowledge in the predictive processing framework. More research 
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is needed to systematically examine how different prior knowledge influences the neural 
computation of prediction and how the route of the acquisition of statistical regularities affects how 
the brain processes this information.  
 
5.5.2 Can sequence knowledge become conscious? 
Chapter 3 showed that sequence repetitions linearly enhanced perceptual echo amplitude in 
the absence of awareness of the sequence repetitions. This suggests that the human visual system 
encodes knowledge of dynamic luminance sequences unconsciously, even when a sequence was 
repeated up to 6 times. However, the current study did not test whether this implicit knowledge may 
become explicit with many more repetitions of a sequence.  
Previous research has demonstrated that humans are capable of learning implicit sequence 
knowledge underlying motor, cognitive and even social skills (Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 
1998; Kaufman et al., 2010; Lieberman, 2000; Nemeth et al., 2011; Romano Bergstrom, Howard, 
& Howard, 2012). However, some evidence suggests, after repeated exposures of a stimulus 
sequence, human subjects may be able to acquire explicit knowledge of the sequence presentation 
rules. A classic example of this phenomenon can be found in the serial reaction time task 
(Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991; Knopman & Nissen, 1987; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; Peigneux 
et al., 2000, 2003; Willingham, Nissen, & Bullemer, 1989). In this task, subjects are required to 
respond as fast and as accurately as possible to the appearance of a target stimulus arranged 
horizontally on a screen by pressing the spatially corresponding key. Without informing the 
participants, the order of target locations used in these studies follows deterministic, probabilistic, 
or grammatical rules. After a short training period on these tasks, participants generally improve 
their reaction times without being able to explicitly describe the rules that determine the stimulus 
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order, suggesting that they have acquired implicit knowledge about the rules. Interestingly, 
individuals often gain explicit awareness of the sequence in the latter phases of the practice session 
(Nissen & Bullemer, 1987), suggesting that the explicit knowledge system takes more time and 
exposure to acquire the embedded rules of target location.  
The current experimental design of Chapter 3 was not optimised to assess the impact of 
sequence repetition on conscious awareness of these repetitions. Future research to investigate this 
research question should use a behavioural recognition task. For example, Agus et al. investigated 
sequence learning in humans within the auditory domain and demonstrated that the auditory system 
can rapidly learn and form memories of repeated sequences constructed of Gaussian random noise 
(Agus et al., 2010). In this study, participants were instructed to perform a judgment task to report 
whether or not they heard a repetition of an audio clip. The result showed that the learning of 
auditory sequences occurred very rapidly, participants were able to learn a novel sequence in less 
than 10 repetitions. Similarly, previous investigation on artificial grammar learning (Reber, 1967) 
used a binary judgment task to assess conscious knowledge of embedded sequence rules (Dienes & 
Altmann, 1997; Zoltán Dienes & Scott, 2005). Participants are first exposed to sequences generated 
by one grammars (grammar A) in the training phase. In the test phase, sequences generated by 
grammar A and another grammar (grammar B) are randomly presented. Participants are asked to 
classify the test items (A or B). Using the binary judgment task, the basic conscious knowledge of 
artificial grammars embedded in sequences can be examined. A similar experimental design could 
be adopted to evaluate whether human participants were able to acquire explicit knowledge of the 
fast changing dynamic luminance sequences used in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
This thesis investigated the behavioural and neural correlates of predictive processing and 
regularity learning across differing levels of predictive information and conscious access. It has 
demonstrated how predictive influences on conscious access develop across time via training, and 
how they permeate and shape conscious experiences more deeply and broadly than previously 
thought. It provides electrophysiological and modelling evidence that the perceptual echo reflects 
the existence of a previously undiscovered temporal regularity learning and predictive processing 
mechanism. It identified a neural correlate of temporal prediction based on duration processing 
that was shared between visual and auditory sensory predictive processing. 
Overall this thesis has added to our understanding of the relationship between unconscious 
statistical inference and conscious access by demonstrating that predictive information is processed 
unconsciously but can influence conscious access. This thesis has also shown that predictive 
processing operates across differing levels of sensory information, low-level, cross-modal, and 
supra-modal. Finally, this thesis suggests that predictive processing mechanisms use different types 
of regularity learning to generate valid predictions about future events.  
Together this thesis has added to our understanding of predictive processing and regularity 
learning across differing types of predictive information.  
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